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ABSTRACT 
Rwabutaza, Allan Anthony. Ph.D., Department of Computer Science & Engineering, Wright 
State University, 2009. 
A Cryptanalysis Methodology for the Reverse Engineering of Encrypted Information in Images. 
 
 
Security is an important issue related to the storage and communication of data and 
information. In data and information security, cryptography and steganography are two of the 
most common security techniques. On one hand, there is cryptography, which is the secret 
communication between two parties by message scrambling on the sender’s side and message 
unscrambling on the receiver’s side so that only the intended receiver gets the secret message. 
On the other hand, there is steganography, which is the hiding of information in a medium in 
such a way that no one other than the sender or the intended receiver realizes there is a hidden 
message.  Successful reverse engineering of cryptography and steganography give 
cryptanalysis and steganalysis respectively. Cryptography and cryptanalysis constitute 
cryptology (or crypto) while steganography and steganalysis make up steganology (or stegano). 
This dissertation consists of three parts needed for a scientific study of a cryptanalysis problem. 
The first part lays out a comparative survey of various cryptology and steganology techniques 
by analyzing and comparing different methodologies using a set of predefined parameters. This 
part offers valuable knowledge on the state of the art techniques used on cryptanalysis. The 
second part proposes a new lossless synthetic stegano-crypto methodology that blends together 
five cryptography, steganography and compression techniques to form a single methodology 
for mutual information encryption and hiding in images. The methods that compose the 
synthetic methodology are SCAN Encryption, SCAN Compression, SCAN Steganography, 
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Least Significant Bit (LSB) Steganography and Regional Steganography with Segmentation. The 
synthetic methodology plays the role of a complex and difficult technique that we have to work 
on in an attempt to break it by using a reverse engineering approach. In the third part, a 
cryptanalysis attack against the proposed synthetic stegano-crypto methodology is presented in 
order for the important features (weak points) related to the method to be extracted and assist 
in the reverse engineering process of encrypted information in images. 
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PART 1- A CRYPTOLOGY COMPARATIVE SURVEY 
1. Introduction- Cryptology 
Cryptography is the secret communication between two parties by message scrambling on the 
sender‟s side and message unscrambling on the receiver‟s side. An unintended interception of the 
message reveals a scrambled message, which is useless to the attacker. If an attacker undoes this process 
by unscrambling the intercepted unintelligible message to get the intelligible message, then we get 
cryptanalysis, which is the reverse engineering of cryptography. 
Cryptography and cryptanalysis both constitute cryptology. Since cryptanalysis works against 
cryptography, the second section of the paper will look at cryptography, the third will focus on 
cryptanalysis and the fourth will be on the works of contemporary cryptologists. 
Basic Cryptology Concepts 
 Cryptography is the process where an individual or party sends a message to another individual 
or party in a scrambled unintelligible manner such that only the intended party will get the scrambled 
message, which will be unscrambled to get the original message. The reverse engineering of cryptography 
is known as cryptanalysis. Cryptography and cryptanalysis together constitute cryptology. 
A cryptography system is known as a cryptosystem, or a cipher. Any cryptosystem must have a 
sender, plaintext, an enciphering (encrypting) function, an enciphering (encrypting) key, an algorithm, 
ciphertext, a transmission medium, a decrypting (deciphering) function, a decrypting (deciphering) key 
and a receiver (Figure 1). 
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Figure 1: A cryptosystem 
 
Plaintext is the original intelligible message a sender sends to the receiver. In order to scramble 
the plaintext to make it unintelligible to the potential attacker, an algorithm, along with a key, maps the 
plaintext to the unintelligible message known as ciphertext. This plaintext to ciphertext scrambling is 
known as enciphering. An algorithm is a mathematical function that maps one message to another 
message. A key is a variable that gives a unique output map when used with an algorithm.  In 
enciphering, the function is referred to as an enciphering function and the key is referred to as an 
enciphering key. After encryption, the ciphertext is sent through a transmission medium to the receiver. 
When a receiver receives the ciphertext, he reverses the encryption to get the original plaintext. 
This reversing is referred to as deciphering. A deciphering function and a deciphering key are 
synonymous to their corresponding counterparts in encryption. 
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2. Cryptography 
2.1. Types of Cryptography 
There are two types of cryptography: Symmetric (private or secret) key cryptography and 
Asymmetric (public or shared) key cryptography. In symmetric key cryptography, the same key is used to 
decrypt and encrypt the message. While in asymmetric key cryptography, a non-secret public key and a 
secret private key are used to encrypt and decrypt messages respectively. 
2.1.1. Symmetric Key Cryptography 
Symmetric Key Cryptography is the cryptography in which a message is encrypted and decrypted 
using the same secret key. This type of cryptography is the oldest and the most widely understood. It has 
been widely used from the beginning of cryptography up-to-date. 
Some of the advantages of symmetric key cryptography are: it is fast, relatively secure and widely 
understood. On the other hand, symmetric key cryptosystems have shortcomings - They require secret 
sharing, complex administration, and have no authentication or non-repudiation mechanisms. 
Some of the widely used symmetric key cryptography algorithms are DES, Triple-DES, AES, 
IDEA, Blowfish, RC4, CAST, GOST, SKIPJACK and SAFER. 
DES 
Data Encryption Standard (DES) is one of the most widely used cryptography algorithms. It was 
developed by IBM in mid 1970s and published in 1977 by the National Bureau of Standards. DES has a 
key of 8 bytes with 8 bits, one of which is a parity bit to make up an 8 x 7 = 56-bit key. DES is widely 
used in ATM machines. 
21 
 
Triple-DES 
Triple-DES, or DES-EDE (Encrypt-Decrypt-Encrypt), is a variation of DES that incorporates 
three DES applications that make up a 56 x 3 = 168-bit key. The larger the key size, the more secure the 
system. Triple-DES is an attempt to get a more secure system from DES. 
 AES 
Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) is a variable-length key and a variable-length block cipher. 
It was adopted by the US government as an encryption standard. Before beating other five algorithm 
finalists to win the title of AES, it was called Rijdael – named after its Belgian developers, Vincent 
Rijmen and Joan Daemen. It is a successor of DES and is expected to be studied and used widely. 
IDEA 
IDEA (International Data Encryption Standard) is a 128-bit symmetric key block cipher. It was 
developed by James Massey and Xuejia Lai of Switzerland in 1991. IDEA is believed to be more efficient 
in software implementation than DES or triple-DES. 
Blowfish 
Blowfish is a variable-length key, 64-bit block cipher. It was developed by Bruce Schneider in 
1993. The algorithm first expands the key of size between 32 and 448 bits into several sub-key arrays 
totaling 4168 bytes. Then, it encrypts the data through a 16-round Feistel network. A Feistel network 
(named after IBM cryptographer, Horst Feistel) is a block cipher with a particular structure. Blowfish is 
slowly gaining popularity as an alternative to DES. 
RC4 
RC4 (Rivest Cipher #4) is a variable-length key stream cipher developed by Ron Rivest of RSA. 
The export version is only 40-bit; however it is more effective when used with a 128-bit key. RC4 is used 
in browsers, such as Netscape Navigator and Internet Explorer. 
22 
 
CAST 
CAST is a variable-length key, 64-bit block cipher developed by Carlisle Adams and Strafford 
Travares. Typical key lengths are between 40 and 256 bits. Supposedly, CAST runs two to three times 
faster than DES in implementation and runs six to nine times faster than Triple-DES.  CAST is used in 
PGP. 
GOST 
GOST (Government Standard) is a 256-bit key, 64-bit block cipher developed in Russia in 1990. 
Its effective key size can be increased to 768 bits by incorporating additional 512-bit secret information 
from its S-boxes. GOST is a Feistel network of 32 rounds. 
SKIPJACK 
Skipjack is an 80-bit key, 64-bit block cipher developed by NSA. It was meant to be used in a 
Clipper chip used in telephony. But its use in the Clipper chip never gained an acceptance. Therefore, 
Skipjack is more of a theoretical cryptography algorithm than an applied algorithm. 
2.1.2. Asymmetric Key Cryptography 
Asymmetric Key Cryptography is the cryptography in which a message is encrypted using a non-
secret public key, but decrypted using a different secret key, or vice versa. It is a more recent 
cryptosystem. It has been made public just in 1976 when Whitfield Diffie and Martin Hellman of 
Stanford University first introduced its concept. 
Diffie and Hellman were believed to be the pioneers of Asymmetric Key cryptography before the 
British Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ), the equivalent of NSA, claimed to have 
conceived it years earlier and had been using it for years privately. 
Some of the advantages of asymmetric key cryptography are: no secret sharing is necessary; it 
supports authentication and non-repudiation mechanisms; and it is scalable. On the negative side, it is 
slower or computationally intensive and requires certificate authority. 
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Some examples of the asymmetric key cryptosystems are Diffie-Hellman, RSA, DSA and Elliptic 
Curve Cryptography (ECC). 
Diffie-Hellman 
The Diffie-Hellman algorithm is an algorithm based on discrete-logarithm computation problem. 
It was developed by Whitfield Diffie and Martin Hellman at Stanford University. It is the first asymmetric 
key algorithm in use. 
RSA 
RSA (Rivest, Shamir, Adleman) is an algorithm based on a large prime number product 
factorization problem. It was developed by Ron Rivest, Adi Shamir and Len Adleman at MIT. This 
algorithm is the one that is mostly associated with asymmetric key cryptography. Moreover, it was the 
first one to be considered useful for both encryption use and digital signature use. 
DSA 
DSA (Digital Signature Algorithm) is a digital signature algorithm developed as part of the 
Digital Signature Standard (DSS). Unlike previous algorithms, DSA is not an encryption algorithm. 
Elliptic Curve Cryptography 
Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) is an asymmetric key cryptography based on the mathematics 
of Elliptic curves. Elliptic curves are planes with non-singular functions y
2
 = x
3
 + ax + b with no cusps or 
self-intersections. In 1985, Neal Koblitz and Victor Miller saw a potential of the mathematics of elliptic 
curves in cryptography and suggested its use. ECC is now expected to be the next generation algorithm. 
The strength of ECC lies in its computational difficulty in solving elliptic curve discrete logarithm 
problem; and its ability to offer security comparable to RSA algorithms with smaller keys. It is widely 
believed that ECC is more difficult to break than RSA. 
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2.1.3. Hybrid Cryptography 
Hybrid cryptography is the one that uses both symmetric and asymmetric key cryptography. In 
hybrid cryptography, an asymmetric key cryptosystem encrypts the communication used to transmit a 
randomly generated key, which is then used to encrypt the rest of the communication by a symmetric key 
cryptosystem. This cryptosystem harvests both the speed and efficiency of a symmetric cryptosystem and 
a secure key exchange of an asymmetric cryptosystem. Hybrid cryptosystems are found in SSL, SSH and 
PGP. 
2.2. Message Integrity in cryptography 
Encryption alone does not guarantee that the plaintext intended to reach the receiver is exactly the 
same message the receiver gets. To ensure that the message was not altered during transmission, the 
cryptosystem must detect and/ or correct any errors. A hash function technique is one of the techniques 
used to perform such a task. A hash function is a one-way function that works by computing a unique 
fixed-value cryptographic checksum for each unique message. A checksum value before and after 
transmission at both ends must match for „error-free‟ transmission. 
Some of the widely used hashing algorithms are MD4, MD5, SHA-1 and RIPEMD. 
MD4 
MD4 (Message Digest #4) is a 128-bit hash algorithm developed by Ron Rivest of RSA. It is a 
one-way function whose input is a variable-length message and whose output is a 128-bit hash value or 
message digest. It is believed that MD4 has serious weaknesses. Its first two rounds out of three are 
believed to be non-one-way. Thus, MD4 can have collisions. As an improvement, Ron Rivest devised 
MD5. 
 MD5 
MD5 (Message Digest #5) is a 128-bit hash algorithm developed by Ron Rivest of RSA in 1991 
as an improvement of MD4. It operates the same way the MD4 operates except that MD5 covers the 
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collision security holes of the MD4. Despite its improvement on MD4, MD5 has also been shown to have 
another collision security hole in its compression function. Due to MD4 and MD5 weaknesses, the 
cryptography community has suggested the use of other hash functions, like SHA-1. 
SHA-1 
SHA-1 (Secure Hash Algorithm-1) is 160-bit hash algorithm designed by the NSA in 1994 as an 
alternative to MD5. Like MD5, SHA-1 is used for creating digital signatures. It operates the same way 
MD4 and MD5 operate, but is considered to be more secure. However, there have been successful attacks 
against SHA-1. SHA-2 variants, which are successors of SHA-1 are now considered more secure and no 
known successful attacks to date. SHA-1 is used in TLS, SSL, PGP, SSH, S/MIME and IPSec. 
RIPEMD 
RIPEMD (RACE Integrity Primitives Evaluation Message Digest) is a hash algorithm developed 
in Europe by Hans Dobbertin, Antoon Booselaers and Bart Preneel. It was published in 1996. There are 
several versions depending on its bit-length. Some are RIPEMD-128, RIPEMD-160 and RIPEMD-256. 
2.3. Authentication in cryptography 
Message encryption and message integrity are not enough in secret communication, especially if 
highly sensitive information is to be communicated. The communicating parties need to authenticate each 
other‟s identity to make sure they are communicating with the same receiver they intend to communicate 
with. The possibility that the receiver may not be the intended receiver must not be overlooked. Digital 
signatures and digital certificates are some of the techniques used to enforce authentication between 
communicating parties. 
Digital Signature 
A digital signature, also known as a public key digital signature, is a digital authentication 
method analogous to a physical paper signature, implemented using public-key cryptography techniques. 
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To a limited extent, a digital signature allows a receiver to authenticate the identity of the sender and to 
verify the message integrity. 
A digital signature works as follows: A sender creates his digital signature by hashing his 
message using his private key to get a message digest. The recipient uses the sender‟s public key to verify 
the message integrity and sender authentication. 
RSA and DSA are currently the competing technologies in authentication through digital 
signatures.  
Digital Certificates 
A digital certificate, also known as a public key certificate or identity certificate, is a certificate 
that binds together a public key with an identity using a digital signature. Such identity information 
maybe name of a person, individual or organization and address. This verifies that an individual owns a 
particular public key. A digital certificate is useful in verifying that a message has been sent unmodified 
and verifying the sender‟s identity by public key. In a Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) scheme, a 
Certificate Authority (CA) usually issues the certificate. 
2.4. Applications of Symmetric and Asymmetric cryptography 
We have seen two types of cryptography, which are symmetric key and asymmetric key 
cryptography. Cryptosystems apply these to encrypt different plaintext topologies. We can categorize 
these plaintext topologies as text, data, image, voice and video. Depending on the topology of each 
plaintext, we can apply different methods and techniques on the plaintext elements to scramble the 
plaintext. 
For example, if the plaintext is in plaintext form, we could generate a ciphertext by permuting 
elements in different ways. Say, we could swap two elements; we could move elements around; we could 
reverse a block of elements; or we could scramble a block of elements. Depending on the topology of the 
plaintext, we can get different encryption techniques. If the plaintext is in image form, we get image 
encryption and so forth. 
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2.4.1. Text Encryption 
Applying symmetric or asymmetric key encryption on a text plaintext gives Text Encryption. 
This encryption involves encrypting data using ASCII symbols of the plaintext as plaintext elements. This 
is the oldest form of encryption even though modern techniques have expanded its complexity and 
security. The first and earliest application of cryptography involved messages written manually on a 
paper. Thus, the earliest ciphers focused on text encryption. There are various text encryption techniques. 
For the sake of completeness, we include the earliest simple insecure text encryption systems to the more 
modern and more secure ones that are still in use today. The classical ones are the transposition and 
substitution ciphers and the modern ones are the ones discussed in symmetric and asymmetric key 
cryptography. We will not repeat the discussion of the modern ones, rather we will look at the classical 
transposition and substitution ciphers.  
Transposition ciphers 
Transposition ciphers are the ones that permute the plaintext characters to get the ciphertext. 
Substitution ciphers 
Substitution ciphers are the ones that substitute plaintext characters or blocks of characters with 
other characters or blocks of characters to get the ciphertext. These include the Z mod NZ and the Z mod 
N
2
Z (Digraph) cryptosystems. 
 
Z mod NZ ciphers 
Z mod NZ ciphers are substitution ciphers with a single plaintext character as a message unit, a 
key together with enciphering and deciphering functions that use modular arithmetic. Some examples of 
Z mod NZ ciphers are Shift Transformation ciphers, Linear Transformation ciphers and the Affine Map 
ciphers. 
28 
 
Shift Transformation Ciphers 
Shift Transformation ciphers are Z mod NZ substitution ciphers with a single plaintext character 
P (for Plaintext) or C (for ciphertext) as a message unit and have an enciphering function C ≡ P + b mod 
N and a deciphering function P ≡ C - b mod N together with a key b. 
Linear Transformation Ciphers 
Linear Transformation ciphers are Z mod NZ substitution ciphers with a single plaintext character 
P (for Plaintext) or C (for ciphertext) as a message unit and have an enciphering function C ≡ a P mod N 
and a deciphering function P ≡ a‟C mod N together with an enciphering key a and a deciphering key a‟. 
Affine Map Ciphers 
Affine Map ciphers are Z mod NZ substitution ciphers with a single plaintext character P (for Plaintext) 
or C (for ciphertext) as a message unit and have an enciphering function C ≡ a P + b mod N and a 
deciphering function P ≡ a‟C + b‟ mod N together with an enciphering key pair (a,b) and a deciphering 
key pair (a‟,b‟). They are an improvement on the Shift and Linear transformation ciphers. 
Z mod N
2
Z ciphers 
Z mod N
2
Z ciphers are substitution ciphers with two plaintext characters as a message unit, a key 
together with enciphering and deciphering functions that use modular arithmetic. This system is similar to 
the Z mod NZ system. The main difference is the one- vs. two-character message unit. Due to its two-
character message unit, they are also known as Digraph Transformations. Like the Z mod NZ, there are Z 
mod N
2
Z Shift, Linear Transformation and Affine Map ciphers. 
2.4.2. Data Encryption 
Applying symmetric or asymmetric key encryption on a data plaintext gives Data Encryption. 
Data plaintext is that which is in binary form. That means the encryption is done on the binary equivalent 
of the message characters discussed in text encryption. Instead of encrypting the text comprehensible to 
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humans, we first convert it to its binary equivalent and then encrypt it. Its techniques are essentially 
similar to the text encryption.  
2.4.3. Image Encryption 
Applying symmetric or asymmetric key encryption on an image plaintext gives Image 
Encryption. There are various image encryption methods. In this paper we will discuss the SCAN and 
chaos methods.  
SCAN methods 
SCAN methods are the ones that bijectively map the original 2-dimensional plaintext array Pmxn 
to a 2-dimensional ciphertext array Cmxn through the Pmxn scanning. By bijectively, it is meant that the 
mapping is in a one-to-one and onto manner. The new Cmxn represents a scanning of Pmxn accessing every 
entry once. The security of this method is based on the NP-complete combinatorial problem of finding the 
mxn-length Hamiltonian cycle (a cycle with all points accessed once) that matches the key‟s scanning 
path. Such an mxn-length Hamiltonian cycle has (mxn)! different possible solutions. SCAN based 
methods control the scrambling process and can apply not only on pixels but also on blocks of pixels of 
various dimensions. 
Chaos methods 
Chaos methods are permutation based methods that scramble the plaintext element units by some 
defined secret permutation to get a ciphertext, which appears chaotic. Chaos methods can be considered 
subsets of the SCAN based ones mentioned above. In image encryption, the image pixels are scrambled 
while the wavelet coefficients, blocks or macro-blocks are scrambled in video encryption. 
2.4.4. Voice Encryption 
Voice Encryption is the application of symmetric or asymmetric key encryption on a voice 
plaintext. Voice plaintext is digital form and is treated like any other plaintext topology we have 
discussed.  
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2.4.5. Video Encryption 
Applying symmetric or asymmetric key encryption on a video plaintext is known as Video 
Encryption. Unlike other plaintext topologies, the video plaintext topology is much more massive and 
dense. Therefore, some traditional symmetric and asymmetric key ciphers may cease to work due to the 
spatial and computational speed lag caused by the massive and dense video plaintext topology. To encrypt 
video plaintext, the video plaintext is first compressed and then encrypted. Compression is done first 
because encryption is a much more expensive task computationally. If we reverse the order of 
compression and encryption, then the encryption will do much more work to encrypt a large file, which 
will reduce the net performance of encryption.  
There are various techniques to encrypt video plaintext. These include SCAN, chaos, MPEG and 
Frequency Domain methods. The SCAN and chaos methods have been discussed above. The MPEG and 
Frequency Domain video encryption methods are discussed below. 
MPEG Video Encryption 
MPEG stands for Moving Pictures Experts Group. This group develops a series Audio and Video 
Encryption techniques called MPEG. Some of the MPEG encryption methods are MPEG-1, MPEG-2, 
MPEG-3, MPEG-4, MPEG-7 and MPEG-21, just to name a few. MPEG encryption is a lossy data 
compression codec (compressors-decompressors) that uses Transform codecs. The lossy data 
compression involves compressing the original audio or video sample, then decompressing it to get a 
sample close to the original. In the process, the original audio or video samples are dissected, and then 
mapped into a frequency space before being quantized. 
Frequency Domain Video Encryption 
Frequency Domain Video Encryption is based on the mathematics of Frequency Domain, which 
the Wikipedia encyclopedia [3] defines as the analysis of mathematical functions with respect to 
frequency. Video is encoded digitally using the frequency domain. It is through frequency domain that the 
video signal is decomposed into finite or infinite frequencies. The frequency domain video encryption 
technique encrypts the digital encoding of the original frequency domain. 
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3. Cryptanalysis 
With cryptanalysis and cryptography going hand in hand, cryptanalysis is as old as cryptography. 
The designing of a cryptosystem takes into consideration cryptanalysis and cryptanalysis aims at breaking 
cryptography. We will discuss cryptanalysis by looking at classical cryptanalysis techniques and modern 
cryptanalysis techniques. 
3.1. Classical cryptanalysis 
Classical cryptanalysis is responsible for breaking classical ciphers discussed previously. Due to 
the relative simplicity of classical cryptography techniques, classical cryptanalysis techniques also tend to 
be relatively simple. Frequency analysis, Index of coincidence and Kasiski examination are some of the 
most common classical cryptanalysis techniques. 
Frequency analysis 
Frequency analysis is the studying of character frequency in the ciphertext. The oldest written 
record of cryptanalysis is a ninth century frequency analysis cryptanalysis technique by an Arabic 
mathematician. Classical ciphers are notoriously weak and vulnerable to this form of attack. This form of 
attack takes advantage of letter statistics in a language. Looking at a substitution cipher as an example, the 
most frequent character x in a language L will most likely correspond to the most frequent ciphertext 
character y, and so forth. 
Index of coincidence 
The Index of coincidence is the ratio of the number of times a character appears in the same 
position of two texts being compared to the total number of such comparisons. The technique of using the 
index of coincidence is useful in breaking the Vigenère cipher, which is a substitution cipher that 
combines various Caesar ciphers in series. Furthermore, this technique is useful in determining whether 
the two texts being compared are in the same language. Two texts in the same language have relatively 
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higher indices of coincidences than if they are written in different languages. This is due to the tendency 
of different languages having different character frequencies. 
Kasiski examination 
Kasiski examination is a cryptanalysis technique for attacking a polyalphabetic substitution 
cipher by first determining its keyword-length n, then splitting the ciphertext into n column units and 
finally attacking each column unit as a single ciphertext of a monoalphabetic substitution cipher by 
frequency analysis. The Kasiski examination can also break a Vigenère cipher. 
3.2. Modern cryptanalysis 
With the evolution of cryptography, cryptanalysis also evolved. Some frequency analysis 
techniques became obsolete against stronger, more secure and more modern ciphers. As a result, 
frequency analysis was replaced by other techniques such as differential cryptanalysis, linear 
cryptanalysis and integral cryptanalysis. However, weak ciphers have not been entirely abandoned; some 
are still in use today. We discuss modern cryptanalysis methods below. 
3.2.1. Modern cryptanalysis 
A modern cryptanalysis attack depends on whether the attack is theoretical or practical. While, 
theoretical attacks are theoretical solutions that exploit the weakness of a cipher without a practical 
implementation, practical attacks are their counterparts that offer a pragmatic implementation solution. 
We characterize practical attacks depending on given knowledge, secret information deduction and 
required computational complexity effort. 
Given knowledge 
The underlying assumption is that a cryptanalyst is aware of how the cryptosystem works. 
Additional knowledge that a cryptanalyst could have could be: 
 Ciphertext-only: the only access is ciphertext 
 Known-plaintext: the only access is ciphertext and its corresponding plaintext 
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 Chosen-plaintext: the only access is the ciphertext of a chosen plaintext 
 Chosen-ciphertext: the only access is the plaintext of a chosen ciphertext 
 Adaptive chosen-plaintext: A chosen-plaintext attack where there is also an additional ability of 
choosing additional plaintext from preceding encryptions. 
 Adaptive chosen-ciphertext: A ciphertext counterpart of adaptive chosen-plaintext. 
 Related-key attack: A chosen-plaintext attack where there is also an additional ability of accessing 
ciphertext encrypted under two unknown related keys that are different, say by two bits. 
 
Having executed a cryptanalysis attack, we classify its success on the basis of secret information 
deduction as follows. 
Secret information deduction 
We classify the success of a cryptanalysis attack on the basis of the quality and quantity of the 
secret information that was obtained from the attack. The classification is as follows: 
 Information deduction: Some new important information about plaintext or ciphertext is revealed. 
 Local deduction or Instance deduction: New additional plaintext or ciphertext is revealed. 
 Global deduction: Encrypting and decrypting algorithms without the key are revealed. 
 Distinguishing algorithm: A cipher is distinguished from a random permutation. 
 Total break: The secret key is revealed. 
Computational complexity effort 
We can characterize a cryptanalysis attack on the basis of how much computational complexity 
effort we require. The resources could be: 
 Data: The plaintext and ciphertext quantity required to execute an attack 
 Space: The amount of memory 
 Time: wall time required to execute the cryptanalysis operations 
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3.2.2. Modern cryptanalysis techniques 
3.2.2.1 - Cryptanalysis of Symmetric Key Cryptography 
Differential cryptanalysis 
Differential cryptanalysis is a cryptanalysis technique that exploits the non-randomness areas of a 
cryptosystem having studied the effects of the difference of the input change to the difference of the 
output change. Thus, it is a chosen-plaintext cryptanalysis technique. This technique is useful in breaking 
block ciphers, stream ciphers and hash functions. It is also one of the two most widely used cryptanalysis 
technique on block ciphers. 
 
Integral cryptanalysis 
Integral cryptanalysis is a cryptanalysis technique similar to differential cryptanalysis, except that 
integral cryptanalysis focuses on the propagation of sums of many consecutive values while differential 
cryptanalysis focuses on the propagation of differences between consecutive values. Integral cryptanalysis 
can be used where differential cryptanalysis is ineffective. 
 
Linear cryptanalysis 
Linear cryptanalysis is a cryptanalysis technique that involves determining the cryptosystem 
action‟s affine approximations. Along with differential cryptanalysis, this technique is widely used in 
breaking block ciphers.  
Statistical cryptanalysis 
Statistical cryptanalysis is a cryptanalysis technique that relies on using statistical procedures to 
break the cipher. 
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3.2.2.2. Cryptanalysis of Asymmetric Key Cryptography 
Asymmetric ciphers are designed based on the difficulty of solving hard mathematical problems, 
such as large number factorization and discrete logarithm determination. To break such ciphers, 
mathematical solutions of the corresponding mathematical problems need to be determined. 
General cryptanalysis techniques 
These involve applying previously discussed techniques (generalized) on Asymmetric Key 
Cryptography. 
Side channel cryptanalysis 
A side channel cryptanalysis technique is the one that exploits the physical implementation 
weakness of a cipher after obtaining its physical implementation information. For instance, a cryptanalyst 
could exploit the cipher‟s physical implementation weakness by taking advantage of relatively little time 
a certain computation takes in the cipher‟s algorithm. 
4. Reflections from Contemporary Cryptology Methods 
In the previous discussion, we looked at cryptography and cryptanalysis techniques. We have also 
discussed some cryptography concepts and techniques by contemporary cryptographers. In this section, 
we will focus mainly on cryptanalysis work and we will only include cryptography approaches that 
introduce a concept that will be discussed along with contemporary cryptanalysis methodologies. In so 
doing, we shift our focus and emphasis on cryptanalysis. 
Multimedia Encryption 
4.1. Liu’s (Jigsaw) Puzzle Algorithm 
In [16], Fuwen Liu proposes a High-Resolution Video Encryption algorithm called Puzzle. 
Puzzle, designed for enciphering software video data, is well-equipped to provide a fast real-time demand 
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in addition to enhanced security required in multimedia cryptosystems. Liu discusses the design and the 
experimentation results of the algorithm. He also incorporates testing against common cryptanalysis 
techniques, such as ciphertext-only attack, known-plaintext attack and chosen-plaintext attack. For the 
sake of completeness, the discussion below will be on both cryptography and cryptanalysis aspects of 
Liu's proposal. 
Problem to solve: 
Starting with the cryptography, Liu et al are solving a cryptography problem of creating a secure 
and efficient cipher for digital video encryption. In our team‟s opinion, their Puzzle algorithm delivers 
promising expectations. We will discuss this approach from our perspective by looking at the 
methodology and techniques used, its strengths, weaknesses, limitations and also give suggestions for 
improvement. We will conclude the Puzzle discussion by summarizing the discussion with a table. 
Methodology used: 
The Puzzle algorithm [15] consists of two steps: light-weight data encryption and data 
scrambling. In light-weight data encryption, small portions of the video stream are encrypted by a stream 
cipher such as SEAL or AES-CTR; and the other portions are self exclusive-ORed with a shifted plaintext 
key stream. In data scrambling, each frame is first split into n blocks and then the n blocks are partitioned 
into two parts consisting of n/2 blocks, the top part and the bottom part. The n/2 top blocks are then 
permuted with n/2 bottom blocks by a permutation list predetermined by the original plaintext and key 
stream K. 
        From our perspective, the Puzzle Algorithm, which is for video encryption is a simple permutation-
based cryptosystem. Its methodology and techniques are synonymous to scrambling and solving a Jigsaw 
puzzle: The method encrypts the video data the same way you scramble a Jigsaw puzzle to deface the 
image of the Jigsaw puzzle; then it decrypts the video ciphertext to get the original video plaintext the 
same way you put the pieces of the Jigsaw puzzle back together to get the original image. Not only is the 
algorithm simple, it also appears vulnerable to attacks. How vulnerable is it? The following discussion 
will look into this. 
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Method’s strengths and limitations: 
 It is known the limitations of conventional ciphers of not supporting the bandwidth requirement of video 
encryption and also not having a good balance of security and efficiency. To satisfy this need, a cipher 
that takes care of these limitations is needed. Thus, such a cipher would be Liu's Puzzle algorithm. How 
successful is this algorithm in fulfilling this? 
Assuming that the Puzzle algorithm works well, it will offer support on the bandwidth of real-
time video encryption. Its efficient obscuring step of the encryption section uses a stream cipher to 
encrypt a small section of the video stream and the majority of the video stream uses self exclusive-OR 
operations. A stream cipher is very slow and inefficient in handling massive and dense video data, 
therefore it is minimally used. On the other hand, exclusive-OR operations are very fast and these are 
maximally used. The combination of minimal stream cipher and maximal exclusive-OR operation result 
in a big performance improvement when compared to using a traditional stream cipher on its own. 
When we look at the security aspects of the Puzzle algorithm, it is very weak in backing up its 
claim that it is sufficiently secure. In ciphertext-only attack, it discusses how big the entire search space of 
the plaintext combinations is. It claims that the attacker can't possibly try all possible combinations, 
therefore it is secure.  
In general, breaking a system is not about brute-force, trying all possible combinations. It's about 
finding a clever short-cut or elegant way to break it. The argument they have seem to be inclined into 
assuming that brute force attack is the only attack, which is not entirely true. In our opinion, a brute force 
attack is not elegant cryptanalysis because it lacks the art, the beauty and the innovation. In most cases, a 
brute force attack rarely, if never, succeeds in breaking a cipher because of ultra-high computation power 
requirement, which is often unavailable. Therefore, we consider that the algorithm is not completely 
secure against ciphertext-only attack. 
This similar argument carries forward to the methodology‟s security argument against known-
plaintext and chosen-ciphertext attack. However, it makes a small deviation by arguing that its AES-CTR 
stream cipher component of the encryption algorithm provides an extra security against known-plaintext 
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and chosen-plaintext attacks. This is a relatively strong point as long as the AES-CTR is not 
compromised.  
The method does not clarify why the disorder of the blocks is chosen by splitting the ciphertext T 
into two equal parts. In its special cryptanalysis section, no further security analysis is offered and further 
security studies, such as differential cryptanalysis, will be useful. 
Further security analysis: security, complexity and robustness 
A brute force attack complexity of the Puzzle algorithm with a minimum of 128 blocks in each 
picture frame is 64! = 1.27 x 10
89
 calculations, which makes a brute force attack ineffective 
computationally. 
For improving security the Puzzle algorithm is suggested on video samples with a frame length of 
at least 300 bytes. This forces the attacker to try at least all 30 x 2
64
 combinations, approximately 2
69
 
combinations, to get plaintexts of the scrambled picture blocks for a single frame. 
The method‟s security discussion relies on an exhaustive brute force attacks and lacks a 
comprehensive cryptanalysis research, we therefore doubt if this algorithm is robust in security and in a 
transmission channel. 
Asymmetric Key Cryptography 
Many RSA algorithms use the mathematics of the Chinese Remainder Theorem (CRT) as part of 
the cipher‟s computations. We will call these RSA algorithms CRT-RSA. CRT-RSA algorithms have 
proved to be very prone to side-channel attacks, particularly fault attacks. This has attracted interest from 
cryptologists who, days in and out, try to break or improve the security of these systems. In protecting 
these cryptosystems, many attempts have been done to shield CRT computations against potential attacks 
such as fault side-channel attacks. The following discussion reflects on some of this work. 
4.2. Blömer-Otto-Seifert’s CRT-RSA immune to Bellcore attacks 
The next methodology deals with an RSA signature algorithm which is widely used in 
smartcards. In [19], Blömer et al propose a CRT-RSA algorithm immune to Bellcore attacks. A Bellcore 
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attack is an example of a fault attack in which the cryptic factorization of the RSA modulus N is broken 
and revealed having introduced a fault that yields a correct signature modulo one of the secret prime 
factors of N and incorrect modulo the other prime factor.  
Problem to solve: 
Blömer et al attempt to solve a problem of CRT computation insecurities in RSA signature 
algorithms that use CRT computations. Particularly, they zero-in on the insecurity of Shamir‟s fault attack 
countermeasure scheme as well as the infective computations that generate single points of failure of a 
checking step. The motivation of solving this problem is to improve the security of CRT-RSA 
applications. Smartcards are typical examples of areas where RSA signature algorithms are used. 
Methodology used: 
Their methodology is to extend Shamir‟s small prime verification countermeasure to cover the 
whole CRT-RSA computation and also eradicate the single point of a checking step‟s failure [16]. 
Why their methodology is good for such a problem 
The authors‟ technique works from the ground-up from an existing Shamir‟s CRT-RSA scheme. 
Their technique is good for such a problem because it is an attempt to patch up the security holes left 
behind by the older cryptosystem. Briefly, “Shamir‟s technique applies a small prime verification 
countermeasure to protect the signature computations modulo the two secret prime factors of the RSA 
modulus N”. The authors in order to improve the countermeasure space, they use Shamir‟s variant in their 
algorithm and extend it by introducing conditions that ensure a good resistance against attacks on memory 
parameters as well as providing security against attacks on the CRT combination. They claim their new 
algorithm is more efficient in computing RSA signatures. 
Further security analysis: Security, complexity and robustness 
Our understanding is that Shamir already had a „solution‟ to the problem of CRT computation 
insecurities in RSA signature algorithms that use CRT computations. However, Blomer et al claim that 
Shamir‟s solution is susceptible to fault attacks because it does not protect the CRT-combination step to 
obtain the final signature modulo N. Furthermore, a single point of a checking step‟s failure is a security 
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hole that can be fatal with fault attacks. As an improvement, the authors attempt to extend Shamir‟s idea 
to cover all CRT computations as well as minimize or remove single point faults. They also provide a 
proof of why they think their system is immune to Bellcore fault attacks. 
The complexity and robustness of the method 
The space and time complexities of the above proposed algorithm are implementation dependent. 
However, the different steps of the algorithm are O(x
y
 mod a.b ) where x
y
 = max(m
dp
 , m
dq
, m-S
et1
 + 1, 
S
c1.c2
 ) , a = max(p, q) and t = max(t1, t2). 
The method shows the security testing of the above algorithm line by line from line 1 to line 6 of the 
algorithm and in Table 1 the most successful attack scenarios is depicted. 
 
Fault attack on Probability of the attack 
Line 1 3/min(t1,t2) 
Line 2 3/min(t1,t2) 
Line 3 2/min(t1,t2) 
Line 4 0 in our fault model 
Line 5 0 in our fault model 
Line 6 0 in our fault model 
 
Table 1:  The summary of success probabilities of a fault 
attack adversary [16]. 
Method’s strength: 
The authors vividly explain various fault models using a three-part format consisting of parameter 
setting, mathematical model and a motivation from the real world. In their discussion on the new 
approach, they give a compact and yet very clear mathematical description of their approach, which is 
very helpful for a reader. Their subsequent discussion of the efficiency of the new algorithm, the security 
analysis of their countermeasure and further security considerations are also clear and provide a very 
good support of their proposal. Furthermore, the strength of their approach lies in the efficiency and 
security improvement in the RSA computation signatures. If indeed, their algorithm is as efficient and 
secure as they have proved it to be, it is definitely a CRT-RSA algorithm to adopt over the Shamir‟s 
scheme.  
Method’s weakness: 
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The limitation of their technique is that in their security discussion, they completely ignore other 
fault attacks, such as when a fault attack is combined with other side channel attacks like power and 
timing attacks. This can be very crucial if an attacker is clever enough to exploit this weakness, thus their 
approach is still vulnerable and it is not as secure as it seems. 
Suggestions for improvement: 
The method could be improved by incorporating other fault attack techniques.  
4.3. Li-Li-Chen-Zhang-Bourbakis’ General Cryptanalysis of Permutation-Only Multimedia Encryption 
Algorithms 
In multimedia encryption, many secret permutations and permutation-only ciphers have been 
proposed. The next methodology looks at one of these techniques. 
In [11], Li et al propose a general cryptanalysis of Permutation-Only Multimedia Encryption 
Algorithms using a known-plaintext and chosen-plaintext attacks. They criticize the security of 
permutation-only multimedia ciphers claiming that all such ciphers are vulnerable to known-plaintext and 
chosen-plaintext attacks. Given image size mn and pixel size value x, only O(logx (mn)) known- or 
chosen-plaintext images are required to break the cipher. Furthermore, the attack‟s time complexity is 
only O(p.(mn)
2
) where p is the number of known- or chosen-plaintext images. They also show empirical 
results that support the feasibility of known- and chosen-plaintext attacks. In their discussion, they clearly 
show that secret permutations are weak to be used alone in securing multimedia encryption systems. 
Problem to solve: 
The objective is to create an efficient and secure image and video encryption algorithm. 
Methodology used: 
The technique is to expose the weaknesses of “secure” image and video encryption algorithms by 
theoretically and practically attacking and breaking the secret permutations. 
Theoretical explanations 
i. Permutation-Only Image Ciphers in Spatial Domain 
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In the spatial domain, permutation-only image ciphers use permutations primarily to encrypt data which 
is in the form of pixels. 
Several ways of generating a permutation matrix are readily available in the literature. Some of 
these are SCAN language, 2-D chaotic maps, Quadtree, Pseudo-random rotations, Fractal curves, 
matrix transformations and composite methods. 
ii. Cryptanalysis of Permutation-Only Image Ciphers in Spatial Domain 
There is a detailed discussion on how to decrypt an image encrypted by the above method and the known-
plaintext attack method is provided [11]. 
The chosen-plaintext attack works in a similar way as above except that plain-images are well 
chosen for optimization for estimating . 
Further security analysis: security, complexity and robustness 
The proposed methodology capitalizes on the weaknesses of relying on secret permutations as a 
basis of securing these cryptosystems. They provide a long discussion of how secret permutations are 
used to secure these encryption algorithms. In addition, they point out the vulnerabilities of these 
mechanisms. Theoretical and practical results are also given to support the vulnerabilities of these 
systems.  
Why is their technique good for such a problem? 
Their cryptanalysis technique is good for such a problem, because cryptanalysis has been a 
traditional way of securing a cryptosystem. Throughout history, cryptanalysis has co-evolved with 
cryptography, and the authors have employed the same technique of cryptanalysis as a motivation to 
improving the cryptography of the cryptosystem. 
Strengths: 
The authors offer a good awareness of how insecure permutation-only image and video 
encryption ciphers are. It addresses the importance of not relying on permutations only when designing 
and implementing multimedia encryption algorithms. If secret permutations are used, they should be used 
along with other encryption techniques. Otherwise, the cipher is vulnerable. 
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Example: 
A Hierarchical chaotic image encryption (HCIE) is used as an example of a recently proposed 
permutation-only cipher. The algorithms and experiment results of known-plaintext, the chosen-plaintext 
and the brute force attacks on HCIE are provided in [11]. 
In addition, a performance comparison of the known-plaintext attack to HCIE and the quantitative  
 
relationship between the known plain-images count and the decryption quality, which is equivalent to the  
 
decryption error ratio, are available in [11]. 
 
We totally agree with the authors‟ perspective that the security analysis of brute-force attacks 
only are not enough to analyze most permutation only ciphers.  
Weaknesses: 
From the security standpoint, the work is not comprehensive enough, it only focuses on known-
plaintext and chosen-plaintext attacks. What about all other techniques. 
Suggestions for improvement: 
The work should also look at other cryptanalysis techniques rather than just know-plaintext and 
cipher-text techniques.  
4.4. Sun-Shieh’s Burst-Error-Correcting-Code Private-Key Cryptanalysis 
In [14], Sun et. al. propose how to break private-key encryption schemes that are based on burst-
error-correcting codes. They introduce a private-key encryption scheme based on burst-error-correcting 
codes as proposed by Alencar and one based on array codes as implemented by Campello de Souza. They 
mathematically show the cipher‟s vulnerability to chosen-plaintext attacks. 
Problem to solve: 
The objective is to probe the security of the private-key encryption scheme based on the burst-
error-correcting codes, as proposed by Alencar et al. It also attempts to test the security of one of its 
implementation by looking at Compello de Souza et al.‟s implementation, which is based on array codes 
(a class of burst-error-correcting codes). 
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Further security analysis: security, complexity and robustness 
The work focuses on the private-key encryption schemes based on burst-error-correcting codes as 
proposed by Alencar et al and implemented by Campello de Souza. The authors provide a background 
and history of these cryptosystems. According to [13], these cryptosystems can be traced back to 1978 
when McEliece used algebraic coding theory to propose a public-key cryptosystem. Rao-Nam proposed 
an improved version in 1989. However, the improvement was found to be vulnerable to some chosen 
plaintext attacks. Alencar et al proposed yet another improvement in 1993. Campello de Souza et al 
provided one of the implementations. Alencar et al‟s and de Souza et al‟s schemes are what their work is 
focusing on. These two schemes are vulnerable. The authors provide an extensive, yet compact, 
mathematical description of how vulnerable they are. 
Methodology used: Why is it good for such problem? 
The authors‟ approach is very similar to the methodology proposed by the authors in [11]. Thus, 
they also use cryptanalysis to examine the security of the Alencar‟s and de Souza‟s approaches.  
Approach’s strength: 
The approach is compact and provides a sound mathematical description of the cryptanalysis 
process.  
4.5. Cain-Sherman’s Ciphertext-only attack on Gifford’s cipher 
In [26], Cain et. al. show how to use a ciphertext-only attack to break a Gifford‟s cipher, which is 
MIT‟s David Gifford‟s stream cipher. The Gifford‟s cipher was widely used for online news articles for 
New York Times and Associated Press. The authors give the description of their ciphertext-only attack on 
the cipher. Their method is efficient and effective enough to recover the individual article key in about 
four hours and can also recover the master key used for a month-worth of news articles. Thus, the 
Gifford‟s stream cipher should be avoided. Moreover, they give their suggestions on how to improve the 
Gifford‟s cipher. 
Problem to solve: 
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They are trying to solve a problem of breaking the Gifford‟s cipher. Particularly, they use a 
ciphertext-only attack. 
Methodology used: 
As pointed out earlier, they use a ciphertext-only attack as a principal attack. They do this by 
using the mathematics of linear algebra over finite fields to exploit the space-time tradeoff finding key 
segments derived from a decomposition of the feedback function. 
Gifford‟s stream cipher comprises an 8-byte shift register, a linear feedback function , and a 
 
 non-linear output function h. At each iteration, f computes a new register state as follows: A feedback 
 
 byte is computed and shifted into the register from left. Byte B7 is discarded, and bytes B0 through B6 are  
 
shifted one byte to the right. The output function h computes an 8-bit keybyte from register bytes B0, B2, 
 
 B4 and B7. The secret key is the initial fill of the register. Gifford‟s cipher generates a keybyte stream,  
 
which is XORed with the plaintext stream to produce a ciphertext stream. In this figure, + denotes XOR  
 
[25] . A decomposition of Gifford‟s cipher shows that the attacks search subfills corresponding to the  
 
invariant subspaces of dimensions 24, 5,6 and 29 induced by the primary rational canonical  
 
decomposition R of the feedback matrix F. A similarity transformation P satisfying F=P
-1
RP maps each  
 
register fill s from the original world into four subfills Ps = (d0, d1, d2, d3) in the decomposed world 
 
Why their methodology good for such a problem? 
Their methodology is good for such a problem because they proved it that it works. Like the 
previous approaches, known cryptanalysis techniques have traditionally been good to solve a problem of 
breaking a cipher. 
Further security analysis: security, complexity and robustness  
A Gifford‟s cipher is a stream cipher designed by David Gifford of MIT in 1984. In the time of 
writing [26], i.e. 1994, it had been ten years and the Gifford‟s cipher had not been broken. Cain et al‟s 
work was the first of its kind to provide a comprehensive cryptanalysis of the Gifford‟s cipher. It provides 
a presentation and implementation of a ciphertext-only attack. 
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Method’s strength: 
The method provides a comprehensive mathematical description of their technique. This gives a 
strong proof and support of their claims. Mere statements and claims about the cipher‟s mechanism and 
security without a mathematical proof is poor way of forming an argument. This work clearly avoids this 
pitfall. 
4.6. Naor’s Public-key Cryptosystems Provably Secure against Chosen Ciphertext Attacks 
Naor et al propose Public-key Cryptosystems Provably Secure against Chosen Ciphertext Attacks 
[27]. They point out that the chosen-ciphertext attack is the fourth most effective and dangerous attack in 
asymmetric key cryptosystems behind ciphertext-only, known-plaintext and chosen-plaintext. They then 
introduce their scheme describing and proving its security. They use probabilistic encryption as a main 
tool and they prove their security proposal mathematically. 
Problem to solve: 
They are trying to create an asymmetric-key encryption system secure against a chosen ciphertext 
attack from a stochastic encryption scheme and a non-interactive zero-knowledge proof system. 
Methodology used - Why it is good for such a problem 
They use a reduction methodology where the security property is reduced to a well-defined 
complexity assumption. They introduce a methodology that was first used in these classes of problems in 
1979 when M. O. Rabin of MIT equated the computation of an attacker‟s complete plaintext extraction 
from ciphertext to that of the computation of factoring. Reducing such a security problem to a complexity 
assumption then gained popularity in the cryptology community. This methodology has also proven to be 
a good technique, especially for such a problem [26]. 
 
Further security analysis: security, complexity and robustness  
A chosen-ciphertext attack is the strongest cryptanalysis attack after ciphertext-only, known-
plaintext and chosen-plaintext (in ascending order of strength). The given description of a chosen 
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ciphertext attack makes us think of it as being synonymous to the problem of solving a system of linear 
equations with many variables by a substitution method. You keep tweaking the system at your own 
convenience solving one variable at a time until you solve all variables. This is very powerful because 
you solve one Jigsaw puzzle piece at a time until you get the entire Jigsaw puzzle image. Other attacks 
lack this capability. 
If the authors proposed an asymmetric-key cryptosystem that is secure against a chosen ciphertext 
attack, it has a great potential to be secure against the other attacks. This should however not imply that 
being secure against a chosen ciphertext automatically implies that it is secure against the other attacks. 
The relative strength of the chosen-ciphertext attack justifies the tremendous security of the 
authors‟ cryptosystem concept, if it is indeed secure against chosen-ciphertext attacks. 
Method’s strength: 
The method is of class. It is elegant: it is vivid, well-organized and professional. It is rich in 
mathematics, both in concepts and proofs, which make a concrete foundation of the concepts it addresses. 
Symmetric Key Cryptology 
DIFFERENTIAL CRYPTANALYSIS 
4.7. Preneel-Govaerts-Vandewalle’s Differential cryptanalysis on Block Cipher Hash Functions 
In [17], Preneel et al outline a Differential cryptanalysis attack on Hash functions based on block 
ciphers. DES as a building block of the block cipher, Preneel, et. al, show how to exploit such ciphers. 
Specifically, they analyze MDC-2 and MDC-4 ciphers and then show an attack on FEAL-N based Hash 
functions. They conclude that differential attacks on DES-based hash function pose no serious threat 
because even numbers of rounds have no history of being vulnerable. Moreover, MDC-2 and MDC-4 
ciphers are not vulnerable with differential cryptanalysis provided that the number of rounds is at least 
thirteen. 
Method summary: 
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The method is on differential cryptanalysis attacks on hash functions based on DES. It is found 
out that differential attacks on these cryptosystems are more successful when the cipher uses an odd 
number of rounds. Even numbers of rounds have withstood the differential cryptanalysis test. Apart from 
the vulnerability of ciphers using odd number of rounds, alternative efficient attacks would be random 
attacks and the second pre-image attack on the single length hash functions. Differential attacks have also 
proven to be ineffective for ciphers using more than thirteen rounds. 
Problem to be solved: 
To break a hash function based on DES block ciphers using differential attacks. 
Brief Methodology Description: 
Differential cryptanalysis of Hash functions based on Block ciphers is used. A hash function is a 
mapping that takes an input of an arbitrary length to a fixed length string. The requirements for hash 
functions as cryptographic functions are one-wayness and collision resistance. In the differential 
cryptanalysis of a hash function based on a block cipher, the goal is to find a single right pair that follows 
the characteristic of the underlying block cipher for which the input XOR equals the output XOR so that 
these XOR‟es cancel out in the result, producing two blocks with the same hash code.  
Why may the authors think that way: 
It is not clear why the authors do not attack an insecure DES. DES has already to be proven to be 
vulnerable and AES has been an alternative to DES. 
Method’s strength: 
Good security analysis, especially the discussion of the search space complexity of the 
cryptography and cryptanalysis algorithms. The method took a good use of mathematical concepts to 
prove their comments and arguments, especially the characteristic probabilities in relationship to the 
cipher‟s cryptography algorithm rounds. 
Method’s weaknesses: 
The omission of DES vulnerability as opposed to AES. 
Our security analysis of the method: 
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Cryptanalysis: 
A question we have in mind is why there is an emphasis on the results for the cases where DES is 
the underlying block cipher. DES is not secure after all, Isn‟t AES is a better alternative to those methods? 
Why did the authors choose that if they knew that DES is insecure? The authors do not discuss why they 
chose DES based block cipher hash functions. We take this as a weakness. 
Complexity: 
The methodology points out the collision resistance of MDC-2 hash function and is therefore 
considered for IDO/IEC standardization. The search space complexity of determining a collision is 2
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encryptions and that of a second pre-image is 2
83
.  
Robustness: 
MDC-2 is twice as slow as MDC-2 since an MDC-4 iteration concatenates two MDC-2 steps. 
However, finding a collision in MDC-4 is not harder than in the MDC-2 case because both have similar 
collision results when identical chaining variables are used. It further concludes that only MDC-2 or 
MDC-4 with 11 rounds or less is faster than a birthday attack. Finding a second pre-image for MDC-4 is 
however harder. It has been shown that MDC-2 differential attack is faster for 11 rounds or less and that 
of MDC-4 is faster for 15 rounds or less. 
LINEAR CRYPTANALYSIS 
4.8. Heyst-Tavares’ Differential cryptanalysis and linear cryptanalysis on Substitution-Permutation Network 
Ciphers 
In 1994, Heyst et al use differential cryptanalysis and linear cryptanalysis to find weaknesses of 
substitution-permutation network ciphers and give suggestions on how to strengthen the ciphers [13]. 
They propose a way to improve the cipher security against differential and linear attacks by using large S-
boxes with good diffusion characteristics along with a replacement of the in-between-round permutation 
by an appropriate linear transformation. 
Method’s summary: 
50 
 
Differential and linear cryptanalysis techniques have been very successful in breaking product 
ciphers. To strengthen substitution-permutation network product ciphers, Heyst et al have proposed a 
scheme that is relatively more secure against these attacks. The method presents a state of the art 
substitution-permutation network design of the cipher explaining its mechanism and how it is built for 
security and robustness. 
Problem to solve: 
To secure a substitution-permutation network (SPN) cipher against differential and linear 
cryptanalysis attacks. 
Methodology: 
The methodology employed in solving the given problem is to improve the cipher‟s encrypting 
and decrypting mechanisms at the design layer by having large S-boxes with good diffusion 
characteristics together with an appropriate linear transformation in place of a corresponding in-between-
rounds permutation. 
Differential cryptanalysis resistance is attained by S-boxes that diffuse bit changes effectively. To 
examine diffusion properties, the input and output XORs are examined. 
The theorem presenting in [12] that S-boxes that satisfy a high diffusion order can decrease the 
upper bound on characteristic probabilities and therefore strengthen a network against differential 
cryptanalysis attacks. 
The second property for differential cryptanalysis resistance by S-boxes is non-linearity. 
Method’s strength: 
The method is very comprehensive in its security analysis. It introduces the strength and history 
of the cryptanalysis techniques used, i.e. differential and linear cryptanalysis. Thereby, the need for 
securing the cipher against these attacks is shown. Mathematics being the kernel of its functionality, the 
mechanism of the scheme is well elaborated using mathematics. The discussion also backs up its 
scheme‟s security claims by discussing how it fulfills diffusion and non-linearity properties.  
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Unlike some previous methods, this approach does a good job at giving a complexity analysis of 
the scheme‟s cryptography aspects. It does so by relating analyzing the differential characteristic 
probabilities and linear approximation probabilities. In the conclusion, it states explicitly why it was 
important to include a complexity analysis discussion, i.e. to show how difficult it is to attack the scheme. 
Additional security analysis: 
Complexity: 
Rather than reflecting the results of the experiments, we will only discuss the implications of the 
results. Table 2 of the method [12] gives a summary of the scheme‟s complexity and its resistance to 
differential and linear cryptanalysis using 8x8 S-boxes with pdelta = 2
-4
 and NLmin = 96. For example, a 
linear cryptanalysis attack on an 8-round permutation and linear transformation networks require a 
minimum of 2
34
 and 2
50
 examinations respectively; while that of a 16-round require a minimum of 2
66
 and 
2
98
 examinations respectively. 
Robustness: 
The scheme is robust due to its more security attainted with a relatively more efficient 
implementation with fewer rounds. 
STATISTICAL CRYPTANALYSIS 
4.9. Vaudenay’s Experiment on DES statistical cryptanalysis 
In [12], Vaudenay proposes “An experiment on DES statistical cryptanalysis”. Having stated that 
Differential and Linear cryptanalysis are the most common cryptanalysis techniques on block ciphers, he 
says that both can independently be improved and then incorporated into a more general statistical 
cryptanalysis. According to the author, statistical cryptanalysis can be designed to yield at least as good 
performance as linear cryptanalysis.  Consequently, the attack‟s theoretical complexity can also be 
improved. Moreover, a chi-square statistical analysis can also be applied to yield better results as an 
improvement over the differential and linear cryptanalysis. 
Method’s summary: 
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Differential and linear cryptanalysis on DES can be perceived in a statistical cryptanalysis 
approach. The method also proposes a new approach that links these to methodologies to linear 
cryptanalysis methodologies. 
Problem to solve: 
The problem to solve is to break a DES cipher using statistical cryptanalysis. 
Methodologies used: 
The methodology uses differential cryptanalysis and linear cryptanalysis, which are both bottom-
up methodologies. The Chi-squared cryptanalysis, a top-down approach, is also used and is seen to be as 
efficient as the former. 
Feistel‟s scheme with 16 rounds. DES is on the Feistel scheme.The scheme has two 32-bit registers L and 
R which are modified by a process that depends on kis  derived from the main key k  
 
Method’s strength: 
It presents a thorough security analysis discussion addressing both the space and time 
complexities. 
Security analysis highlights: 
Complexity: 
DES maps a 64-bit plaintext to a 64-bit ciphertext with a 56-bit key, implying that the best attack 
has a search space complexity of 2
56
. Biham and Shamir used a general method, differential cryptanalysis, 
to show heuristically that it is indeed possible to attack with 2
47
 chosen plaintexts. Later, Matsui proposed 
another general method, linear cryptanalysis, to show that 2
43
 known plaintexts could be used to break 
DES. In the discussion, there is also a proposal of another heuristic approach similar to Matsui, but uses 
statistical cryptanalysis without linear cryptanalysis. 
The method also gives a more comprehensive summary of the space and time complexity of the 
proposed statistical cryptanalysis attack. In summary, it has a space complexity of O(s+r) where s is the 
number of counters for all random samples and r is the number of registers for all key candidates. The 
attack phase which has a counting phase, analysis phase, sorting phase and a searching phase, has a time 
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complexity of O(n), O(sr), O(r log r) and O( N . f(-E/(2
0.5
)) ) for these phases respectively, where n is 
number of random samples and E is the epsilon parameter value. 
Robustness: 
The proposed statistical cryptanalysis attack is more robust than Matsui‟s attack due to an evident 
exhaustive search improvement. It was also found that a Chi-squared statistical cryptanalysis is as robust 
the proposed statistical cryptanalysis attack provided that there is less knowledge about the characteristic.  
4.10. Zhang’s findings on Information leakage of boolean functions and its relationship to other 
cryptographic criteria 
M. Zhang et al [30] propose that the strength of a cryptographic algorithm is directly proportional 
to its information leakage between its inputs and outputs. In particular, a statistical cryptanalysis attack on 
a cipher with no information leakage will always fail. On the other hand, a significant reduction in the 
information leakage further strengthens the cipher against differential and linear cryptanalysis attacks as 
derived from the Boolean functions‟ statistical analysis resistance property. 
Method’s summary: 
The method is well outlined and we can also note that this method ties in with a previously 
discussed [13] since S-boxes are to be designed with security against information leakage. Furthermore, 
the method is geared towards improving the cipher‟s security against information leakage by focusing on 
improving the mathematical aspects of the encrypting and decrypting functions, in this case Boolean 
functions. Different cryptographic criteria are used to evaluate the strength of these Boolean functions. 
Specifically, the method ties the cryptographic criteria to the strength of Boolean functions by zeroing in 
on information leakage. 
Problem to solve: 
The goal is to strengthen a cryptographic algorithm by eradicating all kinds of information 
leakage in the Boolean function. 
Methodologies used: 
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M. Zhang et al  [29] present a mathematical design and analysis of Boolean functions with 
minimal or no static and dynamic information leakage. 
Method’s strength: 
The method is comprehensive in elaborating static and dynamic information leakage and their 
relationship to the specified cryptographic criteria. It unleashes concrete mathematical concepts 
underlying the mechanism of Boolean functions with respect to information leakage and other 
cryptographic criteria. 
The method is well organized and well written. It introduces the topic of discussion by first 
putting it in context with what is currently happening in contemporary cryptology. It states why current 
cryptosystems have to be designed to be strong against statistical cryptanalysis, i.e. because of an 
advancement of statistical analysis attacks. The method also gives some enlightening remarks, such as 
treating information leakage as a basis for measuring cryptographic algorithm strength. 
Security analysis highlights: Security, complexity and robustness 
It is shown that reducing information leakage enhances the cryptosystem‟s security against 
differential and linear attacks. 
The methodology does not explicitly discuss the complexity of the information leakage 
prevention mechanisms; rather it focuses on the probabilistic aspects of the mechanisms. While 
probabilities could be used to implicitly discuss the complexity, probability evaluations from theories and 
experiments are not specified. 
Reducing information leakage enhances the cryptosystem‟s security, thereby increasing the 
cryptosystem‟s robustness against statistical analysis attacks. The appropriate cost function for 
optimization is not yet clear due to the trade-offs between the security against known attacks and 
unknown attacks. This implies that the cryptosystem‟s robustness in transmission is not entirely clear. 
Method evaluation: 
The methodology is well described and presented concisely with relevant mathematical proofs. 
Relevant examples, propositions, corollary are also provided as supporting arguments.  
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Suggestions for improvement: 
It will improve the view of the method if the appropriate cost function is determined during 
optimization. 
4.11. Biham’s technique to decipher and substitute DES-encrypted ciphertext in 2
28
 steps 
In [21], Biham proposes a way of deciphering and substituting DES-encrypted ciphertext in 2
28
 
steps. He discusses the complexity of key recovery when various keys are in use. He also points out the 
vulnerability of key usage in such ciphers. He gives an example of a key in use being recovered and then 
used by the cryptanalyst to modify original messages. Typically, a DES and triple-DES key recovery 
complexities are 2
28
 and 2
84
 respectively. 
Method summary: 
The method addresses how to break the DES cipher by using key-collision attacks with 2
28
 
ciphertexts data complexity, which is relatively much less compared to previously known methodologies. 
For instance, to break the same cipher, differential cryptanalysis and linear cryptanalysis use 2
47
 chosen 
plaintexts complexity and 2
43
 known plaintexts complexity respectively. 
 
Problem to solve: 
The problem is to decrypt and or substitute DES ciphertexts in 2
28
 steps. 
Methodologies used: 
The prime methodology is key collision attacks. The following is a brief description of the 
methodology (Figure 2). 
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Each time we receive a ciphertext C, we 
(1) Enter the ciphertext C into table T1. 
(2) Choose a random number K, and enter (EK(A),K) into 
table T2, indexed by the first field. 
(3) Check whether C appears as the index in a pair (C,K‟) in 
T2. If so, K‟ is expected to be the key which encrypted C. 
(4) Check if EK(A) appears in T1. If so, K is expected to be 
the key which encrypted it. 
In this attack, the first match is expected to appear after about 2k/2 
ciphertexts, so the investment in the first key is about 2k/2 
encryptions. This investment reduces for each additional key, until 
for 2k keys the investment in each key is only one encryption. 
 
Figure 2: A key collision attack [20] 
 
Method’s strength: 
The security of DES had already been compromised by the time the methodology was being 
proposed. The author points that out and indirectly compares the complexities of his cryptanalysis 
technique to other previously known techniques of breaking this DES cipher. He implicitly explains why 
his technique is special and why one would favor his method over others, i.e. his technique is more 
efficient, more robust and effective since it has a relatively much less running time and space complexity. 
The proposed methodology is not specific to a particular cipher, it works against any cipher. This 
makes the methodology a powerful cryptanalysis tool. As we can see, this methodology is unlike 
methodologies we discussed in previous methods. 
The method is also insightful and innovative in ideas and concepts. For example, it arguably uses 
a well known birthday paradox for the first time in proving that the cipher‟s theoretic strength is bounded 
by the square root of the key space size. This is a unique application of the birthday paradox.  
An open problem is presented in this method for extending and improving the proposed work.  
Method’s weakness: 
The method does not explain the birthday paradox in the appendix for readers who are unfamiliar 
with it. The understanding of the birthday paradox is important in understanding the mechanism. 
Security analysis highlights: Security, complexity and robustness 
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It is interesting how the security of this methodology differs from the security of the previous 
methodologies. In this methodology, the theoretic strength of a cipher is tied to the key space size square 
root bound while in the previous method the cipher‟s strength was tied to information leakage. The 
former emphasizes security focusing on the encryption and decryption functions, while the latter 
emphasizes security focusing on the key. 
The methodology shows how easy it is to break the cipher using the proposed method. It shows 
that the theoretic strength of DES to be at most 2
28
 encryption or decryption calculations. This 
cryptanalysis technique has an exponential complexity, which is much more effective than other 
cryptanalysis techniques that have factorial complexities. The method has a trade off between the 
complexity of finding the key and ciphertext message count.  
The low complexity, more efficiency and more effectiveness of this method compared to other 
methods make the proposed method robust. 
Suggestions for improvement: 
The method should include the birthday paradox in the appendix for unfamiliar readers. 
4.12. Hevia-Kiwi’s timing attacks on DES 
Method’s Summary: 
On the other hand, Hevia et al show how to break two DES schemes using timing attacks [25]. 
The two DES implementations are the one from the RSA Euro cryptographic toolkit (RSA-DES) and the 
other one from A. Louko‟s DES package (L-DES). A timing attack is an example of a side channel attack 
in which a cryptanalyst exploits the running time characteristics of some specific computations embedded 
in the cipher‟s algorithm. Hevia et al show their experimentation including their mathematical details. 
Methodology: 
Timing attacks are used on DES. In Diffie-Hellman‟s key exchange protocol and RSA cipher, a 
modular exponentiation is the primary operation. It takes inputs k, n  , n ≠ 0, and y  , then 
calculates y
k
 mod n. In cryptographic protocols, n is public and k is private. 
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Measuring the time taken by the system to calculate y
k
 mod n for several y inputs can result in the 
revelation of secret exponent k.  
Differential cryptanalysis resistance is attained by S-boxes that diffuse bit changes effectively. To 
examine diffusion properties, the input and output XORs are examined. 
The theorem in [12] shows that S-boxes that satisfy a high diffusion order can decrease the upper 
bound on characteristic probabilities and therefore strengthen a network against differential cryptanalysis 
attacks. 
The second property for differential cryptanalysis resistance by S-boxes is non-linearity. 
Method’s strength: 
The method is very comprehensive in its security analysis. It introduces the strength and history 
of the cryptanalysis techniques used, i.e. differential and linear cryptanalysis. Thereby, the need for 
securing the cipher against these attacks is shown. Mathematics being the kernel of its functionality, the 
mechanism of the scheme is well elaborated using mathematics. The discussion also backs up its 
scheme‟s security claims by discussing how it fulfills diffusion and non-linearity properties.  
Unlike some previous methods, this approach does a good job at giving a complexity analysis of 
the scheme‟s cryptography aspects. It does so by relating analyzing the differential characteristic 
probabilities and linear approximation probabilities. In the conclusion, it states explicitly why it was 
important to include a complexity analysis discussion, i.e. to show how difficult it is to attack the scheme. 
Additional security analysis: 
Complexity: 
Rather than reflecting the results of the experiments, we will only discuss the implications of the 
results. Table 2 of the method gives a summary of the scheme‟s complexity and its resistance to 
differential and linear cryptanalysis using 8x8 S-boxes with pdelta = 2
-4
 and NLmin = 96. For example, a 
linear cryptanalysis attack on an 8-round permutation and linear transformation networks require a 
minimum of 2
34
 and 2
50
 examinations respectively; while that of a 16-round require a minimum of 2
66
 and 
2
98
 examinations respectively. 
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Robustness: 
The scheme is robust due to its more security attainted with a relatively more efficient 
implementation with fewer rounds. 
Measuring the time taken by the system to calculate y
k
 mod n for several y inputs can result in the 
revelation of secret exponent k.  
Method’s strength: 
The method gives a comprehensive discussion on how to attack DES by using timing attacks. The 
experiment is provided; this includes the procedures or methodology, data collection, data analysis and 
interpretation. 
Security analysis and complexity: 
The following is a summary on the security and complexity of the timing attacks on DES (Figure 
3). 
  
60 
 
Results of Computational Experiment 
K 14 16 18 20 22 26 28 
pk 0.008 0.058 0.295 1.090 2.973 6.044 10.615 
RSA 0.004 0.131 0.387 1.155 2.221 4.274 9.865 
Louko 0.004 0.029 0.425 0.646 1.654 3.362 6.742 
 
K 30 32 34 36 40 42 44 
pk 9.224 6.044 2.973 1.090 0.295 0.008 0.001 
RSA 8.744 6.054 2.088 1.098 0.459 0.004 0.001 
Louko 5.337 3.768 1.770 0.571 0.172 0.004 0.001 
Columns are labeled according to the weight of the DES key. We denote the weight of a 
key by k. The second row represents the percentage of the total key space corresponding 
to DES keys of Hamming weight k (with precision of 0.0005). We denote this value by 
pk. For each DES key of weight k, we estimated (16000 . pk times) measurements in 
order to ensure that at least 16 measurements were considered for every estimate 
associated to nonzero pk‟s. The last two rows show, for each DES implementation and 
some key weights, the average of the values obtained. 
 
Figure 3: The security and complexity of the timing attacks on DES [24]. 
FURTHER DISCUSSION ON ASYMMETRIC CRYPTOLOGY 
4.13. Boneh’s method of finding smooth integers in short intervals using CRT decoding 
In [20], Boneh proposes a method of finding smooth integers in short intervals using CRT 
decoding. The relevance of his proposal is in prime number factorization, which is one of the useful 
techniques in breaking public-key ciphers based on the mathematics of factoring large prime numbers. 
Method summary: 
In [20] it describes a new algorithm for a Chinese Remainder Theorem (CRT) list decoding 
problem. Useful in determining integers with a large strongly smooth factor in a given interval, the 
algorithm has a polynomial time complexity. Moreover, the quadratic sieve methodology is employed in a 
generalized CRT decoding problem. 
Problem to solve: 
A general problem at hand is having an efficient way of factoring large integers en route to 
decrypt a cipher. A more specific problem is to determine smooth integers in short intervals using CRT 
decoding. Solving this specialized problem is a big step towards solving a bigger problem of factoring. 
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Methodology: 
A CRT list decoding methodology is used. Refer to the description of the methodology for the 
mathematical details. 
Method’s strength: 
The methodology is well presented and rich in proofs. It analyzes the complexity of the 
algorithms under discussion and tries to pin down areas of security weaknesses. The inclusion of alternate 
approaches to finding smooth integers is also a good move on its part. 
The complexity of the algorithms: 
The proposed algorithm has a polynomial time complexity. It gives a thorough analysis of the 
complexity of the algorithms.  
The cryptanalysis and algorithm’s robustness: 
The polynomial time complexity of the algorithm gives the algorithm robustness that is useful in 
real world applications. 
4.14. Shao’s cryptanalysis on a publicly verifiable authenticated encryption system 
Shao proposes how to break a publicly verifiable authenticated encryption system in [22]. He 
argues that a new authenticated encryption system with public verifiability as proposed by Ma and Chen 
is insecure because it fails to fulfill un-forge-ability, non-repudiation and privacy. This is insecurity is 
contrary to the proposal‟s claim. He disproves it by showing that they are indeed forgeable, not 
confidential and receiver or sender could repudiate. Moreover, its confidentiality fulfillment is 
compromised by its vulnerability to known-plaintext or known-ciphertext attack. 
Method’s summary: 
In [22] it is a proof of why Ma and Chen‟s authenticated encryption scheme is not as robust as it 
was shown to be. Rather, it fails to satisfy the basic authentication security properties of un-forge-ability, 
confidentiality and non-repudiation. 
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Problem to solve: 
The given problem is to disprove the security of Ma‟s and Chen‟s authenticated encryption 
scheme.  
Methodology: 
Shao used mathematical proofs to solve the given problem. The method gives a comprehensive 
account on the specifics. Like in the previous method, we will not discuss the mathematical details. 
Method’s strength: 
It is easy to follow and to the point as well as elegant both mathematically and conceptually. 
Cryptanalysis, complexity and robustness: 
As the method stresses, the cryptanalysis of Mao‟s and Chen‟s scheme is an easy feat. The 
mathematical proofs in the method further show how far from robustness Mao‟s scheme is, it breaks 
every basic security property of an authentication system: un-forge-ability, confidentiality and non-
repudiation. Moreover, long messages choke the cryptosystem becoming more vulnerable to known-
plaintext and known-ciphertext attacks. The method talks about the space and time complexities vaguely, 
however it suggests that the search space complexity is fairly easy to exploit. 
4.15. Benini’s hardware implementation of a cryptosystem against differential power cryptanalysis  
In [23]Error! Reference source not found., Benini et al propose a hardware implementation 
of a security system of a cryptosystem and how to protect it against differential power cryptanalysis 
attacks. 
Methodology summary: 
A cryptosystem can be implemented in software or hardware. Most previous methodologies we 
have discussed focused on theories and concepts underlying the cryptosystems, without providing 
implementations. Few hardware implementations have been discussed. In this methodology, we see a 
hardware implementation of a cryptosystem and how important it is to protect this system against a very 
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effective and efficient differential power cryptanalysis attacks. Experiments are done and results are 
presented. The implications of the experiment are also discussed. 
Problem to solve: 
The goal is to design a hardware-oriented cryptosystem resistant to differential power 
cryptanalysis attacks. 
Methodologies used: 
A hardware solution that utilizes power supply noise additions to the cryptographic computations 
and randomized power masking is used. 
The main idea is to design power-managed modules which are then used as a base architectural 
template for power-maskable, low-power data-path units.  
Method’s strength: 
It is concise, clear and experiment-oriented. It is written in a typical scientific experiment form 
where it first introduces the problem to solve, gives the hypothesis, does the experiment, specifies the 
observations, data collections and results, analyzes the results and then gives the conclusion and 
implications of the experiment. It uses diagrams and illustrations that clarify its arguments and discussion. 
Like the previous method discussion, the author also compares his differential power analysis 
attack protection technique to other previously known techniques. In this method, the author specifies 
clearly why his technique is more desirable over other techniques. For example, past noise injection 
techniques have more redundant computations and have more power overhead making them less 
desirable. 
Method’s weakness: 
The experimentation is not comprehensive. It should involve more repetitions and samples for 
more „accurate‟ averages. 
Security analysis highlights: Security, complexity and robustness 
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Differential power cryptanalysis is a very powerful and a very effective side channel 
cryptanalysis attack against cryptoprocessors. A security of a cryptoprocessor must be able withstand 
these attacks. This methodology explains how to protect cryptoprocessors against these attacks. 
An instance of differential power cryptanalysis can be seen in [24] where Dong-Guk Han et al 
propose how to break an XTR Asymmetric Key Cryptosystem using Side channel cryptanalysis. The 
XTR Asymmetric Key Cryptosystem is a relatively new cipher which was introduced in 2000. In this 
methodology, Han et al show that XTR Single exponentiation is susceptible to data-bit differential power 
analysis, address-bit differential power analysis, doubling attack, modified refined power analysis and 
modified zero-value side channel attacks. 
This method‟s security discussion does not implicitly quantify the complexity of the technique. 
However, it can be deduced that a protection against differential power analysis implies a higher 
complexity of breaking the system using the same attacking method. 
As far as robustness is concerned, a hardware solution is less flexible and has less adaptability 
compared to a software solution, as the methodology suggests in the introduction. On the hand, the 
hardware solution is faster, more compact and more energy-efficient than the software solution. Due to 
this trade-off between hardware and software solutions, the robustness of the proposed hardware solution 
depends on which robustness is desired. 
 
Suggestions for improvement: 
Repeating the experiment again a few more times and then average over all results to get more 
„accurate‟ results. 
GENERAL CRYPTOGRAPHY TECHNIQUES 
We shift our discussion to cryptanalysis methodologies that focus on side-channel attacks. We 
have seen that a cryptanalysis can attack a cipher using side-channel attacks in which the physical 
implementation weakness of the cipher is exploited.  
65 
 
4.16. Tiri-Verbauwhede’s VLSI Design Flow for Secure Side-Channel Attack Resistant ICs 
Tiri et al propose a VLSI Design Flow for Secure Side-Channel Attack Resistant ICs [28]Error! 
Reference source not found.. In their proposal, we see a digital VLSI design designed to be secure 
against side channel attacks. Tiri et al give a digital design flow of the scheme. 
Method summary: 
Tiri et al. are proposing a secure VLSI digital design flow for side-channel attack resistant 
Integrated Circuits (ICs). ICs have notoriously been exploited and targeted as security holes hosts of 
security applications due to their information leakage vulnerabilities. With the patching of this 
information leakage hole, security is enhanced. Moreover, the scheme transforms a regular synchronous 
digital design flow into a secure digital design flow by adding and modifying security-enhancing features 
in the regular automated design flow back end. This is done by a push-down approach implementation. 
Problem to solve: 
As the method suggests, the problem at hand is to create a secure VLSI design flow for side-
channel attack resistant ICs. 
Methodology: 
The scheme uses a constant power consumption logic style methodology and a place & route 
methodology, which inhibit parasitism in interconnected wires. 
Method’s strength: 
The method is well-written: It gives claims, elaborates them by illustrations and examples. It 
gives a fairly good security analysis by comparing the before-and-after designs, by zeroing on power 
attacks as well as timing, electromagnetic analysis and differential fault analysis side channel attacks. 
 
Method’s weakness: 
The method lacks mathematical proofs that could back up its claims. How is the reader supposed 
to believe what the author is saying if the author gives mere unproven descriptions? We say this to make 
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the reader to critically analyze the validity of the first statement of the conclusion that claims that the 
scheme is a secure digital design flow. 
Security analysis: Cryptanalysis, complexity and robustness: 
The method provides a detailed security analysis. However, its security analysis seems to lack 
some critical elements, such as mathematical proofs. The scheme however still shows great promise as far 
as security and cryptography is concerned: The modification from the original scheme to this proposed 
scheme increases the search space-and-time by a factor of at least ten, which makes it harder to break. 
The new scheme is more robust security-wise. It is a little unclear how robust it is in transmission. 
4.17. Kari’s Concurrent Error Detection of Fault-Based Side-channel Cryptanalysis of 128-Bit Symmetric 
Block Ciphers 
Karri et al also give a similar discussion in [29] as they introduce the Concurrent Error Detection 
of Fault-Based Side-channel Cryptanalysis of 128-Bit Symmetric Block Ciphers. They argue that a 
typical hardware and time redundancy based concurrent error detection is very expensive in space and 
time. As an alternative, they propose a cheaper concurrent error detection system. Like in [28], they give 
a digital design flow of their scheme and how it works. 
Method summary: 
The methodology presents low-cost, low-latency algorithm level, round level and operation level 
Concurrent Error Detection (CED) architectures for symmetric encryption algorithms. It investigates the 
CED architectures‟ trade-off between area overhead, performance penalty as well as error detection 
latency to come up with a conclusion that FPGA implementations have round level CED architectures 
that optimize area overhead, performance penalty and fault detection latencies. 
Problem to solve: 
The problem to solve is to create low-cost, low-latency CED architectures for symmetric 
encryption algorithms. 
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Methodology: 
FPGA implementations are used to create algorithm level, round level and operation level CED 
architectures for symmetric encryption algorithms. Along with FPGA implementations, Rijndael and 
Serpent AES encryption algorithms are used. Algorithm level, round level and operation level CED 
architectures for symmetric encryption algorithms are given.  
Methodology’s strength: 
The methodology is well presented due to the good use of tables and illustrations. It has a great 
introduction that puts the paper in context with current cryptology, i.e. side channel attacks in conjunction 
with rigorous mathematical analysis. 
Methodology’s weakness: 
It talks about FPGA implementation without defining or explaining what FPGA is. In [34] it 
defines FPGA as a gate array with a logic network that can be programmed into the device after its 
manufacture. The definition continues to say that an FPGA is made up of an array of logic elements, 
either gates or lookup table RAMs, flip-flops and programmable interconnect wiring.  
Security analysis: Cryptanalysis, complexity and robustness 
The security of the scheme is based on securing the system against side channel attacks by a 
careful design of the hardware to either reduce information leakage or nullify information leakage. The 
proposed scheme is designed and tested against fault-based side channel cryptanalysis. This scheme has a 
moderate area overhead and interconnection complexity for permanent and transient fault tolerance. This 
low-cost, low-latency CED architecture scheme for symmetric encryption algorithms is relatively more 
robust due to its improved security. 
OTHER CRYPTOLOGY CONCERNS 
4.18. Anderson’s reasons why cryptosystems fail 
Why do cryptosystems really fail? Is it mainly due to cryptanalysis, some of whose techniques 
have been discussed above, or are there other reasons? Arguably, cryptography designers and engineers 
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think cryptanalysis is the main reason why cryptosystems fail. Our above discussion also seems to 
suggest so. Looking at the history of cryptography and cryptanalysis, we see that both have co-existed and 
co-evolved portraying themselves to be two sides of the same coin. The most obvious reason why 
cryptosystems fail seems to be cryptanalysis. Ross Anderson in [15] provides a paradigm twist in why 
cryptosystems fail. According to him, cryptography designers and engineers fallaciously give too much 
emphasis on cryptanalysis as the reason why cryptosystems fail. 
Methodology summary: 
Anderson argues that cryptanalysis is not the main reason why cryptosystems fail; rather, it‟s the 
implementation errors and human‟s management failures. He continues to say that in other science and 
engineering fields, there is a learning and recovery system as a response to a system failure. But in 
cryptology, such a system is suppressed because of privacy and lack of failure information sharing 
system. For example, in the aeronautics, a system failure, say an accident is quickly and efficiently 
investigated and the cause later revealed for system improvement. But in cryptology, a military failure by 
the government as a result of cryptosystem failure is kept secret and the crucial security failure 
information is in most cases not shared to the cryptology community. As a result, there is less 
improvement, less security holes patching as the same failure repeats itself over and over again in the 
cryptosystems. Anderson points out that after all, cryptosystems failure may not be as a result of 
cryptanalysis success rather it‟s the implementation errors and management failures. Instead of thinking 
about what could go wrong in designing and implementing a cryptosystem, the cryptologists should 
instead think of what is likely to go wrong. 
Problem to solve: 
The problem is to know the real reason why cryptosystems fail. 
Methodology: 
Real world application failure survey is the methodology Anderson used to give his potential 
solution to the specified problem. Anderson looked at the problem from another angle, i.e. from the 
perspective of real world application failures. He was able to see that cryptanalysis has a much minor role 
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in cryptosystem failure. His approach differs from all previous methodologies, in that, he emphasizes a 
different approach where one does not have to crack one‟s head trying to break cryptography algorithms, 
rather one should explore and exploit human and implementation errors of the cryptosystems. According 
to him, most cryptography failures are caused by this. This is not to say that cryptanalysis is totally 
useless, rather its significance in cryptosystem‟s failure is minimal as opposed to other explorations and 
exploitations. 
Methodology’s strength: 
The methodology is in the form of a survey. Unlike previous discussions, this discussion is an 
elaboration of a bigger picture of how cryptography and cryptanalysis should be. In real world, he points 
out; cryptologists should focus more on the likelihood of implementation and human errors or 
weaknesses, rather than the smaller specialized encryption and decryption picture which ignores 
implementation and human errors. An interesting insight is provided, which is both enlightening and 
unique. 
Cryptography, cryptanalysis, complexity and robustness: 
The methodology is an account of a general picture of what and how cryptography and 
cryptanalysis should be. It explores different procedures and techniques, which are mainly not crypto-
centric. Anderson suggests that such procedures and techniques are more effective, efficient and robust in 
the real world, unlike the traditional cryptology techniques and procedures we have been discussing 
throughout the survey. Moreover, the space and time complexities of this approach are essentially 
polynomial at the most. This paper is a relevant conclusion of our discussion as it gives a broad picture 
linking all prior methodologies. 
Anderson’s reasons why cryptosystems fail: 
Cryptanalysis is not the main reason why cryptosystems fail; rather, it‟s the implementation errors 
and human‟s management failures. 
Problem to solve: 
The problem to solve is to determine the reason why cryptosystems fail. 
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Methodology: 
A real world application failure survey is conducted. 
Methodology’s strength: 
It is simply a survey. Unlike previous methodologies, this is an account of a bigger entire picture 
of how cryptography and cryptanalysis should be. 
Cryptography, Cryptanalysis, complexity and robustness: 
- The methodology is a survey accounting for a general picture of what and how cryptography and 
cryptanalysis should be.  
- Different procedures and techniques are reflected upon, most of which are not cryptology-centric. 
- Such procedures and techniques are more effective, efficient and robust in the real world, unlike the 
traditional cryptology techniques and procedures. 
- The space and time complexities of this approach are polynomial at the most.  
This paper is a good conclusion of our discussion as it gives a broad picture that links all our 
methodologies. 
4.19. Chen’s and Yen’s Random Control Encryption System (RCES) algorithm  
[49] proposes a Chen‟s and Yen‟s Random Control Encryption System (RCES) algorithm, 
formerly known as Random Seed Encryption System (RSES). It is an upgraded version of Chaotic Key-
Based Algorithm (CKBA), which has already been broken. 
Problem to solve: 
The problem to solve is to break the RCES/RSES Image Encryption Scheme. 
Methodology used - Why it is good for such a problem 
Two Known/Chosen-Plaintext attacks are used to break RCES. The first breaks RCES with a 
Mask Image and the second is through breaking the Chaotic Map. These two attacks can be combined to 
form a third attack, which is a Combined Known-Plaintext attack. Furthermore, a Brute-Force Ciphertext-
Only attack could also be used to attack this more easily than was previously thought. 
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Further security analysis: security, complexity and robustness  
Given key entropy K = 48, Image width M and image height M, the space complexity of the 
attack is O(2
K
MN) = O(2
64
). Its robustness is yet to be tested due to its newness.  
 Methodology’s strength: 
The methodology is well presented with theorems, lemmas and proofs. 
Methodology’s weakness: 
The methodology is questionable at a comment that says, “… the security of a cipher relies on the 
decryption key only, and it is assumed that all details of the encryption/decryption procedure are known 
to attackers” [37, page 3]. This comment is false, it is assumed so only when the break is a total break. 
Suggestions for improvement: 
The methodology could be improved by removing the above weaknesses. 
 
4.20. Vivek’s, Rangan’s and Jain’s Cryptanalysis of Li et al.’s Identity-Based Threshold 
Signcryption Scheme [53] 
Summary: 
The methodology is for breaking Fagen Li‟s and Yong Yu‟s signcryption cipher. It 
exploits the cipher flaw of the secret key of the sender being exposed during encryption. 
Problem to solve: 
The goal is to break or disprove the signcryption scheme. 
Solution: 
The solution is to expose the unforgeability proof flaw. 
Complexity, Security Analysis: 
The methodology exposes a security hole theoretically. 
Strengths: 
It disproves the security of the cipher and suggests an improvement. 
72 
 
Weaknesses: 
The methodology is a theoretical proof; actual implementation or experimentation was 
not given. 
 
PARAMETERS’ RATING EVALUATION on scales 0≤mi≤10, 0.0≤xi≤1.0, 0≤bi ≤10: 
Methodology mi=8 
The methodology is not perfectly original; it is designed to work alongside the cipher. 
Space complexity x1=0.5 
Applicable, but not discussed. 
Time complexity x2=0.5 
Applicable, but not discussed. 
Data complexity x3=0.5 
Applicable, but not discussed. 
Real-time performance x4=0.3 
No implementation, only theoretical presentation. 
Robustness x5=0.8 
It is robust in a sense that it is designed to be used on the cipher, wherever the cipher is. 
However, the lack of experimentation undermines its robustness claim. It has potential for 
robustness, but there is no experimentation to back it up. 
Application x6=0.8 
It is designed to act on the cipher, therefore useful. No experimentation however to prove 
its applicability. 
Portability x7=0.8 
It is designed to act on the cipher, therefore portable. 
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Implementation x8=0.5 
It is theoretical, no implementation was given. 
Reliability x9=0.8 
No experimentation to prove its reliability. 
Bias bi=8 
Good, but the lack of experimentation undermines its credibility. 
 
4.21. Guneysu’s, Kasper’s, Novotny’s, Paar’s and Rupp’s Cryptanalysis with COPACOBANA [54] 
Summary: 
This is a series of implementations of cryptanalysis applications on a Cost-Optimized 
Parallel Code Breaker (COPACOBANA) machine. 
Problem: 
To perform code breaking tasks successfully in manageable time. 
Solution: 
To perform brute force attacks by exhaustively searching the keyspace. 
Strengths: 
The COPACOBANA machine has massive computing power. 
Weaknesses: 
The COPACOBANA machine uses a brute-force attack which is not considered good or 
smart. Most ciphers are designed to have key spaces too big for any computer to search 
exhaustively. 
PARAMETERS’ RATING EVALUATION on scales 0≤mi≤10, 0.0≤xi≤1.0, 0≤bi ≤10: 
Methodology mi =4 
An exhaustive key search is not a smart attacking technique. 
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Space complexity x1=1.0, Time complexity x2=1.0, Data complexity x3=1.0, Real-time 
performance x4=1.0 
Table 3 give space, time, data complexity results and real-time performance results 
supported by corresponding analysis. For example, the machine can break DES in less than a 
week at an average throughput of 65.3 billion searched keys per second. 
Robustness x5=1.0 
It is very robust. The COPACOBANA machine can host a wide range of cryptanalytic 
applications. 
Application x6=1.0 
Brute force attacks can be applied in many ciphers. In the discussion, they use examples 
of e-Passport and GSM voice encryption. 
Portability x7=1.0 
This methodology can be used in RSA, ECC‟s, DES, A 5/1. 
Implementation x8=1.0 
This is a hardware implementation. 
Reliability x9=0.9 
This is designed for applications with relatively low memory and communication 
requirements. 
Bias bi =10 
It is clear on how it works, for instance it computes integer factorizations for RSA and 
elliptic curve discrete logarithms for Elliptic Curve Cryptosystems (ECC‟s). 
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4.22. Ayoub Khan’s and Singh’s Joint Signature and Hybrid Encryption [55] 
Summary: 
This is a Joint Signature and Hybrid Encryption Scheme, a more secure methodology for 
symmetric-asymmetric hybrid encryption and digital signature. 
Problems: 
The problems to solve are authenticity and encryption. 
Solution: 
The solution is a signencryption scheme for digital signature and encryption. 
Strengths: 
Compared to existing implementations, this has a relatively fast speed of 2.8 Mbps. For 
example, ETH Zurich‟s IDEA algorithm reported a speed of 0.88 Mbps on 33 MHz 386 
machine. It also has low computational costs. 
Weaknesses: 
Combining symmetric, asymmetric and digital signatures may also lead to undesirable 
features. 
PARAMETERS’ RATING EVALUATION on scales 0≤mi≤10, 0.0≤xi≤1.0, 0≤bi ≤10: 
Methodology mi=10 
This attempts to solve a classic problem of authenticity and encryption. 
Space complexity x1=1.0, Time complexity x2=1.0, Data complexity x3=1.0, Real-time 
performance x4=1.0 
This has low computational cost. Table 1 gives a throughput analysis and its 
corresponding discussion implicitly gives the data complexity, the time complexity, the space 
complexity and real-time performance. The algorithm‟s key size is that of 1024 bits for RSA and 
128 bits for IDEA. The speed of the implantation is 2.8 Mbps. 
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Robustness x5=1.0, Portability x7=1.0 
It is implemented on a .NET platform, which is extensible. Some of its portability can be 
traced to ANSI X 9.31, DSS, IDEA, Hybrid, RSA and SHA-256. 
Application x6=1.0 
The application involves secure internet computing, e-Payment in distance education 
system, mobile environment and devices like smart cards. 
Implementation x8=1.0 
The software implementation and its experiment details are given.  
Reliability x9=1.0 
It runs on a .NET platform which provides implementations of many standard 
cryptographic algorithms. It is easy to use, has the safest possible default properties. 
Bias bi =10 
The throughput analysis was a good approach to support its functionality. Mathematical 
formulas are also provided. 
 
4.23. El-Hadidi’s, Hegazi’s and Aslan’s Implementation of a hybrid encryption scheme for 
Ethernet [56] 
Summary: 
This is an implementation of a hybrid encryption scheme for Ethernet. 
Problem:  
This deals with a problem creating a secure encryption algorithm. 
Solution:  
It presents a software implementation of a hybrid encryption scheme for LAN 
Authentication. 
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Strengths: 
The implementation and experimentation are thoroughly done. This involved chart 
analysis, which is a powerful analysis tool. 
Weaknesses: 
Software implementation is usually slower than a hardware implementation. It is 
suggested in the discussion that, some parts of the algorithm could be implemented in hardware 
to speed up some operations. 
 
PARAMETERS’ RATING EVALUATION on scales 0≤mi≤10, 0.0≤xi≤1.0, 0≤bi ≤10: 
Methodology mi=10 
This is a useful topic in the field. 
Space complexity x1=1.0 
The space complexity is given. The required memory space for the SMF was 75 KB and 
for the user stations 170 KB. 
Time complexity x2=1.0, Real-time performance x4=1.0 
The processing time increases exponentially with the increase in the key length. 
Data complexity x3=1.0 
Each IPX packet has a 30-byte long header followed by a data section with a length that 
ranges from 0 to 546 bytes. 
Robustness x5=1.0, Application x6=1.0 
It is robust and widely applicable in LAN authentication. 
Portability x7=1.0 
IPX packets are portable over the LAN and net. 
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Implementation x8=1.0 
The software implementation is given. 
Reliability x9=1.0 
The software implementation and experimentation has shown that it is reliable and 
functions as it is supposed to function. 
Bias bi =10 
The methodology is well presented with an experimentation supporting it. 
 
4.24. Qing’s, Yang’s and Cheng’s Hybrid Encryption Scheme against Adaptive Chosen Ciphertext 
Attack [57] 
Summary: 
This is a hybrid encryption scheme against an adaptive chosen ciphertext attack. This is 
based on weaker Linear Diffie-Hellman (LDDH) assumption. 
Problem: 
The goal is to create a cipher secure against adaptive chosen ciphertext attacks without 
using strong assumptions. 
Solution: 
The proposed algorithm solves the problem with minimal assumptions. 
Strengths: 
It has relatively stronger security than its contemporary counterparts. 
Weaknesses: 
The methodology is presented theoretically without experimentation. Instead of 
experimentation, scenarios are given. This undermines its credibility. 
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PARAMETERS’ RATING EVALUATION on scales 0≤mi≤10, 0.0≤xi≤1.0, 0≤bi ≤10: 
Methodology mi =10 
The topic is important in the field. 
Space complexity x1=0.7, Time complexity x2=0.7, Data complexity x3=0.7, Real-time 
performance x4=0.7 
The algorithm is given theoretically without implementation. This could be calculated 
and the task of complexity analysis is left to the reader. 
Robustness x5=0.5, Application x6=0.5, Portability x7=0.5  
There is no experimentation to prove robustness, portability or application, though the 
potential is there. 
Implementation x8=0.2 
There is no implementation, it is theoretical. 
Reliability x9=0.6 
Due to the avoidance of strong assumptions, it is relatively more reliable than its 
counterparts. 
Bias bi =5 
The methodology lacks implementation and experimentation supports. 
 
4.25. Chang’s and Hu’s Hybrid encrypted holographic data storage [58] 
Summary: 
This is a hybrid encryption holographic data storage scheme. 
Problem: 
The problem to solve is to encrypt holographic data and create an optical encryption 
system. 
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Solution: 
The solution is to implement a scheme based on random-phase modulation of a single 
reference beam for multiplexing images in LINbO3: Fe crystals. 
Strengths: 
It is a functioning scheme. 
Weaknesses: 
In the given prototype example, the probability of decryption p is only p=5x10
-11
, which 
means that there are only 1/p = 2x10
10
 permutations. A software simulation could be designed to 
easily break this system by brute force attack. 
 
PARAMETERS’ RATING EVALUATION on scales 0≤mi≤10, 0.0≤xi≤1.0, 0≤bi ≤10: 
Methodology mi =10 
It is useful in holographic data encryption. 
Space complexity x1=0.9, Time complexity x2=0.9, Data complexity x3=0.9, Real-time 
performance x4=0.9 
With reference to its weakness discussed above, the complexity discussion is implicitly 
implied by the probability of the given decrypt function.  
Robustness x5=0.5 
Its robustness is unknown and in question. 
Application x6=1.0 
It is useful in holographic data encryption. 
Portability x7=0.9 
The prototype is given and looks simple enough to be implemented in embedded systems 
like a camera system. 
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Implementation x8=1.0 
The implementation is given. This uses rotational and shift random-phase encoded 
(RSRE) multiplexing. 
Reliability x9=0.8 
The prototype is simple and looks crude. However, the final version could be more 
reliable. 
Bias bi =8 
The probability of decryption is given. However, the discussion is brief and omitted 
convincing arguments or proofs to show that the scheme functions well. 
 
4.26. Shaar’s, Saeb’s, Elmessiery’s and Badawi’s Hybrid Hiding Encryption Algorithm (HHEA) 
[59] 
Summary: 
This scheme is a hybrid hiding encryption algorithm (HHEA) for data communication 
security. 
Problem: 
The problem to solve is encryption and data hiding. 
Solution: 
A Software implementation solution to the problem is given. 
Strengths: 
It is simple to implement. 
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Weaknesses: 
A software implementation is relatively slower than a hardware implementation. A 
powerful computer can break the key by brute force attacks because of a relatively small key 
space. 
PARAMETERS’ RATING EVALUATION on scales 0≤mi≤10, 0.0≤xi≤1.0, 0≤bi ≤10: 
Methodology mi =10 
Encryption and hiding are important in the field. 
Space complexity x1=1.0 
This is implicitly implied by the data complexity, the second next variable discussion. 
Time complexity x2=1.0 
The algorithm has linear time complexity O(n). It has variable key length of 16 and up 
and a word length of 1-16 bits block size or 1-32 bits block size. 
Data complexity x3=1.0 
The worst case scenario is when replacing 1 bit only from message to vector V. The 
ciphertext size is 8 times the plain text size. 
Real-time performance x4=0.8 
Real-time performance is not given, but it can be implied from the time complexity 
discussion. 
Robustness x5=0.8 
There is a potential security hole because the input plaintext is encrypted serially causing 
some dependency between throughput and nature of the key. This is vulnerable to attacks 
because the confusion or diffusion properties are not enforced. 
Application x6=1.0 
It could be widely applied in encryption and steganography. 
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Portability x7=1.0 
It is portable. 
Implementation x8=1.0 
A software implementation is given. 
Reliability x9=1.0 
It is reliable. 
Bias bi =10 
The design and implementation of the algorithm is given, supported by experimentation. 
 
4.27. Farouk’s and Saeb’s Improved FPGA Implementation of the Modified Hybrid Hiding 
Encryption Algorithm (MHHEA) [60] 
Summary: 
This is an improved FPGA implementation of the modified hybrid hiding encryption 
algorithm (MHHEA). This is an improvement to the former methodology [59].  
Problem: 
The problem to solve is encryption and hiding. 
Solution: 
A hardware implementation solution using Field Programmable Gate Array (FPGA) is 
given. 
Strengths: 
This hardware implementation is faster than the software counterpart. It also attempts to 
eliminate the security hole of having dependency between throughput and the key. This is an 
attempt to avoid chosen plaintext attacks. 
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Weaknesses: 
Weaknesses are currently unknown. 
PARAMETERS’ RATING EVALUATION on scales 0≤mi≤10, 0.0≤xi≤1.0, 0≤bi ≤10: 
Methodology mi =8 
This methodology is useful in the field, however it is an incremental version of previous 
algorithms. 
Space complexity x1=0.8, Time complexity x2=0.8 
These are implied implicitly. 
Data complexity x3=1.0 
The data storage size in all the caches is specified. 
Real-time performance x4=0.8 
This methodology was presented by simulation, not actual hardware implementation. 
Robustness x5=1.0 
This is more robust than the software implementation. 
Application x6=1.0, Portability x7=1.0 
FPGA‟s are readily used and portable. 
Implementation x8=1.0 
FPGA hardware implementation is given, however the experiments were software 
simulations of the hardware. 
Reliability x9=1.0 
It is reliable. 
Bias bi =10 
The algorithm is presented along with its FPGA implementation. 
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4.28. Jiang’s, Ping’s and Zhang’s Pattern Analysis Applied on Steganalysis for Binary Text Images 
[61] 
Summary: 
The methodology is pattern analysis applied on steganalysis for binary text images. 
Problem: 
The problem to solve is to break a steganalysis scheme on binary text images. 
Solution: 
The solution is to perform pattern analysis on 3x3 square pixel blocks of images. 
Strengths: 
It has good performance in successful detection especially in binary text images with 
black and white pixels that are uniformly distributed based on the flipability of the pixel. 
Weaknesses: 
Detecting threshold has some great correlation with the binary text images. 
PARAMETERS’ RATING EVALUATION on scales 0≤mi≤10, 0.0≤xi≤1.0, 0≤bi ≤10: 
Methodology mi =10 
The scheme is useful in the field. 
Space complexity x1=0.8, Time complexity x2=0.8, Data complexity x3=0.8 
These concepts are discussed implicitly. 
Real-time performance x4=0.8 
The discussion on real-time performance is based on success rate. 
Robustness x5=0.8 
The issue of robustness is an open question, however its previously discussed weakness 
could undermine its robustness.  
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Application x6=1.0, Portability x7=1.0 
This scheme is useful and portable in binary text images. 
Implementation x8=1.0 
A software implementation is given. 
Reliability x9=0.6 
The issue of reliability is an open question; however there is some potential for failures as 
discussed in the weaknesses. Its reliability needs further investigation. 
Bias bi =9 
The methodology was well presented: experimentation, chart analysis, variance and 
probability analysis. However, the complexity discussion was implicit. 
 
4.29. Tan’s and Wang’s Extended Optimization Method of LSB Steganalysis [62] 
Summary: 
The methodology is an Extended Optimization method of LSB steganalysis. 
Problem: 
The problem at hand is LSB steganalysis. 
Solution: 
The solution is optimized LSB steganalysis, extending Fridrich‟s method from the case 
L=1 to arbitrary L>0. 
Strengths: 
It is as good as Fridrich‟s scheme. It is an effective steganalytic method for LSB hiding. 
Weaknesses: 
Weaknesses are currently unknown. 
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PARAMETERS’ RATING EVALUATION on scales 0≤mi≤10, 0.0≤xi≤1.0, 0≤bi ≤10: 
Methodology mi =9 
LSB Image steganalysis is important in the field, but the concepts are based on the old 
LSB steganography. 
Space complexity x1=0.8, Time complexity x2=0.8, Data complexity x3=0.8, Real-time 
performance x4=0.8 
The discussion points out that the results were there, but they were truncated and not 
presented. 
Robustness x5=1.0, Reliability x9=1.0 
This scheme has a high success rate; therefore it is an effective scheme, robust and 
reliable. 
Application x6=1.0, Portability x7=1.0 
LSB steganography widely used, therefore this LSB steganalysis is also portable. 
Implementation x8=1.0 
The experiments that involved software implementations are presented. 
Bias bi=10 
The methodology is well presented: Four experiments were presented. 
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5. A Comparative Study on the aforementioned cryptology 
methodologies 
Comparative Survey Table 
Having discussed the above, we are now ready to give a final evaluation and comparison of the 
above methodologies. We will come up with a formula, parameters and criteria that will assist us in 
evaluating each of these methodologies. Each parameter will be weighed based on its importance and 
impact to the focus of our discussion. Finally, we will give a comparative survey table that summarizes 
our discussion.  
The Effectiveness Index Formula and Parameter Definitions: 
For this evaluation we use the opinion of code-methodology developers and users in order to have 
more objective view of the process. Let each methodology Mi be evaluated as mi. Also, let each paper 
have n parameters Pj, each of which has a specified importance and impact weight wj with a 
corresponding value xj. Variables xj are on a 0.0 – 1.0 scale and will be used to scale the corresponding 
specified constant weight wj. Also, let each methodology have a bias bi (on a scale of 1-10), which is a 
subjective measure of the methodology‟s clarity (use of visual aid, tables, illustration and communication 
efficiency), mathematical elegance (mathematical proofs). Define an Effectiveness Index Formula as:  
Effectiveness Index Ei = mi + ( ∑j
n
  wj .xj ) + bi 
Equation 1: The Effectiveness Index Formula Ei for some methodology i. 
 
The maximum Effective Index Ei value is 84 as it will be shown shortly. The higher the Effectiveness 
Index, the higher the effectiveness and the value of the methodology based on our parameters of interest. 
It is also important to know that the effectiveness index is an overall indicator: A methodology with the 
highest Ei does not mean that it is the best methodology; rather it is a methodology that has attempted to 
cover the most aspects of the parameters we are considering. To see which methodology discusses a 
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certain parameter with a relatively good analysis, one needs to sort the evaluated comparative analysis 
table. 
First, we list and define a set of parameters and variables that are important to our discussion, and 
we also explain why they are important to our discussion. 
Mi - evaluated as m 
Each Methodology Mi is evaluated as m based on how the cryptology community views it 
whether it is original, a modification version or an incremental version. Due to the importance and a big 
interest of innovative methodologies in the cryptology community, m will contribute up to 10 points to 
the value of the Effectiveness Index. 
P1 - Space complexity: 
The space complexity of an algorithm is the amount of memory required to execute the algorithm. 
This is important in analyzing how effective and efficient a methodology is. Therefore, this will 
contribute up to 8 points to the Effectiveness Index. Therefore, we set the constant w1 = 8. 
P2 - Time complexity: 
As previously discussed, time complexity is the wall time required to execute the algorithm. Time 
specifications do not have to be in real time, they can be in big O notation. This is important in analyzing 
how effective and efficient a methodology is. Therefore, this will contribute up to 8 points to the 
Effectiveness Index. Therefore, we set the constant w2 = 8. 
P3 - Data complexity: 
Data complexity refers to the plaintext and ciphertext quantity required to execute an algorithm. 
This is important in analyzing how effective and efficient a methodology is. Therefore, this will 
contribute up to 8 points to the Effectiveness Index. Therefore, we set the constant w3 = 8. 
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P4 - Real time performance: 
How long does the methodology execute in real time? This is important in analyzing how 
effective and efficient a methodology is. Therefore, this will contribute up to 5 points to the Effectiveness 
Index because this is a different side of time complexity. Therefore, we set the constant w4 = 5. 
P5 - Robustness: 
How robust is the methodology in communication, transmission and application? Is it easily 
breakable? Does it fall apart easily? This is important in analyzing how effective and efficient a 
methodology is. Therefore, this will contribute up to 10 points to the Effectiveness Index. Therefore, we 
set the constant w5 = 10. 
P6 – Application and variety: 
How useful is the methodology? This is important in analyzing how useful a methodology is. 
Therefore, this will contribute up to 7 points to the Effectiveness Index. Therefore, we set the constant w6 
= 7. 
P7 - Portability: 
How many platforms can the methodology run on? This is not a requirement in a methodology; a 
methodology can be very specialized. However portability is a desirable feature. Therefore, this will 
contribute up to 5 points to the Effectiveness Index. Therefore, we set the constant w7 = 5. 
P8 - Implementation: 
Does the methodology talk of implementation? A methodology could be theory rich without 
specifying the implementation. However, in our survey, a methodology that gives implementation details 
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will be valued higher. Therefore, this will contribute up to 5 points to the Effectiveness Index. Therefore, 
we set the constant w8 = 5. 
P9 - Reliability: 
How much can we depend on the methodology to do its job? Can we trust it to accomplish its 
job? It is important for a methodology to be reliable. Therefore, this will contribute up to 8 points to the 
Effectiveness Index. Therefore, we set the constant w9 = 8. 
Bias b: 
A bias bi is a subjective measure of the methodology‟s clarity and mathematical elegance. Due to 
its importance, we assign up to 10 points. 
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Table 2: Comparative Survey Table 1 (with brief explanations) 
    
Ref
.   Complexity        
# 
Methodology\Param
. # Category Vars Time Space Data 
Real-time 
perform. Robust? Application Portability 
1 Puzzle [16] 
Multimedia 
encryption frame blocks n O(n!) 
Implementation 
dependent Incorrect (n/2)! Yes Multimedia Yes 
2 
CRT-RSA immune 
to Bellcore attacks [19] 
Public-key 
encryption N/A 
Implementa
tion 
dependent 
Implementation 
dependent O(S
c1.c2
); Open question Yes Public key Yes 
3 
Permutation-Only 
Multimedia Cryptos 
Cryptanalysis [11] 
Multimedia 
decryption 
pixel size x; image size 
mn; image count p O(p(mn)
2
) 
Implementation 
dependent O(logx(mn)) Open question Yes Multimedia Yes 
4 
Chosen Plaintext 
attack on Private key 
encryption schemes 
based on Burst-
error-correcting 
codes [14] 
Private-key 
decryption 
Ciphertext 
C=(MG+El,w)P; M = 
binary k-tuple plaintext; 
G = generator matrix of 
B(n,k,d,b); El,w=random 
burst of length l, 
Hamming weight w; P = 
nxn permutation matrix; 
wmin<=w<l<b 
Implementa
tion 
dependent 
Implementation 
dependent 
O(nbmin - w) 
for some 
B(n,k,d,b), 
Hamming 
weight w Open question 
Open 
question Private key 
Open 
question 
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5 
Breaking a Gifford's 
cipher by ciphertext-
only attack [26] 
Broadcast 
decryption: 
NY Times, AP 
wire reports N/A 
4 hrs on 
Sparc 
station 
(2) Time-space 
tradeoff atack: 
2
18
 bytes of 
memory 
(1) Brute-
force: 2
40
 
steps; (2) 
Time-space 
tradeoff 
attack: 2
27
 
steps; (3) 
Correlation 
attack: 2
29 
steps 
4 hrs on Sparc 
station Yes 
Broadcast 
decryption: 
News 
articles Yes 
6 
Quadratic 
residuosity 
intractability; 
Probabilistic 
encryption [27] 
Public-key 
encryption N/A polynom. N/A N/A N/A 
Yes; 
proved General 
Yes; 
general 
                        
7 
Differential 
cryptanalysis of 
Hash functions 
based on Block 
ciphers [17] 
Cryptanalysis 
of Hash 
functions 
based on 
Block ciphers N/A 
Implementa
tion 
dependent 
Implementation 
dependent 
MDC-2 
requires 2
55
 
encryptions 
(collision); 2
83
 
(2nd pre-
image); MDC-
4 requires 2
109
 
encryptions 
(collision) 
Practical; 
MDC-4 2x 
slower than 
MDC-2 
No; No 
good 
character
istics 
with even 
# of 
rounds; 
MDC-2, 
MDC-4 
resistant 
when # 
of rounds 
is >= 13 
DES, MDC-
2, MDC-4, 
FEAL-N 
Yes; 
general 
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8 
Differential and 
linear attack 
resistant 
Substitution-
Permutation 
Networks (SPN) [13] 
Substitution-
Permutation 
Network 
Ciphers N/A 
Brute force 
attack 
requires 
exponential 
time 
Implementation 
dependent 
An 8-round 
SPN with 8x8 
S-boxes with 
NL(S)=112 
takes 250 
plaintexts to 
examine 1 bit. 
(Refer to table 
2 of [13] for 
more info) 
Implementatio
n dependent 
Yes, 
improved 
security 
SPN 
Hardware 
Yes, 
Hardwar
e 
portable 
                        
9 
Combining 
differential and linear 
cryptanalysis into a 
statistical 
cryptanalysis attack 
on DES [12] 
DES 
cryptanalysis 
s counters for all 
random samples S = 
h2(P,C); l registers for all 
candidates K 
statistical - 
O(n) 
(counting 
phase); 
O(sl) 
(Analysis 
phase); 
O(l.log l) 
(sorting 
phase) O(s+l) 
2
46.9
 known 
plaintexts 
Implementatio
n dependent 
Yes; 
takes the 
best of 
differenti
al and 
linear 
attacks 
DES; block 
ciphers 
Yes; 
portabilit
y of DES 
and 
block 
ciphers 
                        
10 
Information leakage 
of Boolean functions [30] 
Cryptology: 
cryptographic 
strength of 
Boolean 
functions N/A 
Out of 
scope: 
probability 
mathematic Out of scope Out of scope Out of scope 
Yes, 
improved 
security 
Boolean 
functions, 
S-boxes, 
Substit.-
Permut. 
Networks 
(SPN) 
Yes, S-
boxes, 
SPNs 
portable. 
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11 Key collision attacks [21] 
cryptanalysis 
of DES and 
triple-DES k-length key O(2
k/2
) O(2
k/2
) 2
28
 ciphertexts 
Much less 
running time 
than other well 
known DES 
attacks 
Yes; 2
28
 
vs. 2
47
 
Differenti
al, 2
43
 
known 
plaintext, 
2
50
 
Davies' 
attack 
Cryptos 
using DES, 
triple-DES, 
such as 
Bank 
cryptos 
Yes, 
portabilit
y of DES 
and 
triple-
DES 
                        
12 
Key recovery 
methodology based 
on a timing attack 
that reveals the 
Hamming weight of 
the key in DES [25] 
DES 
cryptanalysis N/A ---> ---> 
160000 
measuments 
for 28-
Hamming 
weight RSA-
DES key 
(Refer to table 
I of [25]) 
475 micro-
seconds 
Yes; 
reduces 
the 
searched 
key 
space 
DES 
implementa
tion hybrids, 
eg. RSA-
DES, 
Leuko-DES; 
Bank 
cryptos 
Yes; 
portabilit
y of DES 
                        
13 
Large integer 
factorization using 
CRT list decoding [20] 
Public-key 
cryptanalysis N/A polyn. 
Implementation 
dependent; a 
technique for 
solving a 
mathematical 
problem <--- <--- 
Yes; 
polyn. 
Time 
General 
public key 
Yes; 
general 
public-
key 
cryptos 
                        
14 
Mathematical 
disproofs on the Ma-
Chen scheme [22] 
Authenticatio
n attack N/A 
exponen. 
but practical 
Implementation 
dependent; 
mathematics 
theories <--- <--- 
Yes; a 
criticism 
of Ma-
Chen 
scheme 
Authenticati
on systems 
Yes; 
general, 
portabilit
y of 
Public-
key 
cryptos 
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15 
Hardware solution of 
adding power supply 
noise to crypto 
computations and 
randomized power 
masking [23] 
cryptoprocess
ors against 
differential 
power 
cryptanalysis N/A 
N/A: Power 
profile 
experiment
ation <--- <--- <--- 
Less 
robust, 
less 
flexible 
than 
software 
solution. 
But, 
faster, 
more 
compact 
and more 
energy-
efficient 
Cryptoproc
essors 
Yes; 
cryptopro
cessors 
portable 
                        
16 
VLSI design flow for 
side-channel attack 
resistant Ics (DES 
algorithm 
implementation) [28] 
Cryptography
: Side-channel 
attack 
resistant 
cryptosystem 
(VLSI Design 
Flow) N/A 
N/A: Power 
analysis <-- 
At least 2000 
measurement
s (10x more 
than a DPA 
attack on  
regular single 
ended CMOS 
standard cell 
implementatio
n of a DES 
algorithm 
module) <-- 
Yes, 
search 
space-
time 
increase
d by a 
factor of 
10 
Integrated 
Circuits 
(ICs) 
Yes, 
general 
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17 
Field-Programmable 
Gate-Array (FPGA) 
implementations of 
AES [29] 
Concurrent 
Error 
Detection of 
Fault-Based 
Side-Channel 
Cryptanalysis 
of 128-bit 
sysmmetric 
block ciphers 
r rounds, n clock cycles 
per round 
Fault 
detection 
latency is 
2nr (Worst 
case) 
N/A: Circuit 
analysis; Refer 
to table 5 of [29] 
- summary of 
FPGA 
implementation 
of CED 
architectures of 
128-bit 
symmetric 
encryption 
algorithms <-- <-- 
Yes; 
Low-
cost, low-
latency 
artchitect
ures; 
improved 
security 
General; 
AES 
Yes; 
AES - 
Rijdael, 
RC6, 
Twofish, 
Serpent 
                        
18 
Implementation 
errors and human 
errors source of 
cryptosystem 
failures [15] 
General 
cryptography N/A 
N/A - 
Theoretical: 
General 
discussion 
on the 
cause of 
failures in 
cryptosyste
ms <-- <-- <-- 
Yes, 
general 
discussio
n 
General; 
ATM 
machines, 
encryption 
products 
Yes; 
General 
discussio
n 
19 RCES/RSES [16] 
Image 
encryption 
* K = Key entropy = 48; 
* M = Image width = 
256; 
* N = Image height = 
256; 
Unspecified
, 
Proportional 
to data 
complexity 
O(2
K
MN) = 
O(2
64
) 
Proportional to 
data complexity 
O(2
K
MN) = 
O(2
64
) 
O(2
K
MN) = 
O(2
64
) 
Unspecified, 
depends on 
host platform; 
Proportional to 
data 
complexity 
O(2
K
MN) = 
O(2
64
) Yes 
Image, 
Video 
Yes, 
image 
encryptio
n 
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Table 3: Comparative Survey Table 2 (with Values) 
  Method. 
value 
Space Comp. Time Data Real 
Perf. 
Robust. Appl. & variety Portability Implem. Realiability Bias Eff. Index 
I Methodology\Param mi x1 x2 x3 x4 x5 x6 x7 x8 x9 b Ieff 
 wi  for xi N/A 8 8 8 5 10 7 5 5 8 N/A  
1 Puzzle 3
i
 0.1 1.0 0.0 1.0 0.9 1.0 1.0 0.9
ii
 0.8 10 58.7 
2 
CRT-RSA immune to Bellcore 
attacks 
9 0.0 0.0 1.0 0.0 0.9 1.0 0.9 0.1 0.7 9 52.6 
3 
Permutation-Only Multimedia 
Cryptos Cryptanalysis 
8 0.3 0.8 0.8 0.0 0.8 1.0 1.0 0.5 0.8 5 57.1 
4 
Chosen Plaintext attack on 
Private key encryption 
schemes based on Burst-
error-correcting codes 
8 0.5 0.5 1.0 0.5 0.7 0.9 0.8 1.0
iii
 0.9 7 63.0 
5 
Breaking a Gifford's cipher by 
ciphertext-only attack 
8 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
iv
 1.0 10 82.0 
6 
Quadratic residuosity 
intractability; Probabilistic 
9 0.3 0.8 0.3 0.3 1.0 0.9 0.9 0.5
v
 9 9 61.2 
                                               
i Modified version of permutation 
ii Software 
iii Array codes implementation 
iv Filter generator implementation 
v Vague, based on quardratic residuosity intractability 
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encryption 
7 
Differential cryptanalysis of 
Hash functions based on 
Block ciphers 
9 0.5 0.5 1.0 1.0 0.6 0.9 0.9 0.9
vi
 0.8
vii
 9 66.7 
8 
Differential and linear attack 
resistant Substitution-
Permutation Networks (SPN) 
9 0.5 1.0 1.0 0.7 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 10 77.5 
9 
Combining differential and 
linear cryptanalysis into a 
statistical cryptanalysis attack 
on DES 
9 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
viii
 1.0 9 82.0 
10 
Information leakage of 
Boolean functions 
8 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
ix
 0.8 9 56.2 
11 Key collision attacks 9 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.2
x
 0.7
xi
 9 75.6 
12 
Key recovery methodology 
based on a timing attack that 
reveals the Hamming weight 
9 0.8 0.8 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
xii
 0.9
xiii
 10 79.0 
                                               
vi Implicitly discussed 
vii No good characteristics with even # of rounds. 
viii S-box 
ix SPNs 
x Theoretic 
xi Theoretic, not empirically proven 
xii Hardware and Software: RAM cache, instructions 
xiii Can not recover all bits of a DES key. 
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of the key in DES 
13 
Large integer factorization 
using CRT list decoding 
10 0.6 0.9 0.6 0.6 1.0 0.9 0.9 0.1 1.0
xiv
 10 69.1 
14 
Mathematical disproofs on the 
Ma-Chen scheme 
8 0.6 0.9 0.6 0.6 0.9 1.0 1.0 0.1 0.5
xv
 10 63.3 
15 
Hardware solution of adding 
power supply noise to crypto 
computations and randomized 
power masking 
8 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.8 1.0 1.0 1.0
xvi
 0.9 8 56.9 
16 
VLSI design flow for side-
channel attack resistant ICs 
(DES algorithm 
implementation) 
8 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
xvii
 0.9 7 57.9 
17 
Field-Programmable Gate-
Array (FPGA) implementations 
of AES 
9 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.9 9 81.2 
18 
Implementation errors and 
human errors source of 
4 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.9 0.6
xviii
 6 50.0 
                                               
xiv Can correct as many errors as Guruswami-Sudan‟s algorithm for Reed-Solomon list decoding. 
xv Not convincing – Not proven empirically. 
xvi Register-Transfer-Level Implementation and Logic Design 
xvii VLSI, Integrated Circuit (IC) implementation 
xviii Not very concept-rich, deals with the „obvious‟. 
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cryptosystem failures 
19 RCES/RSES 8
xix
 0.8 0.8 1.0 0.5 0.7
xx
 1.0 1.0
xxi
 1.0
xxii
 0.7
xxiii
 8 68.9 
20 
Methodology [53] 8 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.3 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.5 0.8 8 59 
21 
Methodology [54] 4 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0.9 10 78.2 
22 
Methodology [55] 10 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 10 84 
23 
Methodology [56] 10 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 10 84 
24 
Methodology [57] 10 0.7 0.7 0.7 0.2 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.2 0.5 5 53 
25 
Methodology [58] 10 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 1 0.9 1 0.8 8 77 
26 
Methodology [59] 10 1 1 1 0.8 0.8 1 1 1 1 10 82 
27 
Methodology [60] 8 0.8 0.8 1 0.8 1 1 1 1 1 10 78.8 
28 
Methodology [61] 10 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 1 1 1 0.6 9 73 
29 
Methodology [62] 9 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 1 1 1 1 1 10 78.2 
                                               
xix Modified version of CKBA. 
xx This paper is rough draft: robustness not thoroughly tested. 
xxi Portability of Image encryption algorithms 
xxii Software implementation. 
xxiii This paper is rough draft: reliability not thoroughly tested. 
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Discussion: The Comparative Survey  
The objective of the comparative survey is to study and compare different methodologies so as to 
develop a new cryptography methodology that can withstand cryptanalysis attacks. This requires an 
extensive study of some chosen cryptography and cryptanalysis techniques. From the comparative 
evaluations and analysis, we observe that (i) there are a few main categories of cryptanalysis (brutal force, 
middle point, etc.); (ii) there is no cryptanalysis methodology capable of succeeding against all the 
categories of crypto-problems; and (iii) methodologies [55] and [56] received the highest and the 
maximum rating of 84.  
Methodologies 4.1 - 4.19 have helped us see the broad and general picture of how cryptography 
and cryptanalysis methodologies are developed. The majority of these methodologies were proposed 
between 1993 and 2006. We saw what goes on in the minds of cryptographers and cryptanalysts. These 
methodologies among others have provided a foundation for our next study of formulating a new cipher. 
As we considered proposing a new methodology, we continued with the survey by focusing on those 
methodologies that are more specific to our goal of developing a new cipher. These were mainly 
methodologies 4.20 – 4.29. We specifically chose to survey the most relevant old methodologies and the 
most current ones up to the end of 2008. 
By using the Effectiveness Index Formula, methodologies [55] and [56] receive the 
highest and the maximum rating of 84. As we have seen earlier, method [55] is a Joint Signature 
and Hybrid Encryption Scheme, a more secure methodology for symmetric-asymmetric hybrid 
encryption and digital signature. Method [56] is an implementation of a hybrid encryption 
scheme for Ethernet. Their high ratings should only imply that the methodologies have been 
presented to satisfy the parameters we think are important for developing a new methodology. 
The Effectiveness Index formula served us with a purpose of providing an effectiveness rating 
criteria to guide us to how a new methodology is to be developed and what parameters and 
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variables to consider. It is important to note that receiving a higher rating does not imply that the 
methodology is better than the other.  
It can also be observed that these two methodologies with the two highest ratings involve 
hybrid algorithms which fuse at least two different techniques together. However, it should be 
noted that this may also be a coincidence. 
6. Steganology 
Here we offer a few definitions and explanations in order to make understandable the next part of 
the dissertation. Steganography is the hiding of information in a medium in such a way that no one other 
than the sender or the intended receiver realizes there is a hidden message. The main difference between 
steganography and cryptography is that steganography hides the presence of the secret information while 
cryptography hides the meaning of the secret information. The reverse engineering of steganology by the 
unintended receiver is cryptanalysis. Steganography and steganalysis together constitute 
steganology. In steganology, the original secret plaintext message to hide is referred to as an embedded 
message. In order to hide the secret message from the potential attacker, a steganography algorithm, along 
with a stego-key (stegano or stego), embeds the plaintext into another medium, referred to as cover-
medium. A steganography algorithm is a mathematical function that injects one message into another 
message. A stego-key is a variable that gives a unique output map when used with an algorithm.  A cover-
medium, an embedded message and stego-key constitute a stego-medium (Figure 4). 
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cover-medium + embedded message + stego-key  stego-medium 
 
 
 
  
     
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4: A Steganography process (Information Hiding). 
 
A steganography method embeds the secret data into a cover image such that the secret 
data is invisible to an observer of the embedded cover image, and only someone with the 
embedding key can extract the secret data from the embedded cover image.  The secret data can 
be any digital data such as text, image, audio, video or copyright information.  There are many 
information hiding methods.  Some of these are substitution methods, transform methods, and 
other miscellaneous methods. Substitution methods are based on the modification of least 
significant bits of the cover image using the secret data and some key based random 
permutations.  Transform methods are based on modification or rearrangement of transform 
domain (discrete cosine, Fourier, wavelet) coefficients with secret data and some set of rules 
about the coefficients.  Other miscellaneous methods use techniques such as fractals, matrix 
decomposition and predictive quantization.  
Some well-known steganology methodologies are the Least Significant Bit (LSB) Hiding, 
Regional Hiding with Segmentation (RHS) and SCAN Hiding. [52] is a small survey that classifies 
current steganography tools. We discuss the most common of steganography techniques in Part 2 of this 
discussion. 
Embedded message 
 
Cover-medium 
Stegano-medium Stego-key 
105 
 
7. Subsequent study (Part 2) 
In the above survey, we saw two competing sides: cryptography tools and cryptanalysis tools. 
Cryptographers build cryptography tools while cryptanalysts build cryptanalysis tools to break the tools 
cryptographers make. As the two sides compete, so does the field of cryptology grow. 
The next step, the second part, is to develop a new cryptography methodology. In order to do this 
effectively, we also need to consider cryptanalysis issues. In the above survey, the common assumption 
among most cryptanalysis methodologies, if not all, is that a cryptanalyst knows how the cryptosystem 
works. Additionally, cryptanalysis methodologies differ in prior-knowledge that an attacker could have. 
This knowledge falls under: 
 Ciphertext-only: the only access is ciphertext 
 Known-plaintext: the access is ciphertext and its corresponding plaintext 
 Chosen-plaintext: the access is the ciphertext of a chosen plaintext 
 Chosen-ciphertext: the access is the plaintext of a chosen ciphertext 
 Adaptive chosen-plaintext: A chosen-plaintext attack with an additional capability of choosing 
additional plaintext from preceding encryptions. 
 Adaptive chosen-ciphertext: A ciphertext counterpart of adaptive chosen-plaintext. 
 Related-key attack: A chosen-plaintext attack with an additional capability of accessing 
ciphertext encrypted under two unknown related keys that are different, say by two bits. 
 
The survey also showed us that the ciphertext-only attack is the most effective and the most 
dangerous attack in public key cryptosystems. In ciphertext-only attacks, an attacker uses only the 
ciphertext to break the cryptosystem, in addition to knowing how the system works. This attack requires 
no additional prior-knowledge aid, which makes it versatile and dangerous. 
The survey has helped us see the broad picture of how cryptology and steganology methodologies 
are developed. We saw what goes on in the minds of cryptologists. This has provided a foundation for our 
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further study of formulating a new cipher. As we propose a new methodology, we focus on having a 
cryptographer‟s mindset even though we also have to think like a cryptanalyst.  After proposing a new 
methodology, we then switch the mindset to being that of a cryptanalyst rather than a cryptographer. The 
third part will focus on developing a cryptanalysis technique to attack the proposed cryptography 
methodology. 
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PART 2- THE STEGANO-CRYPTO SCHEME 
8. Part 2 Introduction 
Part 2 presents a new lossless stegano-crypto methodology that combines cryptography 
and steganography techniques for mutual information encryption and hiding in images. The 
proposed synthetic methodology is a new information hiding and encryption algorithm that fuses 
SCAN Encryption, SCAN Compression, SCAN Information Hiding, LSB Hiding and Regional 
Hiding algorithms. There two reasons that we present this synthetic methodology here. The first 
reason is to study the features of a methodology as a synthesis of other methodologies. The 
second reason is that we will use the synthetic methodology at the Part-3 to see if can 
successfully perform a reverse engineering process on complex (or synthetic) methodologies 
rather than on single ones. Thus, briefly below we present these methodologies to be used in the 
synthetic one. 
9. SCAN 
Here we offer a brief description of the SCAN language developed by Dr. Bourbakis.  
SCAN is a formal language based on a two dimensional spatial accessing methodology which 
can represent and generate a large number and a wide variety of scanning paths.  The SCAN is a 
family of formal languages such as Simple SCAN, Extended SCAN, and Generalized SCAN, 
each of which can represent and generate a specific set of scanning paths.  Each SCAN language 
is defined by a grammar and each language has a set of basic scan patterns, a set of 
transformations, and a set of rules to compose simple scan patterns to obtain complex scan 
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patterns. The rules for building complex scan patterns from simple scan patterns are specified by 
the production rules of the grammar of each specific language. With reference to [47], we review 
all parts of Maniccam-Bourbakis SCAN technique. 
9.1. SCAN Compression 
Compression of data is an important issue in communication and storage of images.  A 
lossless compression method compresses the data such that the data can be exactly recovered by 
decompression.  The SCAN Image Compression algorithm is one of several lossless image 
compression methods. It is based on a predictive technique. Predictive methods are based on the 
prediction of pixel values using neighboring pixels, context modeling of prediction errors, and 
entropy coding of errors. The main idea is to efficiently predict pixel values using multiple scan 
patterns with adaptive predictors.  The scan patterns are based on SCAN methodology.  Different 
set of scan patterns are used in different regions of the image depending on the pixel values 
variations of the regions.  For each region, the set of scan patterns used in prediction are used in 
context modeling of prediction errors, where contexts are determined by pixel values variations 
of neighboring pixels.  Finally, the prediction errors are encoded with context based adaptive 
arithmetic coding (Figure 5). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                               Figure 5: The SCAN Compression algorithm [47]. 
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9.2. SCAN Encryption 
The SCAN encryption method is based on the permutation of pixels and replacement of 
pixel values.  Scan patterns generated by the SCAN methodology permutes pixel values, and 
then replaced using a substitution rule.  The scan patterns form the encryption keys.  The 
substitution rule adds confusion and diffusion properties.  The permutation and substitution 
operations are applied in intertwined and iterative manner (Figure 6 and Figure 7).  The 
important features of the proposed encryption methods are symmetric private key encryption, 
iterated product cipher, key dependent permutation, large key space, variable length keys, and 
encryption of large blocks. 
Original image         Key k1             Substitution            Spiral s0              Diagonal d0          Substitution        Key k2    Encrypted image 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                   Repeat 
                                        Figure 6: The SCAN Encryption algorithm [47].  
 
 
 
             
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                           
                                                                                                                         
         
 
Figure 7: An example of a SCAN key pattern - B5(s2 Z0(c5 b0 o0 s5) c4 d1) key [47]. 
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9.3. SCAN Information Hiding 
The main idea of the SCAN information hiding method is to identify the complex noisy 
regions such as edges and textures of the cover image and embed the secret data only into those 
regions.  The bits of the secret data are embedded into variable number of least significant bits of 
the pixels in complex regions depending on their complexity.  The bits are embedded in random 
order determined by the SCAN key chosen by the user.  The secret data can be extracted using 
the embedded cover image and the embedding key (Figure 8 and Figure 9).  Since the secret data 
is embedded into the noisy regions of the cover image, it is impossible to detect the presence of 
secret data.  Even if the presence of secret data is detected, the data cannot be read without the 
embedding SCAN key. 
 
                              Figure 8: The SCAN Hiding Embedding algorithm [47] 
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                          Figure 9: The SCAN Hiding Extraction algorithm [47] 
10. LSB Hiding 
10.1. Definition 
Here we also offer a brief description of the LSB (Least Significant Bit) Information 
Hiding technique. LSB is a steganography technique for hiding information in n least significant 
bits of another information medium for some small n (Figure 10). It is based on the idea that 
replacing a pixel intensity by modifying the last n least significant bits for some small n will not 
create enough intensity change to make a naked eye detect the change. A small value of n is 
usually 1 or 2. For example, if n=1 and a pixel has an intensity of 16 = 000100002, changing the 
least significant bit of a pixel intensity will only modify the intensity by at most 2
n
-1=1. This 
means that the given pixel can have the same value of 16 = 000100002 or 17 = 000100012 the 
change of which is hard to detect by naked eye. 
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     Block Bθ  pixel pα 
    LSB: Least Significant Bit 
    MSB: Most Significant Bit 
Figure 10: The LSB Information Hiding methodology with n=1. An 8-bit pα pixel has its 8 bits 
replace the last significant bits of pixels 1, 2, …, 8 contained in an 8-pixel Block Bθ. 
 
10.2. LSB Hiding 
The LSB Hiding methodology is lossy. This means that, after extracting the original 
message from the stego-medium, there is some loss of information in either or both the final 
cover image or extracted message. Let r = the size of the embedded image, s = the size of the 
cover image. There are three cases: r = s/8; s/8 < r < s; and r = s. 
Consider the first case when r = s/8. In this case, there will be no loss of information in 
the extracted message because the n:8 message to cover-medium size ratio allows creating 
enough bit space in the cover medium to fit all bits of the image to hide. 
In the second case when s/8 < r < s, there will not be enough room to store all 8 bits of 
each pixel of the embedding image. For example, consider r = 8 bytes and s = 16 bytes. To fit all 
8x8=64 bits of the embedding message, a 64-bit space needs to be created in the cover image. 
But the entire cover image only has space 16x8 = 132 bits. This means that n has to be 4, which 
is too large for undetectable changes in the image intensities of a cover image. Since n is usually 
1 or 2, it is necessary to lose information in the extracted image. In this case, the best that can be 
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done is to store n most significant bits of the embedding image into the n least significant bits of 
the cover image with some loss of information in the extracted image. 
The third case of r=s is an extreme case of the second case where there is also some loss of 
information in the extracted image. 
In all three cases, there is loss of information in the final cover image because the least 
significant bits of the cover image which were replaced cannot be recovered. The LSB Hiding 
can be made lossless by integrating into the algorithm a mechanism for storing n replaced LSBs. 
 
10.3. Sample Results 
Using n=2, the LSB scheme was implemented in software. A 256x256, 192 KB bitmap 
image was hidden in the 2 least significant bits of another 256x256, 192 KB image. The original 
image was then extracted back with some loss of picture quality that could be detected by human 
eye implying that the method is lossy (Figure 11). 
 
Figure 11: A sample result of a 2-bit LSB Hiding. The image size ratio of the embedding image 
to the cover image is 1:1. Therefore, only 6 most significant bits of the embedding image will be 
store in the 2 least significant bits of the cover medium. The extracted image will have some loss 
of information because the 2 LSB‟s of each bit is replaced and lost. 
Original cover image (256x256, 192KB) 
Image to hide 
(256x256, 192KB) 
Stego-medium: Original + Hidden image Extracted image 
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Note that the message to cover-medium size ratio of 1:1, rather than 2:8, violates the 
condition that allows recovering the exact original message. Therefore, the original image to hide 
and extracted image are not exactly the same. 
11. Regional Hiding with Segmentation 
11.1. Definition 
Regional Hiding is a steganography technique for hiding information in regions of another 
information medium, in most cases in an image medium. There are many Regional Hiding variants. In 
this discussion, Regional Hiding hides one image in the regions of another image after segmenting the 
cover image into segments containing clusters of pixels of similar intensity properties. 
11.2. Regional Hiding 
There are many variants of regional hiding with segmentation. Some are lossy and some 
are lossless. The following discussion will look into one of the lossless variants of regional 
hiding. It hides an mxm image message into an nxn host image for some n>16 and 0<m<=n. This 
variant has two modules, a pixel-to-region mapping module and a key-generation module. In the 
first module, segmentation is first applied to the original cover image to cluster pixels into 
segments of similar intensities. The original cover image and the resulting segmented image 
become an input of the second module whose task is to hide another image after generating a 
stego-key. 
11.3. Regional Hiding Module 1: Pixel-to-region mapping module 
The aim of the first module is to determine the optimal pixel address in the cover image 
for hiding an intensity of another image pixel. This module has three sub-steps:  a 1-D 
115 
 
Segmentation of the original cover image, a 2-D Threshold Segmentation of the original cover 
image and an Intensity-Address Lookup Table synthesis (Figure 12). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1-D Segmentation  2-D Threshold Segmentation 
Initial Intensity-Address 
Lookup Table 
I X y Dirty 
0 20 50 0 
1 32 18 0 
2 15 70 0 
3 102 0 0 
… … … … 
170 -1 -1 1 
… … … … 
255 55 140 0 
 
Table T0 
 
 
Replace each invalid location in T0 with 
a corresponding valid address in a C1 
region. Label the flag as 1.  
    
Final Intensity-Address 
Lookup Table 
I X y Dirty 
0 20 50 0 
1 32 18 0 
2 15 70 0 
3 102 0 0 
… … … … 
170 25 57 1 
… … … … 
255 55 140 0 
 
Table T1 
                                 
Figure 12: A Regional Hiding module 
nxn  
Original 
Cover C0 
2 1 
3 
Segmented Cover C1 
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11.3.1: 1-D Segmentation 
The first sub-step is a 1-D segmentation sub-step. The goal of this sub-step is to match 
each of the possible 256 intensity values with a corresponding pixel address that has a matching 
intensity value found in the cover image. We only consider a [0-255] width range by [0-255] 
length range maximum window because these addresses will be stored as 0-255 image intensities 
in subsequent steps. Addresses with x or y intensities larger than 255 will be converted to mod 
256 resulting in loss of decryption capabilities due to a many-to-one mapping. To avoid losing 
message integrity, we only consider those addresses whose coordinates are at most 255.  
To help us with this task, we use an Intensity-Address Lookup Table. A single record of 
this table consists of four entries: an Intensity value, x and y pixel coordinates of a pseudo-
randomly chosen matching pixel and a flag to indicate how the pixel address was chosen. A flag 
has four different possibilities: -1 indicates an invalid initial address of (-1,-1), 0 indicates that 
the address was chosen from the cover image, 1 indicates that the address was chosen from the 
segmented cover image and 2 indicates that the address was a randomly generated pixel address. 
Therefore, the table will have 4 columns. There are 256 possible intensities ranging from 0 to 
255, therefore the lookup table will have 256 rows. To ensure message integrity while extracting 
the original message back, only x and y addresses within the 0-255 range are considered, and 
each (x,y) pixel address appearing in the Intensity-Address Lookup Table will have to be unique. 
We refer to the original cover image as C0 and the initial lookup table as T0. We initialize the 
first column with intensity values as 0, 1, 2, …, 255, all the second (x-coordinates) and third 
column (y-coordinates) entries as -1, and all fourth column (flags) entries as -1. For each 
intensity in T0, if the flag is -1, we use a pseudo-random number generator to pick a random 
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pixel (xrand, yrand) in C0. From the pixel (xrand, yrand), we scan the pixels of C0 left-to-right top-to-
bottom in a circular manner once to find a matching intensity pixel whose address does not exist 
in T0. If the matching intensity pixel is found and if its address does not exist in T0, we 
respectively update its x coordinate, y coordinate and its flag to the new x coordinate, new y 
coordinate and new flag of 0. After all intensities of T0 are processed, T0 might still contain 
intensities with -1 flags. These will be processed in subsequent steps. 
The 1-D Segmentation process yields an updated initial Intensity-Address Lookup Table 
T0. The third sub-step will use T0 and update it to get an updated table T1. 
11.3.2: 2-D Threshold Segmentation 
The second sub-step is a 2-D threshold segmentation sub-step. The goal of this sub-step 
is to match each of the remaining -1 flagged intensity values with a corresponding optimal pixel 
address that has a matching segmented intensity value found in the segmented cover image, but 
not found in the cover image.  
We first segment the image by Threshold segmentation. Threshold segmentation of an 
image is the process of grouping image pixels into image segments or regions that contain only 
those pixels that fall within a certain predefined pixel value range. A segment is not necessarily 
continuous, it can be disjoint. The process is 2-D in a sense that the segments are 2-D as opposed 
to individual pixels being 1-D.  
In the prototype of our proposed hybrid methodology, let d be a positive integer that 
represent a segment‟s intensity range size. For example, d=7 means that intensities 0-6 will be in 
one segment while intensities 7-13 will fall in another segment. Suppose d=10. Then pixels with 
intensity values 0, 7, 54, 99 and 255 will be in segments 0, 0, 50, 90 and 250 respectively. In this 
case, there can be only 26 segments, which may also be disjoint ( 
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Figure 13). 
 
34 35 85 90 102 108 111 122 
39 38 80 97 110 100 109 125 
37 50 73 80 109 50 75 120 
25 56 78 130 120 47 50 52 
25 23 46 50 46 44 45 47 
27 34 40 38 42 40 49 48 
80 32 79 31 38 39 40 45 
86 45 60 22 32 36 38 43 
  
 
30 30 80 90 100 100 110 120 
30 30 80 90 110 100 100 120 
30 50 70 80 100 50 70 120 
20 50 70 130 120 40 50 50 
20 20 40 50 40 40 40 40 
20 30 40 30 40 40 40 40 
80 30 70 30 30 30 40 40 
80 40 60 20 30 30 30 40 
 
8x8 image before 2-D Threshold Segmentation 8x8 image after 2-D Threshold Segmentation 
 
Figure 13: 2-D Threshold Segmentation 
 
In the given example, an 8x8 sample image is given. The image is then segmented by 2-D 
Threshold segmentation. After the segmentation, segment 30 is disjoint: One sub-segment 
contains a (0,0) pixel and the other contains the (6,7) pixel. 
The 2-D Threshold segmentation process yields a Segmented Cover image, we call it C1. The 
next sub-step which is the third sub-step will use C1. 
11.3.3: Intensity-Address Lookup Table Synthesis 
The third sub-step is an Intensity-Address Lookup Table Synthesis. The aim of this sub-
step is to finish updating the Intensity-Address Lookup Table to remove all -1 flagged invalid 
intensities. 
This sub-step uses the Intensity-Address Lookup table T0 from the first sub-step and the 
segmented cover image C1 from the second sub-step. The goal is to replace all pixel addresses of 
dirty intensities found in T0 with optimal hiding locations in the cover image with the help of 
C1.  
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We scan T0 to identify -1 flagged intensities. For each such intensity, we find a 
corresponding segment by scanning the segmented image from randomly picked pixel location in 
(a similar manner as earlier). For example, if 45 is a -1 flagged intensity, a corresponding 
segment is segment 40. There are two cases, a corresponding segment exists in C1 or a 
corresponding segment doesn‟t exist in C1.  
In the first case, if a corresponding segment exists in C1, we pick any pixel in the 
corresponding segment. We acquire its (x,y) address as the optimal hiding destination address. 
We update the x coordinate, the y coordinate and the flag to 1 in the lookup table T0. We then 
continue scanning T0 to identify the next -1 flagged intensity. 
In the second case, if a corresponding segment does not exist in C1, we do the following: Using a 
pseudo-random number generator, we pick a random pixel address whose address does not exist 
in T0. We adopt the pixel address as the optimum address and update it in T0. The flag is 
updated from -1 to 2. 
This process yields a final Intensity-Address Lookup table, which we call T1. At the end 
of all three sub-steps, the Regional Hiding sub-module 1 yields an Intensity-Address Lookup 
table T1 and a segmented Cover Image C1. 
11.4. Regional Hiding Module 2: Key generation module 
The second module of this Regional Hiding method takes an mxm message image M0 
and an Index-Address Lookup Table T1 from the first module, then extracts an mxm X-mask and 
an mxm Y-mask. Respectively, the X and Y masks represent the corresponding optimal 
destination x and optimal destination y pixel addresses for hiding corresponding pixels in the 
cover image.  
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Consider an Intensity-Address Lookup Table T1 with rows ri with i=0,…,255. Recall, 
each row ri of T1 consists of an intensity i, a corresponding optimal xi address, corresponding 
optimal yi, and a dirty flag di. Also consider an mxm message image M0 with an (r,s) pixel with 
intensity J(r,s). Then, an (r,s) pixel in M0 with an intensity value J(r,s)= j in M0 has a 
corresponding intensity value j in T1,  a value X(i,j)= xj in the X mask, and a value Y(i,j)=yj in the 
Y mask.  
For example, consider a (10,20) pixel with an intensity value of 30 in M0, and an 
Intensity-Address Lookup Table with a 31
st
 row containing (30,50,60,0) as its (Intensity, optimal 
x, optimal y, dirty flag)-tuple. Then, a corresponding (10,20) X mask pixel will have a value of 
50 while that of a corresponding (10,20) Y mask will have a value of 60 (Figure 14). 
 
 
I X y Dirty 
0 20 50 0 
1 32 18 0 
2 15 70 0 
3 102 0 0 
… … … … 
30 50 60 0 
… … … … 
255 55 140 0 
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An mxm Y Mask- a 
(10,20) pixel with 
intensity Y(10,20)=60 
 
 
Figure 14: Extracting X and Y masks from the encrypted image M0 using the Intensity-Address 
Lookup Table. 
 
After the mask extraction procedure, the module will then use T1, the X mask and the Y 
mask altogether as a stego-key K. Recall, the sizes of T1, X-mask and Y-mask are 256x4, mxm 
and mxm respectively. The cover image is now the stego-image (Figure 15). An unintended 
receiver of a stego-image who does not have the stego-key can only see the original cover image. 
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The intended receiver with the stego-image and the stego-key K is the only one who can extract 
the exact same original embedded message. 
 
 
 
 Y Mask  X Mask
  T1  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 15: The composition of stego-key 
K. The stego-key K consists of T1, the X 
mask and the Y mask.  
11.5. Key space. 
In T1, the first column is fixed with intensities 0-255, therefore there is only 1 
permutation of a sequence 0,1,2,…, 255. Recall, n>16 and 0<m<=n. Without loss of generality, 
let n > 256. To fill T1, we need to choose 256 pixel addresses from the possible 256
2
 maximum 
pixel addresses in C0. Therefore, there are 
 256𝑥256
256
 =
(256𝑥256 )!
 256x256 −256 !  256!
=  
 256𝑥256 !(256𝑥256−1)!(256𝑥256−2)!…(256𝑥256−255 )
256 !
   ways to 
choose 256 unique pixel addresses. We know this number is very large because the i-th term of 
the numerator is much larger than the i-th term of the denominator, therefore their products will 
be very large. Each of the 256 fourth column entries, i.e. the flag entry, has 3 valid intensity 
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possibilities, 0, 1 or 2. Therefore, there are 3
256
 permutations for the flags. All together, T1 has 1 
x  256𝑥256
256
  x 3256 permutations. 
The X mask has 256
(mxm)
 permutations since each of the mxm entries has 256 possible 
addresses in T1. Similarly, the The Y mask has 256
(mxm)
 permutations. 
Altogether, the stego-key K has [1x  256𝑥256
256
 ) x 3256] x [256(mxm)] x [256(mxm)] = 
 256𝑥256
256
  3256.2562mxm   permutations. Therefore, this regional hiding algorithm is O(2562mxm). 
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11.6. Experimentation results 
Let d be an unsigned integer that represents the intensity range of a segment. A 512x512, 
257KB PGM cover image was segmented using different values of d (Figure 16, Figure 17). 
 
(a) 512x512, 257KB Abe Natsumi 
PGM cover image, d=1 
 
(b) Segmented cover, d=10 
 
(c) Segmented Cover, d=20 
 
(d) Segmented Cover, d=50 
Figure 16: Experimentation results- A 512x512, 257KB PGM cover image was 
segmented using different segment intensity ranges d. The above images 
illustrate the results. 
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Histograms: 
 
 
(a) 512x512, 257KB PGM cover image, d=1 
 
 
(b) Segmented cover, d=10 
 
 
(c) Segmented Cover, d=20 
 
 
(d) Segmented Cover, d=50 
 
Figure 17: Experimentation results- A 512x512, 257KB PGM cover image was segmented using 
different segment intensity ranges d. The above images illustrate the histograms of the results. 
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By embedding the secret message, the following results were obtained (Figure 18). 
 
A 512x512, 257KB Abe Natsumi PGM 
cover image. 
 
 
 
The histogram of a cover image. 
 
 
Lenna: A 512x512, 257KB Lenna 
PGM image to hide. 
 
 
 
 
The histogram of the image to hide. 
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A 512x512, 257KB PGM stego image 
 
 
 
Stego image histogram 
 
 
The extracted message image. 
 
 
The histogram of the extracted message image. 
 
Figure 18: Experimentation results- A 512x512, 257KB PGM message image was embedded 
in another 512x512, 257KB PGM. 
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12. The new Synthetic Stegano-Crypto Methodology 
The proposed methodology is a new synthetic, lossless, stegano-crypto methodology for 
mutual information hiding and encryption. It fuses the techniques of Regional Hiding, SCAN 
encryption, SCAN hiding, SCAN compression and LSB Hiding to form a single methodology. 
The proposed methodology has nine modules each of which has its name-sake step (Figure 19).  
The first module is the first Regional Hiding sub-module. It has three sub-steps whose aim is to 
set up an environment for hiding a message into the original cover image by regional-hiding. The 
second module is a SCAN compression module 1. It compresses the original image message by 
SCAN compression. The third module is the second Regional Hiding sub-module. It maps the 
encrypted original message to corresponding addresses or regions in the original cover image. 
The output of this module is an X mask image and a Y mask image. An X mask image with 
respect to an encrypted original image message is an image whose pixels represent 
corresponding x addresses in the original cover image. Similarly, the Y mask image 
corresponds to the y addresses in the original cover image.  
The fourth module is a SCAN encryption module 1. It encrypts X and Y masks by SCAN 
encryption. The fifth module is a SCAN hiding module. It losslessly SCAN hides a SCAN-
encrypted X mask into the original cover image. The resulting product is an X-masked Cover 
Image. The sixth module is an LSB-Hiding module, which through lossless LSB-hiding, it hides 
a Y-Mask into the image resulting from the fifth module. The resulting image is an input to the 
seventh module which the second SCAN compression module. This module SCAN compresses 
the image output by the sixth step to give a compressed image. This compressed image is an 
input to the eighth module (The Stegano-Crypto Image Packing Module). The task of this 
module is to pack relevant all relevant information needed for decoding and extracting the 
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original message, this includes the compressed image from the seventh step, the SCAN key, the 
lookup table (to be introduced shortly) and the replaced Least Significant bits from the fifth step. 
The output of this module goes to the ninth and last step.  
The ninth and last module is the second SCAN encryption module. Its task is to SCAN-
encrypt the output of the eighth step to yield the final product of the proposed Stegano-crypto 
methodology. The SCAN modules are lossless and all modules work together to retain all the 
original information in the final product. Reversing this entire encryption process gives back the 
original message and the original cover image. Experiments will be conducted to show this. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 19: The proposed lossless Stegano-Crypto Methodology 
12.1. The Regional Hiding Sub-module 1 
The first module of our proposed stegano-crypto methodology is the Regional Hiding 
sub-module 1. This module is exactly the first module of the Regional Hiding Algorithm, i.e. the 
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pixel-to-region mapping module. The aim of this module is to determine the optimal pixel 
address in the cover image for hiding a given intensity of another image pixel. This module has 
three sub-steps:  a 1-D Segmentation of the original cover image, a 2-D Threshold Segmentation 
of the original cover image and an Intensity-Address Lookup Table synthesis.  At the end of all 
three sub-steps, the Regional Hiding sub-module 1 yields an Intensity-Address Lookup table T1 
and a segmented Cover Image C1. 
12.2. The SCAN Compression Module 1 
The SCAN compression module compresses an original message image M0 to a 
compressed image M1 by SCAN compression. A SCAN Compression algorithm compresses M0 
to a one dimensional compressed message _M1. A subsequent step converts _M1 to an 
equivalent two dimensional image M1 with the same size as M0 (Figure 20). 
 
 
   SCAN Compression                          Convert to 2-D 
 
 
 
 
Original Message Image M0     1-D Compressed Message _M1    2-D Compressed Image M1 
 
 
Figure 20: The original message image M0 is fed into the SCAN Compression module. 
 
In this module, the original message image M0 is an input to the SCAN Compression 
Module, which then yields a 2-D Compressed Message Image M1. The next module, which is 
the regional hiding sub-module 2, will use M1 as one of its inputs. 
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12.3. The Regional Hiding Sub-module 2 
The Regional Hiding Sub-module 2 extracts an mxm X-mask and an mxm Y-mask  from 
the input of an mxm SCAN-compressed image M1 (from the previous SCAN Compression 
Module) and an Index-Address Lookup Table T1 (from the Regional Hiding Sub-module 1). 
Respectively, the X and Y masks represent the corresponding optimal destination x and optimal 
destination y pixel addresses for hiding pixels in the cover image. Refer to the second module of 
Regional Hiding Algorithm in section 3.4, i.e. the key generation module. After the mask 
extraction procedure, the compressed image M1 is no longer needed. The next module, the 
SCAN encryption module will use the X mask and the Y mask as its input. 
12.4. The SCAN Encryption Module 1 
The SCAN Encryption module ( 
Figure 21) takes an X mask X0 and a Y mask Y0 from the Regional Hiding Sub-module 
2, encrypts them independently by the SCAN encryption algorithm to yield an encrypted X mask 
X1 and encrypted Y mask Y1. The SCAN encryption algorithm was discussed in Figure 6. 
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    SCAN Encryption    
 
 
 
        Encrypted X Mask X1 
 X Mask  X0  
 
 
    SCAN Encryption    
 
 
 
        Encrypted Y Mask Y1 
 Y Mask Y0  
 
 
Figure 21: In the SCAN Encryption module, the X and Y masks are independently fed into two 
independent SCAN encryption channels, the X and Y channels respectively. 
 
The module has two tunnels, an X tunnel that encrypts the X mask and a Y tunnel that 
encrypts the Y mask. X1, which is the output of the X tunnel, will be fed to the fifth module, the 
SCAN hiding module while Y1, the output of the Y tunnel, will be fed to the sixth module, the 
LSB-Hiding Module. 
12.5. The SCAN Hiding Module 
The SCAN Hiding Module is the fifth module. Its task is to hide a compressed X Mask 
X1 inside an original Cover image C0 by using the SCAN Hiding algorithm. The output of this 
module is a stego-image S0 (Figure 22). S0 will be an input to the sixth module, which is the 
LSB Hiding module. 
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Encrypted X Mask X1 
 
 
  
     
 
 
         
 
 
        Stego-Image S0 
         
    Original Cover C0    
 
                   
Figure 22: In the SCAN Hiding module, the original cover image C0 is embedded into the 
encrypted X mask X1. 
 
12.6. The LSB Hiding Module 
The LSB Hiding Module is the sixth module. Its task is to hide a compressed Y Mask Y1 
inside a stego-image S0 by using the LSB Hiding algorithm. The LSB hiding algorithm was 
discussed previously in chapter 2. The output of this module is a stego-image S1 (Figure 23).  
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Encrypted Y Mask Y1 
 
 
  
     
 
 
         
 
 
       Stego-Image S1, a stegano-crypto image. 
         
    Stego-image S0   
 
 
Figure 23: In the LSB Hiding module, the encrypted Y mask Y1 is embedded into the stego-
image S0 to get another stego-image S1. 
 
12.7. The SCAN Compression Module 2 
The result of the sixth module is an input to the seventh module, the SCAN compression 
module 2. This works the exact same way as the previous SCAN compression module. The only 
difference is the input and output images. The input image of this module is image S1 and the 
output image is image S2. 
 
12.8. The Stegano-Crypto Image Packing Module 
The eighth module is the Stegano-Crypto Image Packing module. This module creates an 
nxn image (same size as the original cover image) for storing all relevant information required to 
extract the original message back. It stores the following information in sequence using the 
binary format: the width of the cover image in int (4 bytes), the byte count of the SCAN key file 
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in int (4 bytes), the byte count of image S2, i.e. the input compressed image from the previous 
module, in int (4 bytes), the content of the Intensity-Address Lookup table T1 (256x4=1024 
bytes), the byte content of the SCAN key file (whose byte count had already been stored), the 
replaced Least Significant bits of the image S0 in the LSB Hiding module (1/4 the byte count of 
image S0) and finally the content of image S2, the compressed image from the previous module 
(Figure 24). The empty space remaining after storing previous information is the filled with a 
chosen dummy byte constant, in this discussion 0 is chosen as a dummy byte constant. 
width of the cover image in int 4 bytes 
byte size of the SCAN key file in int 4 bytes 
byte size of image S2 in int  4 bytes 
the content of the Intensity-Address Lookup 
table T1 
256x4=1024 bytes 
the content of the SCAN key file. byte size stored in the 
second token 
the replaced Least Significant bits of the image 
S0  
1/4 the byte size of 
image S0 
the content of image S2 byte size stored in the 
third token 
a sequence of dummy bytes (S3 image byte size) – 
(total byte count of all 
previous contents)  
 
Figure 24: The output of the Stego-Image Packing module is an image S3 which is stored as 
shown above. 
12.9. The SCAN Encryption Module 2 
The ninth module is the second SCAN Encryption module. It takes in an image S3 from 
the previous step and SCAN-encrypts it to yield the final result of the proposed stegano-crypto 
algorithm. The role of this step is to instill more confusion and diffusion into the resulting stego-
crypto image. This final resulting image is referred to as image S4. 
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13. Experiments 
13.1. Experiments Hypothesis 
The proposed Stegano-Crypto methodology is a new lossless methodology for mutually 
hiding and encrypting information in images. 
13.2. Experiments Procedure 
The proposed hybrid algorithm was implemented using C and C++ with a Microsoft 
Visual Studio 2005 compiler (Version 8.0.50727.867 on a Microsoft .NET Framework Version 
2.0.50727 SP1). The original Maniccam‟s SCAN executable software was used along in all the 
SCAN modules of the hybrid algorithm. The SCAN software uses the KEYFILE, CKEYFILE 
and LRFILE key files. These three files are attached in the appendix section.  
The proposed methodology was tested using non-medical and medical images. The first 
two tests involved encrypting and hiding a non-medical image into another non-medical image. 
The next three tests involved encrypting and hiding a medical information text file into a medical 
image associated with the medical information (Table 4). One test is done with a non-medical 
image with medical text file. A medical image is not a good cover image because of its low 
hiding capacity. However, a medical image‟s hiding capacity suffices to hide smaller files such 
as text files. 
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Experiment Cover image Message to hide 
Experiment 1  
 
512x512, 257 KB Lenna image. 
 
 
128x128, 17 KB Medical image 1. 
Experiment 2  
 
256x256, 65 KB Green Peppers image. 
 
 
64x64, 5 KB Medical image 2. 
Experiment 3  
 
512x512, 257 KB Medical image 1. 
Medical information contained in 
message.txt text file (available in the 
appendix). 
Experiment 4  
 
512x512, 257 KB Medical image 2. 
Medical information contained in 
message.txt text file (available in the 
appendix). 
Experiment 5  
 
512x512, 257 KB Medical image 3. 
Medical information contained in 
message.txt text file (available in the 
appendix). 
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Experiment Cover image Message to hide 
Experiment 6 
 
512x512, 257 KB Non-medical image 4. 
Medical information contained in 
message.txt text file (available in the 
appendix). 
 
Table 4: The summary of the six experiments.  
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13.3.1. Experiment 1: Results and Analysis 
 
 
 
Image C0 (512x512, 257 KB): A 
PGM medical image, a cover image. 
 
 
 
 
The histogram of image C0. 
 
 
 
 
Image C1 (512x512, 257 KB): A 
segmented cover image C0 with 
d=30. 
 
 
 
 
 
The histogram of image C1. 
 
 
Table T1, the final 
Intensity-Address Lookup 
Table: 
I X Y D 
0 176 237 1 
1 195 212 1 
2 178 237 1 
3 183 253 1 
4 237 226 0 
5 223 240 0 
6 221 241 0 
7 198 228 0 
8 196 230 0 
9 196 229 0 
10 193 249 0 
11 192 235 0 
12 192 248 0 
13 191 249 0 
14 191 235 0 
15 190 235 0 
16 190 232 0 
17 192 249 0 
18 220 214 0 
19 190 236 0 
20 187 231 0 
21 202 230 0 
22 189 236 0 
23 225 200 0 
24 185 235 0 
25 190 234 0 
26 187 230 0 
27 185 237 0 
28 197 207 0 
29 184 253 0 
30 216 248 0 
31 233 190 0 
32 182 254 0 
33 179 69 0 
34 231 208 0 
35 185 239 0 
36 78 66 0 
37 198 67 0 
38 210 188 0 
39 219 208 0 
40 169 66 0 
41 216 255 0 
42 253 140 0 
43 146 69 0 
44 92 6 0 
45 72 20 0 
46 40 68 0 
47 197 241 0 
48 144 66 0 
49 232 189 0 
50 134 70 0 
51 253 96 0 
52 237 65 0 
53 68 70 0 
54 186 76 0 
55 8 67 0 
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56 234 23 0 
57 156 73 0 
58 237 160 0 
59 201 250 0 
60 223 93 0 
61 120 10 0 
62 216 222 0 
63 189 154 0 
64 182 93 0 
65 111 8 0 
66 39 92 0 
67 221 105 0 
68 6 71 0 
69 225 247 0 
70 101 90 0 
71 226 14 0 
72 62 103 0 
73 208 229 0 
74 117 138 0 
75 107 141 0 
76 243 113 0 
77 2 88 0 
78 144 112 0 
79 66 94 0 
80 131 26 0 
81 76 104 0 
82 29 110 0 
83 10 111 0 
84 184 149 0 
85 194 155 0 
86 234 132 0 
87 235 239 0 
88 254 225 0 
89 64 121 0 
90 165 157 0 
91 96 161 0 
92 254 30 0 
93 29 127 0 
94 198 180 0 
95 123 177 0 
96 253 210 0 
97 145 161 0 
98 54 145 0 
99 41 163 0 
100 87 58 0 
101 61 19 0 
102 104 202 0 
103 8 134 0 
104 53 27 0 
105 127 31 0 
106 59 168 0 
107 168 156 0 
108 152 210 0 
109 96 58 0 
110 177 181 0 
111 70 204 0 
112 111 183 0 
113 204 59 0 
114 110 30 0 
115 211 59 0 
116 120 191 0 
117 110 57 0 
118 165 194 0 
119 83 211 0 
120 212 32 0 
121 61 17 0 
122 86 224 0 
123 61 212 0 
124 92 54 0 
125 188 140 0 
126 55 196 0 
127 43 54 0 
128 65 10 0 
129 2 5 0 
130 2 12 0 
131 123 53 0 
132 23 17 0 
133 212 35 0 
134 207 35 0 
135 214 56 0 
136 199 136 0 
137 86 226 0 
138 11 37 0 
139 235 36 0 
140 215 142 0 
141 227 37 0 
142 221 248 0 
143 159 237 0 
144 233 246 0 
145 106 44 0 
146 163 123 0 
147 18 39 0 
148 66 7 0 
149 169 48 0 
150 61 239 0 
151 29 30 0 
152 56 238 0 
153 70 226 0 
154 118 236 0 
155 252 233 0 
156 113 244 0 
157 124 207 0 
158 216 51 0 
159 118 237 0 
160 201 143 0 
161 175 131 0 
162 230 255 0 
163 109 234 0 
164 105 231 0 
165 226 250 0 
166 108 255 0 
167 74 153 0 
168 230 248 0 
169 222 254 0 
170 179 124 0 
171 247 240 0 
172 226 112 0 
173 178 129 0 
174 46 234 0 
175 48 232 0 
176 60 233 0 
177 147 124 0 
178 190 131 0 
179 114 248 0 
180 49 233 0 
181 47 232 0 
182 153 124 0 
183 144 125 0 
184 50 246 0 
185 111 243 0 
186 48 231 0 
187 72 247 0 
188 151 123 0 
189 49 245 0 
190 137 125 0 
191 192 124 0 
192 101 242 0 
193 191 128 0 
194 89 255 0 
195 108 249 0 
196 93 248 0 
197 124 127 0 
198 213 131 0 
199 90 255 0 
200 90 253 0 
201 191 124 0 
202 234 138 0 
203 198 129 0 
204 128 124 0 
205 184 126 0 
206 145 122 0 
207 228 137 0 
208 120 126 0 
209 210 133 0 
210 123 126 0 
211 193 123 0 
212 119 127 0 
213 196 124 0 
214 139 123 0 
215 118 127 0 
216 221 132 0 
217 137 123 0 
218 206 130 0 
219 160 120 0 
140 
 
220 168 119 0 
221 154 120 0 
222 229 136 0 
223 226 134 0 
224 136 123 0 
225 116 128 1 
226 124 125 1 
227 174 119 1 
228 125 125 1 
229 126 125 1 
230 129 124 1 
231 132 124 1 
232 147 121 1 
233 133 124 1 
234 142 122 1 
235 171 119 1 
236 229 135 1 
237 153 120 1 
238 197 124 1 
239 214 132 1 
240 220 65 2 
241 214 237 2 
242 32 171 2 
243 81 75 2 
244 120 45 2 
245 165 178 2 
246 171 240 2 
247 36 170 2 
248 183 127 2 
249 150 97 2 
250 74 73 2 
251 179 41 2 
252 74 34 2 
253 170 248 2 
254 78 195 2 
255 156 231 2 
 
Table T1: The final  
Intensity-Address  
Lookup Table. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Image M0 (128x128, 17 KB): A 
message to hide image. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The histogram of the image to hide M0. 
 
 
 
 
Image M1 (97x97, 10 KB): SCAN-
compressed M0. Compression ratio = 
1.75267. 
 
 
 
 
The histogram of image M1. 
 
 
 
 
Image X0 (97x97, 10 KB): X Mask 
extracted from M1 and T1. 
 
 
 
The histogram of image X0. 
 
 
 
Image Y0 (97x97, 10 KB): Y Mask 
extracted from M1 and T1. 
 
 
 
The histogram of the image Y0. 
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Image X1 (97x97, 10 KB): X0 is 
encrypted by SCAN encryption to get 
X1.  
 
 
 
The histogram of image X1. 
 
 
 
 
Image Y1 (97x97, 10 KB): Y0 is 
encrypted by SCAN encryption to get 
Y1. 
 
 
 
 
The histogram of image Y1. 
 
 
 
 
Images C0 (Top left, 512x512, 257 
KB), S0 (Top right, 512x512, 257 
KB) and X1 (Bottom left, 97x97, 10 
KB): Image S0 is an image C0 with 
image X1 hidden in it by SCAN 
hiding. All three images are in the 
same scale. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The histogram of image S0. 
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Images S1 (Left, 512x512, 257 KB) 
and S2 (Right, 151 KB), 1.7003 
Compression ratio: Image S1 is an 
image S0 with Y1 hidden in it by 
LSB-hiding. The images are in the 
same scale. 
 
For the LSB Hiding step: 
Cover-image S0 size = 262144 bytes. 
Cover-image S0‟s LSB hiding 
capacity=     65536 bytes. 
Image to hide Y1 size= 9608 bytes. 
  
 
 
 
 
The histogram of image S1. 
 
 
The histogram of image S2. 
 
 
 
 
Images S3 (Left, 512x512, 257 KB) and S4 
(Right, 512x512, 257 KB): Image S3 stores the 
SCAN key character count in int format (4 
bytes), image S2 byte count in int format (4 
bytes), the content of the Lookup Table T1 (1024 
bytes), the content of the SCAN key (variable 
byte size), the replaced LSB‟s of S1 (1/4 the size 
of S0 since n=2) and the content of S2 
(Compressed S1), the remaining bytes are 
dummy bytes of 0 to fill the remaining empty 
space. Image S4 is the final stegano-crypto 
product of the proposed methodology. 
 
 
 
 
The histogram of image S3. 
 
 
The histogram of image S4. 
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Extracted Image (128x128, 17 KB): The 
extracted message is the same as the original 
hidden message. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The histogram of the extracted image. It can 
be seen that it is similar to the histogram of 
the message to hide M0. 
 
Table 5: The results and analysis of Experiment 1. 
13.3.2. Experiment 1 Results and Analysis 
 
 
 
Image C0 (256x256, 65 KB): A 
PGM medical image, a cover image. 
 
 
 
 
The histogram of image C0. 
 
 
 
 
Image C1 (256x256, 65 KB): A 
segmented cover image C0 with 
d=30. 
 
 
 
 
The histogram of image C1. 
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Table T1, the final 
Intensity-Address Lookup 
Table: 
I x y D 
0 43 37 0 
1 23 226 0 
2 49 19 0 
3 221 85 0 
4 22 55 0 
5 108 182 0 
6 147 34 0 
7 146 40 0 
8 98 20 0 
9 70 194 0 
10 23 227 0 
11 173 214 0 
12 178 214 0 
13 243 144 0 
14 240 193 0 
15 129 23 0 
16 76 195 0 
17 222 236 0 
18 128 17 0 
19 19 228 0 
20 148 14 0 
21 202 249 0 
22 237 199 0 
23 30 227 0 
24 28 22 0 
25 35 18 0 
26 250 129 0 
27 244 136 0 
28 133 233 0 
29 212 232 0 
30 242 133 0 
31 127 6 0 
32 11 229 0 
33 34 63 0 
34 148 226 0 
35 255 138 0 
36 228 165 0 
37 79 99 0 
38 245 133 0 
39 39 53 0 
40 47 95 0 
41 149 237 0 
42 147 238 0 
43 198 15 0 
44 233 131 0 
45 21 101 0 
46 165 230 0 
47 96 148 0 
48 122 6 0 
49 148 245 0 
50 225 167 0 
51 71 132 0 
52 202 101 0 
53 20 122 0 
54 87 200 0 
55 47 135 0 
56 127 95 0 
57 94 153 0 
58 83 149 0 
59 101 35 0 
60 213 107 0 
61 127 179 0 
62 86 110 0 
63 4 124 0 
64 91 168 0 
65 31 165 0 
66 151 247 0 
67 173 240 0 
68 142 90 0 
69 55 151 0 
70 91 207 0 
71 63 182 0 
72 241 194 0 
73 229 178 0 
74 12 60 0 
75 80 190 0 
76 94 179 0 
77 222 124 0 
78 6 7 0 
79 13 57 0 
80 158 85 0 
81 9 91 0 
82 38 47 0 
83 240 102 0 
84 212 108 0 
85 53 35 0 
86 115 46 0 
87 239 223 0 
88 140 138 0 
89 45 45 0 
90 54 199 0 
91 52 196 0 
92 190 154 0 
93 88 203 0 
94 144 157 0 
95 208 17 0 
96 120 122 0 
97 130 181 0 
98 11 59 0 
99 182 114 0 
100 34 83 0 
101 219 170 0 
102 190 160 0 
103 185 156 0 
104 124 164 0 
105 66 115 0 
106 64 73 0 
107 60 199 0 
108 4 231 0 
109 207 160 0 
110 152 86 0 
111 7 13 0 
112 173 100 0 
113 41 79 0 
114 170 21 0 
115 47 195 0 
116 0 198 0 
117 158 255 0 
118 128 99 0 
119 60 119 0 
120 70 167 0 
121 0 124 0 
122 212 126 0 
123 87 98 0 
124 187 108 0 
125 164 162 0 
126 20 161 0 
127 118 123 0 
128 30 2 0 
129 69 160 0 
130 20 155 0 
131 179 159 0 
132 111 201 0 
133 110 165 0 
134 155 157 0 
135 3 57 0 
136 219 137 0 
137 30 45 0 
138 175 128 0 
139 228 180 0 
140 233 245 0 
141 0 123 0 
142 169 109 0 
143 126 185 0 
144 71 29 0 
145 102 253 0 
146 229 70 0 
147 14 151 0 
148 110 186 0 
149 210 174 0 
150 121 160 0 
151 120 144 0 
152 34 23 0 
 
 
153 197 171 0 
154 129 137 0 
155 64 41 0 
156 102 0 0 
157 53 13 0 
158 243 249 0 
159 162 106 0 
160 77 204 0 
161 116 140 0 
162 170 77 0 
163 175 41 0 
164 119 216 0 
165 107 60 0 
166 168 77 0 
167 74 97 0 
168 11 234 0 
169 25 219 0 
170 32 12 0 
171 28 229 0 
172 35 241 0 
173 109 194 0 
174 160 79 0 
175 103 210 0 
176 143 110 0 
177 107 55 0 
178 6 173 0 
179 239 3 0 
180 239 95 0 
181 103 51 0 
182 19 195 0 
183 161 50 0 
184 205 75 0 
185 92 253 0 
186 23 250 0 
187 132 141 0 
188 103 212 0 
189 226 49 0 
190 226 213 0 
191 229 57 0 
192 178 58 0 
193 167 60 0 
194 154 173 0 
195 181 59 0 
196 57 237 0 
197 74 78 0 
198 53 215 0 
199 207 68 0 
200 219 63 0 
201 158 67 0 
202 5 248 0 
203 11 189 0 
204 65 82 0 
205 196 62 0 
206 251 102 0 
207 242 6 0 
208 221 5 0 
209 26 194 0 
210 82 89 0 
211 41 186 0 
212 19 191 0 
213 14 175 0 
214 3 48 0 
215 71 217 0 
216 37 192 0 
217 66 219 0 
218 222 8 0 
219 132 151 0 
220 15 184 0 
221 223 6 0 
222 222 7 0 
223 58 245 0 
224 156 149 0 
225 250 104 0 
226 248 82 0 
227 127 199 0 
228 7 74 0 
229 66 156 0 
230 27 42 0 
231 230 189 0 
232 141 153 0 
233 230 187 0 
234 104 249 0 
235 9 136 0 
236 79 242 0 
237 2 158 0 
238 128 86 1 
239 10 137 0 
240 167 21 2 
241 179 158 2 
242 49 42 2 
243 160 12 2 
244 118 177 2 
245 183 222 2 
246 198 57 2 
247 124 11 2 
248 119 68 2 
249 181 191 2 
250 97 200 2 
251 237 219 2 
252 97 175 2 
253 242 115 2 
254 214 87 2 
255 87 79 2 
 
Table T1: The final  
Intensity-Address  
Lookup Table. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Image M0 (64x64, 5 KB): A 
message to hide image. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The histogram of the image to hide M0. 
 
 
 
 
Image M1 (58x58, 4 KB): SCAN-
compressed M0. Compression ratio = 
1.24008. 
 
 
 
 
The histogram of image M1. 
 
 
 
 
Image X0 (58x58, 4 KB): X Mask 
extracted from M1 and T1. 
 
 
 
The histogram of image X0. 
 
 
 
Image Y0 (58x58, 4 KB): Y Mask 
extracted from M1 and T1. 
 
 
 
The histogram of the image Y0. 
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Image X1 (58x58, 4 KB): X0 is 
encrypted by SCAN encryption to get 
X1.  
 
 
 
The histogram of image X1. 
 
 
 
 
Image Y1 (58x58, 4 KB): Y0 is 
encrypted by SCAN encryption to get 
Y1. 
 
 
 
 
The histogram of image Y1. 
 
 
 
 
Images C0 (Top left, 256x256, 65 
KB), S0 (Top right, 256x256, 65 
KB) and X1 (Bottom left, 58x58, 4 
KB): Image S0 is an image C0 with 
image X1 hidden in it by SCAN 
hiding. All three images are in the 
same scale. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The histogram of image S0. 
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Images S1 (Left, 256x256, 65 KB) 
and S2 (Right, 38 KB), 1.72268 
Compression ratio: Image S1 is an 
image S0 with Y1 hidden in it by 
LSB-hiding. The images are in the 
same scale. 
 
For the LSB Hiding step: 
Cover-image S0 byte size = 65540 
bytes. 
Cover-image S0‟s LSB hiding 
capacity=     16384 bytes. 
Image to hide Y1 size= 3368 bytes. 
  
 
 
 
 
The histogram of image S1. 
 
 
The histogram of image S2. 
 
 
 
 
Images S3 (Left, 256x256, 65 KB) and S4 
(Right, 256x256, 65 KB): Image S3 stores the 
SCAN key character count in int format (4 
bytes), image S2 byte count in int format (4 
bytes), the content of the Lookup Table T1 (1024 
bytes), the content of the SCAN key (variable 
byte size), the replaced LSB‟s of S1 (1/4 the size 
of S0 since n=2) and the content of S2 
(Compressed S1), the remaining bytes are 
dummy bytes of 0 to fill the remaining empty 
space. Image S4 is the final stegano-crypto 
product of the proposed methodology. 
 
 
 
 
The histogram of image S3. 
 
 
The histogram of image S4. 
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Extracted Image (64x64, 5 KB): The extracted 
message is the same as the original hidden 
message. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The histogram of the extracted image. It can 
be seen that it is similar to the histogram of 
the message to hide M0. 
 
 
Table 6: The results and analysis of Experiment 2. 
 
13.3.3. Experiment 3 Results and Analysis 
 
 
 
Image C0 (512x512, 257 KB): A 
PGM medical image, a cover image. 
 
 
 
 
The histogram of image C0. 
 
 
Image C1 (512x512, 257 KB): A 
segmented cover image C0 with 
d=16. 
 
 
 
 
The histogram of image C1. 
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Table T1, the final 
Intensity-Address Lookup 
Table: 
I x y D 
0 240 3 0 
1 13 137 0 
2 213 4 0 
3 68 14 0 
4 30 65 0 
5 222 27 0 
6 25 124 0 
7 209 101 0 
8 145 23 0 
9 78 79 0 
10 91 180 0 
11 244 240 0 
12 44 110 0 
13 67 94 0 
14 174 212 0 
15 83 85 0 
16 210 240 0 
17 198 132 0 
18 103 185 0 
19 251 241 0 
20 236 154 0 
21 133 132 0 
22 87 93 0 
23 91 106 0 
24 148 130 0 
25 191 139 0 
26 45 188 0 
27 234 238 0 
28 85 103 0 
29 187 164 0 
30 57 140 0 
31 147 141 0 
32 93 111 0 
33 193 208 0 
34 44 137 0 
35 173 176 0 
36 164 236 0 
37 165 244 0 
38 196 212 0 
39 248 231 0 
40 196 185 0 
41 60 168 0 
42 173 186 0 
43 250 219 0 
44 165 236 0 
45 94 235 0 
46 116 243 0 
47 217 234 0 
48 71 167 0 
49 166 236 0 
50 24 244 0 
51 166 241 0 
52 106 247 0 
53 1 1 0 
54 82 149 0 
55 184 217 0 
56 127 219 0 
57 172 246 0 
58 105 210 0 
59 27 212 0 
60 26 250 0 
61 27 243 0 
62 152 233 0 
63 25 251 0 
64 29 205 0 
65 37 234 0 
66 143 209 0 
67 24 254 0 
68 210 254 0 
69 25 254 0 
70 27 251 0 
71 28 251 0 
72 30 205 0 
73 83 173 0 
74 29 252 0 
75 68 162 0 
76 124 206 0 
77 27 255 0 
78 18 1 0 
79 28 253 0 
80 73 242 0 
81 38 224 0 
82 143 218 0 
83 130 199 0 
84 106 236 0 
85 28 254 0 
86 30 255 0 
87 30 254 0 
88 29 254 0 
89 19 0 0 
90 99 193 0 
91 35 252 0 
92 34 253 0 
93 33 254 0 
94 35 253 0 
95 36 253 0 
96 37 253 0 
97 41 253 0 
98 34 254 0 
99 49 205 0 
100 19 1 0 
101 42 254 0 
102 50 199 0 
103 34 255 0 
104 39 254 0 
105 37 255 0 
106 49 204 0 
107 61 205 0 
108 52 205 0 
109 61 208 0 
110 20 0 0 
111 49 202 0 
112 50 200 0 
113 57 210 0 
114 95 192 0 
115 52 202 0 
116 50 203 0 
117 50 201 0 
118 51 201 0 
119 51 202 0 
120 62 253 0 
121 20 1 0 
122 63 254 0 
123 50 202 1 
124 51 203 1 
125 51 200 1 
126 51 204 1 
127 52 201 1 
128 21 0 1 
129 21 1 1 
130 52 235 2 
131 204 84 2 
132 130 115 2 
133 170 161 2 
134 236 48 2 
135 60 150 2 
136 11 205 2 
137 191 249 2 
138 97 76 2 
139 150 39 2 
140 209 130 2 
141 198 141 2 
142 34 152 2 
143 121 48 2 
144 254 0 1 
145 255 0 1 
146 22 0 0 
147 22 1 1 
148 23 0 1 
149 200 125 2 
150 240 138 2 
151 230 179 2 
152 222 48 2 
153 46 206 2 
154 166 239 2 
155 31 210 2 
156 87 21 2 
 
 
157 252 120 2 
158 7 228 2 
159 75 172 2 
160 253 0 0 
161 247 0 1 
162 248 0 1 
163 252 0 0 
164 23 1 0 
165 24 0 0 
166 249 0 0 
167 250 0 0 
168 249 1 1 
169 250 1 1 
170 253 1 0 
171 24 1 0 
172 251 0 1 
173 251 1 0 
174 252 1 1 
175 254 1 1 
176 26 1 0 
177 246 0 0 
178 28 1 0 
179 36 0 1 
180 247 1 0 
181 244 1 0 
182 241 1 0 
183 230 1 0 
184 114 1 0 
185 31 0 0 
186 32 0 0 
187 240 0 0 
188 238 0 0 
189 233 0 0 
190 232 0 0 
191 231 0 0 
192 224 0 0 
193 73 0 0 
194 205 0 1 
195 111 0 1 
196 160 0 1 
197 202 0 1 
198 182 0 1 
199 44 0 1 
200 92 0 1 
201 156 0 1 
202 115 0 1 
203 135 0 1 
204 106 0 1 
205 45 0 1 
206 46 0 1 
207 47 0 1 
208 237 131 2 
209 95 56 2 
210 117 153 2 
211 58 17 2 
212 122 206 2 
213 131 114 2 
214 45 11 2 
215 24 70 2 
216 53 223 2 
217 135 92 2 
218 43 251 2 
219 150 233 2 
220 30 180 2 
221 188 3 2 
222 17 133 2 
223 166 39 2 
224 120 138 2 
225 180 180 2 
226 190 5 2 
227 121 109 2 
228 194 221 2 
229 62 251 2 
230 86 26 2 
231 127 105 2 
232 191 106 2 
233 108 166 2 
234 55 160 2 
235 106 7 2 
236 110 48 2 
237 144 194 2 
238 4 179 2 
239 42 116 2 
240 17 105 2 
241 57 156 2 
242 157 178 2 
243 241 30 2 
244 40 148 2 
245 58 193 2 
246 36 57 2 
247 48 177 2 
248 118 110 2 
249 162 253 2 
250 249 37 2 
251 151 26 2 
252 250 243 2 
253 196 94 2 
254 189 146 2 
255 23 134 2 
 
Table T1: The final  
Intensity-Address  
Lookup Table. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Image M0 (87x87, 8 KB): An image-
equivalent of a message to hide. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The histogram of the image to hide M0. 
 
 
 
 
Image M1 (63x63, 4 KB): SCAN-
compressed M0. Compression ratio = 
1.95379. 
 
 
 
 
The histogram of image M1. 
 
 
 
 
Image X0 (63x63, 4 KB): X Mask 
extracted from M1 and T1. 
 
 
 
The histogram of image X0. 
 
 
 
Image Y0 (63x63, 4 KB): Y Mask 
extracted from M1 and T1. 
 
 
 
The histogram of the image Y0. 
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Image X1 (63x63, 4 KB): X0 is 
encrypted by SCAN encryption to get 
X1.  
 
 
 
The histogram of image X1. 
 
 
 
 
Image Y1 (63x63, 4 KB): Y0 is 
encrypted by SCAN encryption to get 
Y1. 
 
 
 
 
The histogram of image Y1. 
 
 
 
 
Images C0 (Top left, 512x512, 257 
KB), S0 (Top right, 512x512, 257 
KB) and X1 (Bottom left, 63x63, 4 
KB): Image S0 is an image C0 with 
image X1 hidden in it by SCAN 
hiding. All three images are in the 
same scale. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The histogram of image S0. 
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Images S1 (Left, 512x512, 257 KB) 
and S2 (Right, 99 KB), 2.60539 
Compression ratio: Image S1 is an 
image S0 with Y1 hidden in it by 
LSB-hiding. The images are in the 
same scale. 
 
For the LSB Hiding step: 
Cover-image S0 size = 262144 bytes. 
Cover-image S0‟s LSB hiding 
capacity=     65536 bytes. 
Image to hide Y1 size= 3973 bytes. 
  
 
 
 
 
The histogram of image S1. 
 
 
The histogram of image S2. 
 
 
 
 
Images S3 (Left, 512x512, 257 KB) and S4 
(Right, 512x512, 257 KB): Image S3 stores the 
SCAN key character count in int format (4 
bytes), image S2 byte count in int format (4 
bytes), the content of the Lookup Table T1 (1024 
bytes), the content of the SCAN key (variable 
byte size), the replaced LSB‟s of S1 (1/4 the size 
of S0 since n=2) and the content of S2 
(Compressed S1), the remaining bytes are 
dummy bytes of 0 to fill the remaining empty 
space. Image S4 is the final stegano-crypto 
product of the proposed methodology. 
 
 
 
 
The histogram of image S3. 
 
 
 
The histogram of image S4. 
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Extracted PGM Image (87x87, 8 KB): An 
image-equivalent of an extracted message that 
was hidden. Removing the headers of this image 
and then opening the file as a text file, this image 
yields hidden medical information exactly the 
same as the original message as contained in 
message.txt text file (available in the appendix). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The histogram of the extracted image. It can 
be seen that it is similar to the histogram of 
the message to hide M0. 
 
 
Table 7: The results and analysis of Experiment 3. 
 
13.3.4. Experiment 4 Results and Analysis 
 
 
 
Image C0 (512x512, 257 KB): A 
PGM medical image, a cover image. 
 
 
 
 
The histogram of image C0. 
 
 
 
 
Image C1 (512x512, 257 KB): A 
segmented cover image C0 with 
d=16. 
 
 
 
 
 
The histogram of image C1. 
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Table T1, the final 
Intensity-Address Lookup 
Table: 
I x y D 
0 5 88 2 
1 53 195 2 
2 47 84 2 
3 222 151 2 
4 63 226 2 
5 24 55 2 
6 232 108 2 
7 25 137 2 
8 125 113 2 
9 248 197 2 
10 122 5 2 
11 49 248 2 
12 252 79 2 
13 34 133 2 
14 68 9 2 
15 144 159 2 
16 56 4 2 
17 34 209 2 
18 226 162 2 
19 229 119 2 
20 238 89 2 
21 199 65 2 
22 48 55 2 
23 28 183 2 
24 28 89 2 
25 28 176 2 
26 77 114 2 
27 98 217 2 
28 255 74 2 
29 110 53 2 
30 149 60 2 
31 37 151 2 
32 172 2 0 
33 151 6 0 
34 26 52 0 
35 163 20 0 
36 28 51 0 
37 149 106 0 
38 170 24 0 
39 254 1 0 
40 199 51 0 
41 156 17 0 
42 207 72 0 
43 36 124 0 
44 187 20 0 
45 242 46 0 
46 128 47 0 
47 131 46 0 
48 53 109 0 
49 113 55 0 
50 16 174 0 
51 89 72 0 
52 127 50 0 
53 204 19 0 
54 77 134 0 
55 166 179 0 
56 119 55 0 
57 249 12 0 
58 204 75 0 
59 64 97 0 
60 85 76 0 
61 147 83 0 
62 221 83 0 
63 58 105 0 
64 111 61 0 
65 218 17 0 
66 41 130 0 
67 51 115 0 
68 113 61 0 
69 83 122 0 
70 214 46 0 
71 228 16 0 
72 76 125 0 
73 36 139 0 
74 196 23 0 
75 102 68 0 
76 254 106 0 
77 214 80 0 
78 64 99 0 
79 126 55 0 
80 244 15 0 
81 62 102 0 
82 67 96 0 
83 69 138 0 
84 170 242 0 
85 193 49 0 
86 154 211 0 
87 238 43 0 
88 14 207 0 
89 197 75 0 
90 14 216 0 
91 138 71 0 
92 86 131 0 
93 111 63 0 
94 22 173 0 
95 74 140 0 
96 15 220 0 
97 82 135 0 
98 133 52 0 
99 162 208 0 
100 147 45 0 
101 114 62 0 
102 254 16 0 
103 228 89 0 
104 152 201 0 
105 124 57 0 
106 236 183 0 
107 148 191 0 
108 230 90 0 
109 155 178 0 
110 34 147 0 
111 226 44 0 
112 63 245 0 
113 32 152 0 
114 254 108 0 
115 218 45 0 
116 202 77 0 
117 94 195 0 
118 15 210 0 
119 150 224 0 
120 235 94 0 
121 202 47 0 
122 126 240 0 
123 26 167 0 
124 141 48 0 
125 59 109 0 
126 248 17 0 
127 208 22 0 
128 17 232 0 
129 29 160 0 
130 35 147 0 
131 63 247 0 
132 145 186 0 
133 181 74 0 
134 22 179 0 
135 66 244 0 
136 95 196 0 
137 82 138 0 
138 186 245 0 
139 97 121 0 
140 57 112 0 
141 16 208 0 
142 139 242 0 
143 100 187 0 
144 124 236 0 
145 84 228 0 
146 149 221 0 
147 170 201 0 
148 60 247 0 
149 42 135 0 
150 60 109 0 
151 27 166 0 
152 121 253 0 
 
 
153 59 246 0 
154 63 240 0 
155 170 169 0 
156 221 163 0 
157 108 187 0 
158 70 97 0 
159 18 222 0 
160 17 205 0 
161 55 178 0 
162 228 225 0 
163 17 212 0 
164 165 223 0 
165 52 177 0 
166 208 90 0 
167 21 190 0 
168 69 242 0 
169 84 219 0 
170 187 97 0 
171 51 217 0 
172 54 193 0 
173 189 28 0 
174 67 133 0 
175 223 96 0 
176 77 143 0 
177 183 136 0 
178 104 230 0 
179 220 95 0 
180 81 85 0 
181 72 244 0 
182 47 171 0 
183 18 212 0 
184 185 78 0 
185 133 190 0 
186 20 221 0 
187 40 142 0 
188 186 125 0 
189 19 203 0 
190 47 220 0 
191 149 177 0 
192 248 152 0 
193 178 109 0 
194 243 105 0 
195 124 96 0 
196 64 134 0 
197 66 161 0 
198 71 124 0 
199 124 118 0 
200 252 135 0 
201 242 128 0 
202 253 133 0 
203 149 166 0 
204 110 172 0 
205 219 192 0 
206 146 137 0 
207 57 206 0 
208 21 200 0 
209 140 65 0 
210 189 122 0 
211 230 208 0 
212 207 113 0 
213 181 118 0 
214 168 39 0 
215 250 116 0 
216 66 106 0 
217 146 169 0 
218 41 145 0 
219 194 125 0 
220 122 139 0 
221 223 209 0 
222 228 209 0 
223 214 241 0 
224 148 50 0 
225 216 23 0 
226 152 49 0 
227 216 241 0 
228 58 129 0 
229 23 205 0 
230 224 234 0 
231 218 239 0 
232 130 100 0 
233 191 29 0 
234 206 252 0 
235 252 24 0 
236 170 50 0 
237 105 101 0 
238 237 227 0 
239 247 237 0 
240 49 252 0 
241 89 98 0 
242 160 46 0 
243 28 252 0 
244 106 75 0 
245 234 230 0 
246 30 251 0 
247 231 253 0 
248 141 58 0 
249 224 36 0 
250 87 91 0 
251 32 253 0 
252 190 37 0 
253 89 80 0 
254 86 88 0 
255 33 252 0 
 
Table T1: The final  
Intensity-Address  
Lookup Table. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Image M0 (87x87, 8 KB): An image-
equivalent of a message to hide. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The histogram of the image to hide M0. 
 
 
 
 
Image M1 (63x63, 4 KB): SCAN-
compressed M0. Compression ratio = 
1.95379. 
 
 
 
 
The histogram of image M1. 
 
 
 
 
Image X0 (63x63, 4 KB): X Mask 
extracted from M1 and T1. 
 
 
 
The histogram of image X0. 
 
 
 
Image Y0 (63x63, 4 KB): Y Mask 
extracted from M1 and T1. 
 
 
 
The histogram of the image Y0. 
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Image X1 (63x63, 4 KB): X0 is 
encrypted by SCAN encryption to get 
X1.  
 
 
 
The histogram of image X1. 
 
 
 
 
Image Y1 (63x63, 4 KB): Y0 is 
encrypted by SCAN encryption to get 
Y1. 
 
 
 
 
The histogram of image Y1. 
 
 
 
 
Images C0 (Top left, 512x512, 257 
KB), S0 (Top right, 512x512, 257 
KB) and X1 (Bottom left, 63x63, 4 
KB): Image S0 is an image C0 with 
image X1 hidden in it by SCAN 
hiding. All three images are in the 
same scale. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The histogram of image S0. 
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Images S1 (Left, 512x512, 257 KB) 
and S2 (Right, 99 KB), 2.60539 
Compression ratio: Image S1 is an 
image S0 with Y1 hidden in it by 
LSB-hiding. The images are in the 
same scale. 
 
For the LSB Hiding step: 
Cover-image S0 size = 262144 bytes. 
Cover-image S0‟s LSB hiding 
capacity=     65536 bytes. 
Image to hide Y1 size= 3973 bytes. 
  
 
 
 
The histogram of image S1. 
 
 
The histogram of image S2. 
 
 
 
 
Images S3 (Left, 512x512, 257 KB) and S4 
(Right, 512x512, 257 KB): Image S3 stores the 
SCAN key character count in int format (4 
bytes), image S2 byte count in int format (4 
bytes), the content of the Lookup Table T1 (1024 
bytes), the content of the SCAN key (variable 
byte size), the replaced LSB‟s of S1 (1/4 the size 
of S0 since n=2) and the content of S2 
(Compressed S1), the remaining bytes are 
dummy bytes of 0 to fill the remaining empty 
space. Image S4 is the final stegano-crypto 
product of the proposed methodology. 
 
 
 
 
The histogram of image S3. 
 
 
 
The histogram of image S4. 
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Extracted PGM Image (87x87, 8 KB): An 
image-equivalent of an extracted message that 
was hidden. Removing the headers of this image 
and then opening the file as a text file, this image 
yields hidden medical information exactly the 
same as the original message as contained in 
message.txt text file (available in the appendix). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The histogram of the extracted image. It can 
be seen that it is similar to the histogram of 
the message to hide M0. 
 
 
Table 8: The results and analysis of Experiment 4. 
 
13.3.5. Experiment 5 Results and Analysis 
 
 
 
Image C0 (512x512, 257 KB): A 
PGM medical image, a cover image. 
 
 
 
 
The histogram of image C0. 
 
 
 
Image C1 (512x512, 257 KB): A 
segmented cover image C0 with 
d=16. 
 
 
 
 
The histogram of image C1. 
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Table T1, the final 
Intensity-Address Lookup 
Table: 
I x y D 
0 2 216 2 
1 51 194 2 
2 65 210 2 
3 109 86 2 
4 82 140 2 
5 200 253 2 
6 7 12 2 
7 16 207 2 
8 73 29 2 
9 103 232 2 
10 145 205 2 
11 194 233 2 
12 111 239 2 
13 106 120 2 
14 6 154 2 
15 124 188 2 
16 141 168 2 
17 105 225 2 
18 208 56 2 
19 119 154 2 
20 173 44 2 
21 62 154 2 
22 152 172 2 
23 44 26 2 
24 23 161 2 
25 2 87 2 
26 71 59 2 
27 85 17 2 
28 85 108 2 
29 14 12 2 
30 6 107 2 
31 234 146 2 
32 48 50 2 
33 250 240 2 
34 62 255 2 
35 36 244 2 
36 175 215 2 
37 160 118 2 
38 151 254 2 
39 124 204 2 
40 29 128 2 
41 25 84 2 
42 252 172 2 
43 171 238 2 
44 3 148 2 
45 189 127 2 
46 149 142 2 
47 171 111 2 
48 147 0 1 
49 52 6 1 
50 163 9 1 
51 23 19 1 
52 98 15 1 
53 45 17 1 
54 14 34 1 
55 85 24 1 
56 45 18 1 
57 254 2 1 
58 161 2 1 
59 143 33 0 
60 64 18 0 
61 74 12 0 
62 253 12 0 
63 134 7 0 
64 63 6 0 
65 76 9 0 
66 32 7 0 
67 173 1 0 
68 214 9 0 
69 183 60 0 
70 242 33 0 
71 164 64 0 
72 167 135 0 
73 85 50 0 
74 117 72 0 
75 8 50 0 
76 9 50 0 
77 210 135 0 
78 252 117 0 
79 209 81 0 
80 52 51 0 
81 67 51 0 
82 64 50 0 
83 242 159 0 
84 207 156 0 
85 173 93 0 
86 210 156 0 
87 145 127 0 
88 224 151 0 
89 135 102 0 
90 216 151 0 
91 14 83 0 
92 200 133 0 
93 59 65 0 
94 13 89 0 
95 254 147 0 
96 187 183 0 
97 221 196 0 
98 41 120 0 
99 59 137 0 
100 3 55 0 
101 20 55 0 
102 57 121 0 
103 237 210 0 
104 117 185 0 
105 192 165 0 
106 225 209 0 
107 47 65 0 
108 240 217 0 
109 158 175 0 
110 35 155 0 
111 73 185 0 
112 127 209 0 
113 79 202 0 
114 228 211 0 
115 73 187 0 
116 50 166 0 
117 132 214 0 
118 223 62 0 
119 211 201 0 
120 108 185 0 
121 185 214 0 
122 24 155 0 
123 194 216 0 
124 120 204 0 
125 3 63 0 
126 50 205 0 
127 252 226 0 
128 233 223 0 
129 96 217 0 
130 120 207 0 
131 113 215 0 
132 78 206 0 
133 89 117 0 
134 67 198 0 
135 88 215 0 
136 196 224 0 
137 143 231 0 
138 42 148 0 
139 63 215 0 
140 86 107 0 
141 149 97 0 
142 44 202 0 
143 37 183 0 
144 11 183 0 
145 45 205 0 
146 12 181 0 
147 4 203 0 
148 63 227 0 
149 233 226 0 
150 81 213 0 
151 108 237 0 
152 60 224 0 
153 173 228 0 
154 149 237 0 
155 52 146 0 
156 89 230 0 
 
 
157 62 230 0 
158 180 229 0 
159 19 176 0 
160 245 233 0 
161 51 221 0 
162 94 101 0 
163 104 239 0 
164 76 224 0 
165 127 231 0 
166 52 135 0 
167 117 236 0 
168 36 217 0 
169 235 234 0 
170 39 215 0 
171 183 236 0 
172 230 255 0 
173 196 236 0 
174 250 235 0 
175 98 239 0 
176 0 228 0 
177 10 224 0 
178 0 233 0 
179 17 162 0 
180 164 238 0 
181 117 238 0 
182 12 225 0 
183 193 242 0 
184 1 234 0 
185 111 240 0 
186 47 126 0 
187 93 113 0 
188 215 251 0 
189 227 234 0 
190 89 108 0 
191 213 251 0 
192 17 237 0 
193 204 240 0 
194 122 255 0 
195 200 247 0 
196 188 243 0 
197 74 247 0 
198 152 249 0 
199 31 243 0 
200 200 248 0 
201 183 249 0 
202 77 246 0 
203 239 243 0 
204 31 245 0 
205 49 254 0 
206 237 243 0 
207 167 239 0 
208 180 244 0 
209 222 244 0 
210 240 245 0 
211 38 245 0 
212 225 242 0 
213 16 242 0 
214 232 240 0 
215 199 251 0 
216 43 242 0 
217 83 246 0 
218 83 247 0 
219 80 254 0 
220 90 251 0 
221 107 249 0 
222 175 244 0 
223 205 238 0 
224 44 246 0 
225 177 242 0 
226 45 246 0 
227 217 238 0 
228 79 255 0 
229 219 238 0 
230 220 238 0 
231 82 254 0 
232 105 252 0 
233 92 255 0 
234 83 254 0 
235 148 243 0 
236 126 246 0 
237 91 255 0 
238 228 238 0 
239 117 248 0 
240 90 253 0 
241 119 248 0 
242 87 254 0 
243 88 254 0 
244 82 255 0 
245 89 254 0 
246 88 255 0 
247 83 255 0 
248 84 255 0 
249 86 255 0 
250 168 241 1 
251 81 255 1 
252 85 255 1 
253 146 244 1 
254 86 254 1 
255 87 255 1 
 
Table T1: The final  
Intensity-Address  
Lookup Table. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Image M0 (87x87, 8 KB): An image-
equivalent of a message to hide. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The histogram of the image to hide M0. 
 
 
 
 
Image M1 (63x63, 4 KB): SCAN-
compressed M0. Compression ratio = 
1.95379. 
 
 
 
 
The histogram of image M1. 
 
 
 
 
Image X0 (63x63, 4 KB): X Mask 
extracted from M1 and T1. 
 
 
 
The histogram of image X0. 
 
 
 
Image Y0 (63x63, 4 KB): Y Mask 
extracted from M1 and T1. 
 
 
 
The histogram of the image Y0. 
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Image X1 (63x63, 4 KB): X0 is 
encrypted by SCAN encryption to get 
X1.  
 
 
 
The histogram of image X1. 
 
 
 
 
Image Y1 (63x63, 4 KB): Y0 is 
encrypted by SCAN encryption to get 
Y1. 
 
 
 
 
The histogram of image Y1. 
 
 
 
 
Images C0 (Top left, 512x512, 257 
KB), S0 (Top right, 512x512, 257 
KB) and X1 (Bottom left, 63x63, 4 
KB): Image S0 is an image C0 with 
image X1 hidden in it by SCAN 
hiding. All three images are in the 
same scale. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The histogram of image S0. 
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Images S1 (Left, 512x512, 257 KB) 
and S2 (Right, 99 KB), 2.48768 
Compression ratio: Image S1 is an 
image S0 with Y1 hidden in it by 
LSB-hiding. The images are in the 
same scale. 
 
For the LSB Hiding step: 
Cover-image S0 size = 262144 bytes. 
Cover-image S0‟s LSB hiding 
capacity=     65536 bytes. 
Image to hide Y1 size= 3973 bytes. 
  
 
 
 
 
The histogram of image S1. 
 
 
The histogram of image S2. 
 
 
 
 
Images S3 (Left, 512x512, 257 KB) and S4 
(Right, 512x512, 257 KB): Image S3 stores the 
SCAN key character count in int format (4 
bytes), image S2 byte count in int format (4 
bytes), the content of the Lookup Table T1 (1024 
bytes), the content of the SCAN key (variable 
byte size), the replaced LSB‟s of S1 (1/4 the size 
of S0 since n=2) and the content of S2 
(Compressed S1), the remaining bytes are 
dummy bytes of 0 to fill the remaining empty 
space. Image S4 is the final stegano-crypto 
product of the proposed methodology. 
 
 
 
 
The histogram of image S3. 
 
 
The histogram of image S4. 
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Extracted PGM Image (87x87, 8 KB): An 
image-equivalent of an extracted message that 
was hidden. Removing the headers of this image 
and then opening the file as a text file, this image 
yields hidden medical information exactly the 
same as the original message as contained in 
message.txt text file (available in the appendix). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The histogram of the extracted image. It can 
be seen that it is similar to the histogram of 
the message to hide M0. 
 
 
Table 9: The results and analysis of Experiment 5. 
13.3.6. Experiment 6 Results and Analysis 
 
 
 
Image C0 (512x512, 257 KB): A 
Cameraman PGM image, a cover 
image. 
 
 
 
The histogram of image C0. 
 
 
Image C1 (512x512, 257 KB): A 
segmented cover image C0 with 
d=16. 
 
 
 
The histogram of image C1. 
0
500
1000
1500
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90
10
0
11
0
12
0
13
0
14
0
15
0
16
0
17
0
18
0
19
0
20
0
21
0
22
0
23
0
24
0
25
0
f
I
0
1000
2000
3000
4000
5000
6000
7000
0 1
0
2
0
3
0
4
0
5
0
6
0
7
0
8
0
9
0
10
0
11
0
12
0
13
0
14
0
15
0
16
0
17
0
18
0
19
0
20
0
21
0
22
0
23
0
24
0
25
0
0
10000
20000
30000
40000
50000
60000
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90
10
0
11
0
12
0
13
0
14
0
15
0
16
0
17
0
18
0
19
0
20
0
21
0
22
0
23
0
24
0
25
0
 
 
 
 
Table T1, the final 
Intensity-Address Lookup 
Table: 
I x y D 
0 75 229 1 
1 248 99 0 
2 76 228 0 
3 126 194 0 
4 124 195 0 
5 77 229 0 
6 76 230 0 
7 79 214 0 
8 136 180 0 
9 110 247 0 
10 128 215 0 
11 75 230 0 
12 144 154 0 
13 215 173 0 
14 196 78 0 
15 191 187 0 
16 213 204 0 
17 223 202 0 
18 132 213 0 
19 227 195 0 
20 197 77 0 
21 76 220 0 
22 226 199 0 
23 147 131 0 
24 79 248 0 
25 191 225 0 
26 181 244 0 
27 165 111 0 
28 85 205 0 
29 207 210 0 
30 168 107 0 
31 112 195 0 
32 211 70 0 
33 76 237 0 
34 186 87 0 
35 209 214 0 
36 168 216 0 
37 236 178 0 
38 235 177 0 
39 176 244 0 
40 76 239 0 
41 78 212 0 
42 118 225 0 
43 181 243 0 
44 80 208 0 
45 153 223 0 
46 74 223 0 
47 97 200 0 
48 148 220 0 
49 122 216 0 
50 234 140 0 
51 163 206 0 
52 143 221 0 
53 217 69 0 
54 171 208 0 
55 238 87 0 
56 76 241 0 
57 241 187 0 
58 145 220 0 
59 78 211 0 
60 76 216 0 
61 169 208 0 
62 109 255 0 
63 180 208 0 
64 74 230 0 
65 113 224 0 
66 179 238 0 
67 139 228 0 
68 82 254 0 
69 206 216 0 
70 132 162 0 
71 75 233 0 
72 157 205 0 
73 108 198 0 
74 150 241 0 
75 98 199 0 
76 74 221 0 
77 202 216 0 
78 113 246 0 
79 180 244 0 
80 145 252 0 
81 83 255 0 
82 74 231 0 
83 113 223 0 
84 120 249 0 
85 130 219 0 
86 78 210 0 
87 235 83 0 
88 167 247 0 
89 155 208 0 
90 115 220 0 
91 120 238 0 
92 121 248 0 
93 177 244 0 
94 129 187 0 
95 246 96 0 
96 214 68 0 
97 211 211 0 
98 191 230 0 
99 133 224 0 
100 115 218 0 
101 131 226 0 
102 74 232 0 
103 164 220 0 
104 121 238 0 
105 222 71 0 
106 163 207 0 
107 122 238 0 
108 159 219 0 
109 129 229 0 
110 116 217 0 
111 123 238 0 
112 145 207 0 
113 118 251 0 
114 136 230 0 
115 159 208 0 
116 141 251 0 
117 137 231 0 
118 115 243 0 
119 74 220 0 
120 85 203 0 
121 130 184 0 
122 145 245 0 
123 74 233 0 
124 118 222 0 
125 198 74 0 
126 75 238 0 
127 75 217 0 
128 165 209 0 
129 177 247 0 
130 135 231 0 
131 107 197 0 
132 121 225 0 
133 83 203 0 
134 76 245 0 
135 197 221 0 
136 137 234 0 
137 249 95 0 
138 146 250 0 
139 80 252 0 
140 112 252 0 
141 243 1 0 
142 174 0 0 
143 75 215 0 
144 246 0 0 
145 63 1 0 
146 170 102 0 
147 73 225 0 
148 80 1 0 
149 9 1 0 
150 212 207 0 
151 6 0 0 
152 254 94 0 
153 84 3 0 
154 62 9 0 
155 9 53 0 
156 200 6 0 
 
 
157 124 239 0 
158 48 29 0 
159 42 17 0 
160 69 22 0 
161 200 21 0 
162 196 53 0 
163 163 12 0 
164 252 49 0 
165 30 45 0 
166 250 84 0 
167 81 53 0 
168 79 60 0 
169 246 87 0 
170 19 107 0 
171 134 61 0 
172 41 97 0 
173 159 68 0 
174 199 69 0 
175 44 141 0 
176 187 80 0 
177 181 83 0 
178 43 151 0 
179 189 80 0 
180 208 67 0 
181 102 113 0 
182 165 100 0 
183 78 143 0 
184 243 89 0 
185 109 191 0 
186 39 215 0 
187 56 243 0 
188 100 195 0 
189 55 245 0 
190 66 233 0 
191 149 124 0 
192 70 224 0 
193 90 199 0 
194 148 207 0 
195 153 254 0 
196 71 223 0 
197 141 131 0 
198 71 221 0 
199 72 226 0 
200 72 224 0 
201 72 233 0 
202 72 219 0 
203 72 223 0 
204 162 248 0 
205 72 228 0 
206 72 220 0 
207 72 222 0 
208 72 221 0 
209 108 195 0 
210 124 189 0 
211 150 204 0 
212 144 203 0 
213 72 231 1 
214 147 204 0 
215 148 204 0 
216 148 206 0 
217 149 207 0 
218 118 40 1 
219 150 205 0 
220 152 206 0 
221 119 40 1 
222 149 205 0 
223 148 205 0 
224 147 205 0 
225 150 206 0 
226 150 207 1 
227 151 206 1 
228 152 207 0 
229 151 207 1 
230 126 92 2 
231 231 22 2 
232 219 200 2 
233 199 65 2 
234 103 93 2 
235 44 215 2 
236 224 94 2 
237 141 234 2 
238 154 80 2 
239 55 21 2 
240 252 128 2 
241 204 243 2 
242 0 123 2 
243 194 165 2 
244 182 148 2 
245 224 81 2 
246 194 98 2 
247 196 157 2 
248 218 63 2 
249 96 56 2 
250 73 201 2 
251 120 82 2 
252 110 101 2 
253 38 31 2 
254 61 183 2 
255 87 87 2 
 
Table T1: The final  
Intensity-Address  
Lookup Table. 
 
 
 
 
 
Image M0 (87x87, 8 KB): An image-
equivalent of a message to hide. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The histogram of the image to hide M0. 
 
 
 
 
Image M1 (63x63, 4 KB): SCAN-
compressed M0. Compression ratio = 
1.95379. 
 
 
 
 
The histogram of image M1. 
 
 
 
 
Image X0 (63x63, 4 KB): X Mask 
extracted from M1 and T1. 
 
 
 
The histogram of image X0. 
 
 
 
Image Y0 (63x63, 4 KB): Y Mask 
extracted from M1 and T1. 
 
 
 
The histogram of the image Y0. 
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Image X1 (63x63, 4 KB): X0 is 
encrypted by SCAN encryption to get 
X1.  
 
 
 
The histogram of image X1. 
 
 
 
 
Image Y1 (63x63, 4 KB): Y0 is 
encrypted by SCAN encryption to get 
Y1. 
 
 
 
 
The histogram of image Y1. 
 
 
 
 
Images C0 (Top left, 512x512, 257 
KB), S0 (Top right, 512x512, 257 
KB) and X1 (Bottom left, 63x63, 4 
KB): Image S0 is an image C0 with 
image X1 hidden in it by SCAN 
hiding. All three images are shown in 
the same scale. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The histogram of image S0. 
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Images S1 (Left, 512x512, 257 KB) 
and S2 (Right, 106 KB), 2.4 
Compression ratio: Image S1 is an 
image S0 with Y1 hidden in it by 
LSB-hiding. The images are in the 
same scale. 
 
For the LSB Hiding step: 
Cover-image S0 size = 262144 bytes. 
Cover-image S0‟s LSB hiding 
capacity=     65536 bytes. 
Image to hide Y1 size= 3973 bytes. 
  
 
 
 
 
The histogram of image S1. 
 
 
The histogram of image S2. 
 
 
 
 
Images S3 (Left, 512x512, 257 KB) and S4 
(Right, 512x512, 257 KB): Image S3 stores the 
SCAN key character count in int format (4 
bytes), image S2 byte count in int format (4 
bytes), the content of the Lookup Table T1 (1024 
bytes), the content of the SCAN key (variable 
byte size), the replaced LSB‟s of S1 (1/4 the size 
of S0 since n=2) and the content of S2 
(Compressed S1), the remaining bytes are 
dummy bytes of 0 to fill the remaining empty 
space. Image S4 is the final stegano-crypto 
product of the proposed methodology. 
 
 
 
 
The histogram of image S3. 
 
The histogram of image S4. 
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Extracted PGM Image (87x87, 8 KB): An 
image-equivalent of an extracted message that 
was hidden. Removing the headers of this image 
and then opening the file as a text file, this image 
yields hidden medical information exactly the 
same as the original message as contained in 
message.txt text file (available in the appendix). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The histogram of the extracted image. It can 
be seen that it is similar to the histogram of 
the message to hide M0. 
 
 
Table 10: The results and analysis of Experiment 6. 
13.5. The effectiveness of the proposed methodology 
Having done the experimentation, we are now ready to evaluate the effectiveness of the 
proposed methodology. We use the effectiveness index formula Ei = mi + ( ∑j
n
  wj .xj ) + bi, which 
was introduced in Part 1, the Survey. Since the comparative survey table (Table 3) looks at 29 
methodologies, let i=30, 
The Preliminary Evaluation of the methodology’s Effectiveness Index: 
It can be recalled from the end of the comparative survey study of Part 1 that the 
effectiveness of a methodology Mi can be evaluated using Equation 1 (Page 88). The preliminary 
evaluation will be done before the discussion of Part 3, which looks at the reverse engineering the 
proposed scheme. The final evaluation will be done after a more thorough security penetration 
testing and robustness testing of this proposed methodology. We do this before-and-after 
evaluation because it is obvious that we may only have a better understanding of the proposed 
methodology after a thorough security testing, penetration testing and robustness testing of the 
methodology. This is the topic of discussion in the subsequent part of this discussion, Part 3, the 
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reverse engineering of the proposed methodology. The following is a parameter-by-parameter 
preliminary evaluation of the methodology. 
M30 - evaluated as m30 
The proposed methodology M30 is evaluated as m30, could range from 0 to 10, based on 
how the cryptology community views it whether it is original, a modification version or an 
incremental version. The proposed methodology is new and original: it is not a modified version 
or an incremental version of another version. Even though it blends together older component 
methodologies, it is a new methodology as a system. Due to the originality of this stegano-crypto 
system, m30 is rated as 10. 
P1 - Space complexity: 
The next parameter to rate is the space complexity, which is the amount of memory 
required to execute the algorithm. The proposed algorithm uses memory buffers to store initial, 
intermediate and final variables, which consist of simple data types, one dimensional and two 
dimensional arrays. The design diagram of the methodology illustrates the main variables. In 
asymptotic notation, the algorithm is O(n
2
) given the cover image width n. This space complexity 
is good, therefore the space complexity x1=1.0. 
P2 - Time complexity: 
As previously discussed, the time complexity is the asymptotic theoretical time required 
to execute the algorithm. This is in big O notation. With reference to ..., the theoretical time 
complexity of the proposed methodology is … Therefore the time complexity x2=1.0. 
P3 - Data complexity: 
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Data complexity refers to the plaintext and ciphertext quantity required to execute the algorithm. 
Like space complexity, the data complexity of the algorithm is O(n
2
) given the cover image width 
n. Therefore, the data complexity x3= 1.0. 
P4 - Real time performance: 
Real time performance refers to how long the methodology execute in real time. This is 
the wall time required to execute the algorithm. In the case of the proposed methodology, the 
exact wall time is not very important because of frequent user input interruptions. However, it is 
fast enough, running under 2 seconds if there were no user interruptions. Therefore, the real time 
performance x4=1.0. 
P5 - Robustness: 
 Due to the high time complexity, the fusion, confusion and diffusion properties of the 
proposed stegano-crypto algorithm, the proposed algorithm is very robust. It is not easily 
breakable and does not fall apart easily. Therefore, the robustness variable x5= 1.0. 
P6 – Application and variety: 
The methodology is useful in the information hiding and encryption in images. This is 
useful in military privacy, government privacy and medical data and imaging privacy. Therefore, 
the application variable x6= 1.0. 
P7 - Portability: 
The proposed methodology is very portable. It works in different platforms and could 
also be implemented in hardware. The prototype is implemented to work with PGM images to 
which a free xnView software (available online) can convert any image format. The mechanism 
of the algorithm is not restricted to PGM format only; it could be modified to work with other 
image formats. Therefore, the portability variable x7= 1.0. 
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P8 - Implementation: 
This proposal gives a software implementation. Therefore, the implementation variable 
x8= 1.0. 
P9 - Reliability: 
The methodology is reliable. The experiments have tested and proven that the algorithm 
does its job. The proposed algorithm can be trusted to do what it is supposed to do. Therefore, the 
reliability variable x9= 1.0. 
Bias b: 
The next parameter to evaluate is a bias b which is a subjective measure of the 
methodology‟s clarity and mathematical elegance. The proposed methodology is clear and 
discusses relevant mathematical concepts involved in the algorithm; this includes the 
combinatory of the various key spaces. Therefore, the bias variable b=10. 
The Effectiveness Index Formula Evaluation: 
Using the effectiveness index formula Ei = mi + ( ∑j
9
  wj .xj ) + bi, the parameter variable 
ratings are as follows, w.l.o.g. let i= 30, then m30 = 10, xj = 1.0 for all j=1,…,9,  b30=10  E30 = 
Emax = 84.0. 
Even though the preliminary E30 = Emax = 84.0, it may not live up to its current E30 
expectations after a more thorough analysis of the scheme. This analysis follows in the 
subsequent Part 3 discussion.   
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13.5. Experiments Conclusion 
The results and analysis of the five aforementioned experiments lead to the 
conclusion that the proposed Stegano-Crypto methodology is a lossless methodology for 
mutually hiding and encrypting information in images. After yielding image S4, the 
proposed hybrid algorithm terminates with image S4 being the final product of the 
algorithm, i.e. the Stegano-Crypto image. Reversing the process yields the exact same 
embedded image without any loss of information. In the case of text message hiding, the 
exact same message is retrieved in the description process. Therefore, the proposed 
hybrid algorithm is a lossless stegano-crypto algorithm. Additionally, the proposed 
stegano-crypto methodology inherits the confusion and diffusion properties of the 
inherent SCAN algorithms. With reference to the histogram of the resulting stegano-
crypto image S4, it can be seen that the histogram is flat. This implies that the proposed 
algorithm satisfies the diffusion and confusion properties. Therefore, the security of the 
methodology is also enhanced. 
14. Complexity Comparisons 
This complexity comparison is based on the key space size whenever applicable. 
The LSB algorithm does not use a key, therefore its complexity is based on the time 
complexity to its encryption operation.  
Without loss of generality, let C be an nxn cover image and let M be an mxm 
message to hide or encrypt such that 0<m<=n and n>16. 
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14.1. LSB Hiding 
The theoretical time complexity of the LSB algorithm is O(n
2
) since all n
2
 pixels 
are accessed to hide 2 least significant bits. 
14.2. Regional Hiding with Segmentation 
In 3.5, we saw that the Regional Hiding with Segmentation Algorithm is 
O(256
2mxm
). 
14.3. SCAN Encryption, Hiding and Compression 
Given the number of scan patterns S(r) of a 2
r
2
r 
two dimensional array generated 
by the encryption specific SCAN, the number encryption key pairs T(r) which can be 
used to encrypt a 2
r
2
r 
image, then 
            S(2) = 104 
            S(r) = 104 + 24(S(r-1))
4
 for r3 
            T(r) = (S(r))
2
 for r2 
For very large r, S(r) is O(r
4(r-1)
)  O(r
4r-4
)  O(n
4n
). Consequently, for very 
large r, T(r) is O(n
8n
). 
14.4. The complexity of the proposed Stegano-Crypto scheme 
The first three modules of the methodology weave SCAN Compression and 
Regional Hiding Methodologies. The first module, the Regional Hiding Module, is 
partially initiated, but before completion, the second modules runs to produce results that 
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are fed to the third module that completes the regional hiding algorithm by combining the 
results. This means that their complexities involve a complicated partial composition of 
corresponding functions. After the first three modules, SCAN Hiding then composes the 
resulting product from the previous three functions. The O(n
2
) LSB hiding module then 
composes the result. The SCAN compression module then composes this result with its 
corresponding complexity. The image packing module then arranges them. The final 
SCAN encryption module then composes the output with its corresponding function to 
get the final result. It can be concluded that the complexity of this algorithm is very high, 
higher than O(max{ n
2
, 256
2mxm
, n
8n
 }). 
14.5. The Complexity Comparison Summary 
Without loss of generality, let C be an nxn=2
r
2
r
 cover image and let M be an 
mxm message to hide or encrypt such that 0 <m<=n and n>16. 
Methodology Functionality Theoretical Complexity 
LSB steganography O(n
2
) 
Regional Hiding 
with Segmentation 
steganography O(256
2mxm
) 
SCAN Encryption Cryptography O(n
8n
) 
SCAN Hiding steganography O(n
8n
) 
SCAN Compression Compression O(n
8n
) 
Proposed Stegano-
Crypto scheme 
Mutual encryption 
and 
steganography  
Very High- Much higher than regional 
hiding with segmentation, SCAN encryption, 
SCAN hiding and SCAN compression 
composed together. 
RCES/RSES  
(Also found in first 
survey table) 
Encryption  O(2
K
n
2
) for some key entropy K 
Puzzle [16] Encryption O(n
2
!) 
Table 11: The complexity comparison of various image encryption and steganography 
methodologies. 
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From Table 11, it can be concluded that the proposed methodology is relatively 
very secure compared to most contemporary encryption and steganography algorithms. A 
brute force attack and many other widely used smarter attacks are hopeless. 
15. Part 2 Conclusion 
The security of data is important in the storage and communication of data. 
Cryptography and steganography are two of the common processes for securing data. 
While cryptography deals with encrypting data, steganography deals with hiding data. 
This paper has presented a new lossless stegano-crypto methodology that fuses both 
cryptography and steganography techniques for mutual information encryption and 
information hiding in images. This proposed hybrid methodology is a single information 
hiding and encryption algorithm that fuses SCAN Encryption, SCAN Compression, 
SCAN Information Hiding, LSB Hiding and Regional Hiding with Segmentation 
algorithms. Experimentation results support and prove the given hypothesis that the 
proposed hybrid methodology is functional and lossless. 
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PART 3- THE REVERSE ENGINEERING PROCESS 
16. The Overview of Our Reverse Engineering strategy 
Having designed and implemented a new stegano-crypto methodology for mutual 
information hiding and encryption in images, the next step is to develop a reverse 
engineering attack to break it. With cryptanalysis and cryptography going hand in hand 
and steganalysis and steganography going hand in hand, the designing and 
implementation of the proposed methodology took into account security and reverse 
engineering issues. In order to reverse engineer our methodology, we need to think like 
an attacker. The following discussion will present ways to explore and exploit our 
methodology system. 
As we have seen above, there are many cryptanalysis and steganalysis techniques 
that could be very good candidates to break our methodology. Part 1 of this discussion, 
the survey, showed that the cipher-text only attack is the most dangerous because of its 
effectiveness and versatility. Therefore, we will conduct our further study of creating our 
own methodology by first using ciphtertext-only attack as the attack method of choice. 
To develop our new cryptography methodology, we think of possible ciphtertext-only 
attacks that could break the system. We use the following steps to develop a cryptanalysis 
attack on the proposed methodology: 
 study the cryptosystem 
 choose the cryptology and steganology space to explore  
 choose the cryptology and steganology space to exploit 
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 get the ciphertext 
 explore and exploit the data space by analyzing the ciphertext topology 
 search for security holes 
 break the cryptosystem 
Study the cryptosystem 
 The first step is to analyze and know the mechanism of the proposed stego-crypto 
scheme. The idea is to think about the cryptography, cryptanalysis, steganography and 
steganalysis aspects of the system. The goal is to extract the hidden message from the 
given stego-ciphertext without using the key. The strategy is to reverse engineer all the 
steps backwards by exploring and exploiting the weaknesses of the scheme used in the 
corresponding modules. 
Choose the cryptology and steganology spaces to explore  
Cryptography and steganology are broad and general; the idea is to focus on the 
relevant cryptology and steganology spaces to explore. We are looking to explore and 
exploit the weaknesses of the modules, therefore the spaces to explore are SCAN 
Encryption Cryptanalysis, SCAN Compression attacks, SCAN Hiding Steganalysis, LSB 
Hiding Steganalysis, Regional Hiding Steganalysis and related cryptanalysis and 
steganalysis techniques. 
Choose the cryptology and steganology spaces to exploit 
Having chosen the relevant cryptology and steganology techniques to explore, the 
next step is to exploit these techniques and zero in on a more specific, more specialized 
and more success-potential technique to solve the given problem. Schemes [63], [64], 
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[65], [66] are LSB Hiding steganalysis schemes that exploit LSB Hiding weaknesses. The 
scheme [67] proposes a blind image steganalysis scheme based on run-length histogram 
analysis. This is a candidate methodology for exploiting the Regional Hiding with 
segmentation scheme. For SCAN cryptanalysis and SCAN steganalysis, we consider [11] 
where S. Li et al propose a general cryptanalysis of permutation-only multimedia 
encryption algorithms. [68], [69], [70] and [71] are also candidate methodologies for 
exploiting SCAN schemes, which are based on chaos, permutations and blocks. More 
candidate schemes will be sought. 
Get the ciphertext 
The next step is to collect the ciphtertext data for analyzing in the experiments. 
Explore and exploit the data space by analyzing the ciphertext topology 
The next step is to do the experiments: The idea is to observe and analyze the 
results from the experiments on the ciphertext topology attempting to find security holes 
for exploitation. 
Explore and exploit the security holes 
The most gruesome task is to explore and exploit the security holes. This step 
involves redoing and tweaking space and environment variables repeatedly to penetrate 
the security holes. 
Break the cryptosystem 
After penetrating the security holes, the goal is achieved. The final step is to 
propose the design and implementation of the successful cryptanalysis attack. 
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17. The Proposed Reverse Engineering Attack 
The following four steps assisted in the design and implementation of a new reverse 
engineering attack on the proposed stegano-crypto methodology: 
a. Stegano-Crypto Attacks Exploration: Choosing the cryptology and steganology 
space to explore  
b. Stegano-Crypto Attacks Exploitation: Choosing the cryptology and steganology 
space to exploit 
c. System analysis: Studying the Stegano-Crypto system and Theoretical Proof 
d. Security Hole Exploration and Exploitation: The Reverse Engineering Attack 
 
Figure 25: The flow chart of our steganalysis and cryptanalysis attack strategy. 
17.1. Stegano-Crypto Attacks Exploration 
Cryptography and steganology are broad and general; the idea is to focus on the 
relevant cryptology and steganology spaces to explore. We are looking to explore and 
exploit the weaknesses of the modules and the system as a whole, therefore the global 
Stegano-Crypto Attacks 
Exploration
Stegano-Crypto Attacks 
Exploitation
System Analysis
Security Hole Exploration 
and Exploitation
186 
 
space to explore involve attacks related to SCAN Encryption, SCAN Compression, 
SCAN Hiding, LSB Hiding, Regional Hiding and related cryptanalysis and steganalysis 
attacks. 
 
Figure 26: The flow chart of the processes involved in the Stegano-Crypto Exploration 
step. 
 
Schemes [63], [64], [65], [66] are LSB Hiding steganalysis schemes that exploit 
LSB Hiding weaknesses. The scheme [67] proposes a blind image steganalysis scheme 
Stegano-Crypto 
Attacks 
Exploration
Segmentation
Strengths
Weaknesses
Regional Hiding
Strengths
Weaknesses
Permutation
Strengths
Weaknesses
Chaos
SCAN 
Compression
Strengths
Weaknesses
SCAN Encryption
Strengths
Weaknesses
SCAN Hiding
Strengths
Weaknesses
LSB
Strengths
Weaknesses
Other Related
Strengths
Weaknesses
Strengths 
similarities 
and 
differences 
Weaknesses 
similarities 
and 
differences 
187 
 
based on run-length histogram analysis. This is a candidate methodology for exploiting 
the Regional Hiding with segmentation scheme. For SCAN cryptanalysis and SCAN 
steganalysis, we consider [11] where S. Li et al propose a general cryptanalysis of 
permutation-only multimedia encryption algorithms. [68], [69], [70] and [71] are also 
candidate methodologies for exploiting SCAN schemes, which are based on chaos, 
permutations and blocks (Figure 27). We will compare and contrast the strengths and 
weaknesses of these attacks to hypothesize on the techniques that could be relevant to our 
goal of successfully attacking the system (Figure 26). 
 
 
Figure 27: Reference pointers for known attack techniques. 
 
The goal of this step is to choose the most relevant cryptology and steganology 
attack techniques to explore from the current known steganology and cryptology 
literature. In part 1 of this discussion, i.e. the survey, we looked at a wide range of attack 
techniques. From the previously discussed overview of this step, we matched the 
encrypting and hiding techniques used in the proposed stegano-crypto scheme with their 
corresponding attacks as follows: Chaos ([68], [69], [70], [71]), Permutation ([11], [67]), 
LSB ([63], [64], [65], [66]), Regional Hiding ([67]) and Hybrid ([53]). 
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Chaos Based Techniques 
[68], [69], [70], [71] are cryptanalysis methods that are relevant to our chaos-
based cryptanalysis objectives because they possess features that are directly or indirectly 
applicable to our Stegano-Cryptanalysis. 
Attack Attack Title Mechanism Strengths Weaknesses 
[68] A Framework for 
Describing  
Block Cipher  
Cryptanalysis. 
 
 
 
The Xi framework 
designed to 
compactly describe 
the block cipher 
cryptanalysis 
techniques 
regardless of their 
individual 
differences. 
- It provides a 
thorough guideline 
for a successful 
block cipher 
attack: It is like a 
map for a 
successful block 
cipher attack. 
- Not only does it 
give a 
mathematical 
model, it also gives 
an application 
example. 
- It gives a 
framework similar 
to what we are 
trying to create for 
our proposed 
stegano-crypto 
cipher. 
- Technique 
general, not 
specific: It gives a 
general 
framework for an 
attack on a block 
cipher without 
focusing on any 
single block 
cipher.  
- Technique 
designed for block 
ciphers, the 
proposed stegano-
crypto system is 
not a block cipher, 
it only has some 
block cipher 
characteristics. 
[69] Cryptanalysis of 
Block Ciphers via 
Improved  
Simulated 
Annealing. 
 
 
 
- Based on 
Improved 
Simulated 
Annealing on the 
key space: A 
combinatorial 
optimization key 
space search 
where a single 
key trial solution 
is modified at 
random, an 
energy then 
defined to 
represent how 
good the solution 
is; the goal being, 
to find the best 
key solution by 
minimizing the 
- It is practical, the 
implementation is 
given. 
- It cryptanalyzes 
block ciphers 
using heuristic 
optimization 
techniques based 
on the principles 
of simulated 
annealing and 
thermostatistical 
persistency. 
- Most likely, this 
technique will not 
work for our 
proposed 
stegano-crypto 
scheme because 
the confusion and 
diffusion 
properties of our 
scheme obscures 
effects of single 
key modification 
trials.  
- The technique is 
for block ciphers, 
specifically DES- 
The proposed 
stegano-crypto 
system is not a 
block cipher, it 
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energy. only has some 
block cipher 
characteristics. 
[70] An Introduction to 
Block Cipher 
Cryptanalysis 
 
 
 
Gives a big picture 
on the literature on 
block cipher 
cryptanalysis: Attack 
Scenarios, Bounds 
on the Security of a 
Block Cipher, Short 
cut attacks, 
Differential and 
Linear attacks, 
Multiset attacks, 
Algebraic and Side-
channel attacks. 
- It gives an 
overview of 
various block 
cipher 
cryptanalysis 
techniques. 
- It is presented like 
a survey on 
existing literature 
rather than new 
knowledge. 
- Like the two 
former 
techniques, it 
focuses on block 
cipher 
cryptanalysis, 
which may not 
transfer to our 
proposed 
stegano-crypto 
scheme whose 
final ciphertext is 
not fully a block 
ciphertext. 
[71] Cryptanalyzing an 
Encryption Scheme 
Based on Blind 
Source Separation 
 
 
 
It is a mathematical 
proof to show that 
the real size of the 
key space is much 
smaller than 
previously estimated 
due to security flaws 
of the BSS-based 
encryption scheme. 
- It shows that the 
encryption scheme 
is not secure 
against known-
/chosen-plaintext 
attack and chosen-
ciphertext attack. 
- The divide and 
conquer attack 
shows a reduction 
in key space size. 
- The BSS cipher 
doesn‟t satisfy the 
confusion and 
diffusion principle. 
- It mathematically 
shows a successful 
differential attack 
through solving 
simultaneous 
equations. 
- Experiment results 
are given. 
- Not apparent. 
Table 12: The strengths and weaknesses of Chaos Based techniques. 
190 
 
Permutation Based Techniques 
[11], [67], Frequency Analysis, Index of Coincidence, Kasinski‟s Examination, 
Differential, Integral and Linear Cryptanalysis are cryptanalysis techniques that are 
relevant to our permutation-based cryptanalysis objectives because they possess features 
that are directly or indirectly applicable to our Stegano-Cryptanalysis. 
Attack Attack Name Mechanism Strengths Weaknesses 
[11] A General 
Cryptanalysis of 
Permutation-Only 
Multimedia 
Encryption 
Algorithms using a 
known-plaintext 
and chosen-
plaintext attacks. 
 
 
 
 
- Exploits the 
security flaws of 
permutation-
only multimedia 
ciphers by 
showing 
mathematically 
how all such 
ciphers are 
vulnerable to 
known-plaintext 
and chosen-
plaintext attacks. 
- Shows empirical 
results that 
support the 
feasibility of 
known- and 
chosen-plaintext 
attacks. 
- Shows why secret 
permutations are 
weak to be used 
alone in securing 
multimedia 
encryption 
systems. 
- Gives theoretical 
and practical 
solutions on 
secret 
permutations 
attacks. 
- The attack only 
focuses on 
known-plaintext 
and chosen-
plaintext attacks, 
it may not work 
on ciphertext 
only attack where 
the only access is 
ciphertext. 
[67] Blind image 
steganalysis based 
on run-length 
histogram analysis. 
 
 
 
 
- Using run-length 
histogram 
analysis, it 
attempts to 
detect the 
presence of data 
embedding both 
having known 
the image 
texture and 
blindly without 
knowing the 
image texture. 
- Empirical results 
show that the 
proposed scheme 
significantly 
outperforms prior 
techniques in 
detection 
accuracy and 
generality. 
- It focuses on data 
embedding 
detection rather 
than embedded 
data extraction: It 
leaves a question 
whether it is a 
true and 
complete 
steganalysis 
technique. 
Frequency 
Analysis 
Frequency Analysis 
(Classical 
Cryptanalysis 
Technique), 
discussed in Part 1, 
the survey. 
- Studies the 
character 
frequency in the 
ciphertext: The 
most frequent 
character in a 
- Very effective in 
permutation-only 
or substitution-
only ciphers. 
-  
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language will 
most likely 
correspond to 
the most 
frequent 
ciphertext 
character, and so 
forth. 
Index of 
coincidence  
Index of 
coincidence 
(Modern 
Cryptanalysis 
Technique), 
discussed in Part 1, 
the survey. 
- The index of 
coincidence 
refers to the 
ratio of the 
number of times 
a character 
appears in the 
same position of 
two texts being 
compared to the 
total number of 
such 
comparisons. 
- Very effective in 
permutation-only 
or substitution-
only ciphers. 
- Very effective in 
breaking the 
Vigenère cipher (A 
substitution 
cipher that 
combines various 
Caesar ciphers in 
series): This is 
good for our 
stegano-crypto 
scheme 
cryptanalysis 
because our 
scheme contains 
sub-ciphers in 
series in the SCAN 
encryption 
module and in the 
system as a 
whole. 
- Does not work in 
ciphertext-only 
attacks where 
there is no access 
of plaintexts. 
Kasiski 
examination 
Kasiski 
examination, 
discussed in Part 1, 
the survey. 
- A cryptanalysis 
technique for 
attacking a 
polyalphabetic 
substitution 
cipher by first 
determining its 
keyword-length 
n, then splitting 
the ciphertext 
into n column 
units and finally 
attacking each 
column unit as a 
single ciphertext 
of a 
monoalphabetic 
substitution 
cipher by 
frequency 
- Can successfully 
break 
permutation-only 
or substitution-
only ciphers, such 
as the Vigenère 
cipher. 
- This is good for 
our stegano-
crypto scheme 
cryptanalysis 
because our 
scheme contains 
substitution 
components in 
series with other 
components in 
the SCAN 
encryption 
module and in the 
- It is very specific 
to a 
polyalphabetic 
substitution 
cipher. 
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analysis. system as a 
whole. 
Differential 
Cryptanalysis 
Differential 
Cryptanalysis, 
discussed in Part 1, 
the survey. 
- A cryptanalysis 
technique that 
exploits the non-
randomness 
areas of a 
cryptosystem 
having studied 
the effects of the 
difference of the 
input change to 
the difference of 
the output 
change. 
- Useful in breaking 
block ciphers, 
stream ciphers 
and hash 
functions. 
- It is a chosen-
plaintext 
cryptanalysis 
technique, thus 
may not work as 
a ciphertext-only 
attack. 
Integral 
Cryptanalysis 
Integral 
Cryptanalysis, 
discussed in Part 1, 
the survey. 
- A cryptanalysis 
technique similar 
to differential 
cryptanalysis, 
except that this 
focuses on the 
propagation of 
sums of many 
consecutive 
values rather 
than differences 
between 
consecutive 
values. 
- It can be used 
where differential 
cryptanalysis is 
ineffective. 
- It is a chosen-
plaintext 
cryptanalysis 
technique, thus 
may not work as 
a ciphertext-only 
attack. 
Linear 
Cryptanalysis 
Linear 
Cryptanalysis, 
discussed in Part 1, 
the survey. 
- A cryptanalysis 
technique that 
involves 
determining the 
cryptosystem 
action’s affine 
approximations. 
- Along with 
differential 
cryptanalysis, this 
technique is 
widely used in 
breaking block 
ciphers. 
- It is very specific 
to the cipher’s 
affine 
approximation 
determination. 
 
Table 13: The strengths and weaknesses of Permutation Based techniques. 
LSB Based Techniques 
[63], [64], [65], [66] are steganalysis methods that are relevant to our LSB-based 
steganalysis objectives because they possess features that are directly or indirectly 
applicable to our Stegano-Cryptanalysis. 
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Attack Attack Name Mechanism Strengths Weaknesses 
[63] - An empirical 
analysis of RS 
Steganalysis. 
 
 
 
- An empirical 
analysis of an LSB 
steganalysis 
technique called 
RS Steganalysis. 
- RS Steganalysis 
estimates the 
length of the 
hidden message 
in addition to 
detecting the 
presence of the 
hidden message. 
- It is practical: 
Empirical results 
are given. 
- It is versatile: It 
works on both 
natural and 
synthetic images. 
- RS analysis is 
effective for LSB 
replacement using 
random 
embedding, but 
less effective for 
LSB matching and 
LSB replacement 
with sequential 
embedding. RS 
analysis is least 
effective for LSB 
matching with 
sequential 
embedding. 
- RS Steganalysis is 
relatively less 
effective for LSB 
matching and LSB 
replacement with 
sequential 
embedding. This 
is not good news 
because it is very 
likely that this 
technique is 
consequently less 
effective in our 
stegano-crypto 
scheme which 
contains 
sequential LSB 
Hiding 
replacements. 
- RS Steganalysis is 
also not effective 
for synthetic 
images using LSB 
replacement with 
sequential 
embedding. This 
is not good news 
because the 
proposed stegano-
crypto scheme is 
exactly what it 
uses in the LSB 
Hiding Module. 
[64] Steganalysis of 
Embedding in Two 
Least-Significant 
Bits (2LSB). 
 
 
 
- A mathematical 
model on 2LSB 
steganalysis 
through 
specialized 
structural 
detectors. 
- Experimental 
results have shown 
that these 
detectors are more 
sensitive than 
other known 
detectors in the 
literature. 
- This technique like 
our stegano-crypto 
scheme involves 
the 2 least 
significant bit 
hiding rather than 
single least 
significant bit 
hiding. This 2LSB 
steganalysis is 
potentially more 
- It focuses on the 
detection of 
embedded 
messages and 
does not address 
the issue of 
determining 
which steganalysis 
method to apply; 
it leaves that for 
future work. Our 
primary aim is not 
to detect the 
presence of 
hidden message 
(we already know 
they exist) rather 
it is to see which 
steganalysis 
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appropriate for our 
discussion than 
just LSB 
steganalysis with 
one LSB. 
method to apply. 
However, looking 
at this technique 
brainstorms an 
idea on 2-LSB 
steganalysis 
tackling. 
[65] Steganalysis 
frameworks of 
Embedding in 
Multiple Least 
Significant Bits 
(MLSB). 
 
 
 
- Steganalysis 
frameworks for 
IMLSB (‘I’ for 
Independent 
effects of bit 
planes) and 
TMLSB (‘T’ for 
Typical, not 
independent as 
the former) 
embedding 
through the 
transitions of the 
pixel pair among 
some trace 
subsets. 
- It gives a novel 
mathematical 
framework model 
for MLSB Hiding 
detectors 
supported by 
experimental 
results. 
- [65] also gives a 
broad picture of 
current detectors 
in literature. 
- The technique 
focuses on 
detectors and 
ignores 
embedded 
message 
extractors. This 
may not help 
much directly 
since we are more 
interested in 
embedded 
message 
extractors. 
However, it 
provides a 
brainstormed idea 
that may 
indirectly be 
useful in our quest 
for embedded 
message 
extraction. 
[66] Steganalysis of LSB 
matching based on 
histogram features in 
grayscale image. 
 
 
 
- LSB matching is 
flips the LSBs by 
randomly adding 
1 or -1 to image 
pixels. 
- A mathematical 
formulation is 
given to show 
how the LSB 
matching 
steganalysis is 
done: The LSB 
matching involves 
the image 
degradation and 
image histogram 
smoothness steps 
while that of LSB 
matching 
steganalysis 
involves the 
Wavelet 
- Practical: 
Experimental 
results show that 
this technique is 
more reliable than 
previous known 
techniques. 
- This steganalysis 
technique focuses 
on detection 
rather than 
hidden message 
extraction. 
- The technique 
needs image 
restoration 
methods to get 
more precise 
estimations. It 
also needs new 
detectors 
sensitive to LSB 
matching 
embedding so as 
to improve the 
detection at low 
embedding rates. 
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Denoising 
Estimation and 
Histogram 
Features 
Extraction steps. 
 
Table 14: The strengths and weaknesses of LSB Based techniques. 
Regional Hiding Based Techniques 
In [67], which was previously discussed, [72], [73] and [74] are image 
steganalysis techniques that are blind, i.e. general-purpose rather than specific to a 
particular steganography technique. Therefore, [67], [72], [73] and [74] are also 
steganalysis methods that are relevant to our Regional-based steganalysis objectives:  
They possess features that are directly or indirectly applicable to our Stegano-
Cryptanalysis. 
Attack  Attack Name Mechanism Strengths Weaknesses 
[67] [67] has already been discussed in 3.2.2, i.e. Permutation-based steganalysis. 
 
[72] A blind steganalysis 
technique based on 
image texture 
energy-entropy 
features. 
 
 
- By analyzing 
image complexity, 
image texture 
features are 
extracted to 
perform blind 
image steganalysis 
on various 
steganographic 
schemes: Image 
segmentation, 
classifiers and 
pattern 
recognition 
techniques are 
used in this 
process. 
- It is practical and 
not limited to only 
theoretical: A 
mathematical 
model along with 
its experimental 
results are given. 
- The technique 
exploits regional 
texture 
differences in the 
images so as to 
embed data in 
complex regions. 
This corresponds 
to the mechanism 
of SCAN Hiding 
and Regional 
Hiding with 
Segmentation in 
our Stegano-
Crypto scheme. 
-  The scheme is 
relatively weak at 
extracting proper 
image texture 
features that are 
sensitive to 
embedded 
message but 
insensitive to 
cover image. 
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[73] Blind Image 
Steganalysis Based 
on Statistical 
Analysis of 
Empirical Matrix. 
 
- It is a blind 
technique for 
detecting the 
presence of 
hidden messages 
by statistical 
analysis of the 
empirical matrix: 
Classifiers and 
Pattern 
recognition 
techniques are 
used in the 
process. 
- The system 
performs better 
than known 
techniques in 
literature and the 
technique is 
relatively more 
portable.  
- It is practical: 
Experimental 
results are also 
given. 
- It focuses on 
detection and 
ignores embedded 
message 
extraction. 
- The performance is 
not optimal; more 
features could still 
be extracted from 
the empirical 
matrix. 
[74] A Feature-Based 
Classification 
Technique for Blind 
Image Steganalysis. 
 
- A neural classifier 
based on two 
extracted features 
(gradient energy 
and statistical 
variance of the 
Laplacian 
parameters) for 
blind image 
steganalysis. 
- It has an effective 
classifier system 
for feature 
extraction. 
- The training phase 
used a database of 
2088 plain and 
stego images 
(generated by six 
different 
steganography 
schemes). 
- The scheme: 1) 
has a 90%+ 
positive-detection 
rate; 2) is blind; 3) 
can detect stego 
images with an 
embedding rate as 
low as 0.01 bpp. 
 
- It addresses 
hidden message 
detection and 
leaves the 
message 
extraction task for 
future work. 
- It points out that 
there is need to 
make the system 
more practical. 
 
Table 15: The strengths and weaknesses of Regional Hiding Based techniques. 
Hybrid Based Techniques 
In [53], the eight cryptanalysis techniques discussed (permutation based), and the 
four blind image steganalysis techniques (Regional Hiding) are the steganalysis and 
cryptanalysis methods that are relevant to our Hybrid-based steganalysis and 
cryptanalysis objectives because they possess features that are directly or indirectly 
applicable to our Stegano-Cryptanalysis. 
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Attack  Attack Name Mechanism Strengths Weaknesses 
[53] Breaking Fagen Li‟s 
and Yong Yu‟s 
Identity-Based 
Threshold 
Signcryption cipher. 
Mathematical 
theoretical model: It 
exploits the cipher‟s 
flaw of the secret 
key of the sender 
being exposed 
during encryption. 
It disproves the 
security claim of the 
cipher by exposing 
the unforgeability 
proof flaw. 
The methodology is 
a theoretical proof; 
implementation and  
experimentation 
were not given. 
[67], 
[72], 
[73], 
[74] 
(Discussed above) (Discussed above) (Discussed above) (Discussed above) 
 
Table 16: The strengths and weaknesses of Hybrid Based techniques. 
Similarities and Differences in Strengths and Weaknesses among Techniques 
Similarities in Strengths: 
According to the above, the strength in a cryptanalysis technique lies on the 
mathematical modeling of the solution of the problem at hand, the practicality of the 
solution, the effectiveness and portability of the solution. 
Differences in Strengths: 
Some techniques were blinder (more general) than the other. The ones that were 
blind were often considered to be superior to their counterparts because of their 
portability and less specificity. 
Similarities in Weaknesses: 
Most steganalysis techniques tended to focus on the detection of embedded 
message only and ignoring the embedded message extraction process, which was often 
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left as further work. Another weakness similarity was that most techniques were very 
specific and not portable. 
Differences in Weaknesses: 
Some of the cryptanalysis techniques that were discussed can be directly or 
indirectly mapped to our stegano-crypto scheme but some cannot be, rather they provide 
a motivation to brainstorm ideas for openness rather than restricting ourselves to a box. 
17.2. Stegano-Crypto Attacks Exploitation 
Having chosen the relevant cryptology and steganology techniques to explore and 
having compared and contrasted their strengths and weaknesses, the next step is to 
choose and zero in on a more specific, more specialized and more success-potential 
technique to exploit security holes of the stegano-crypto system. The goal of this step is 
to choose the most relevant cryptology and steganology attack for attacking the system 
successfully. In the previous step, we explored different possible potential attacks while, 
in this step, we choose the most relevant attack or attacks out of the explored attacks. 
Having looked at different cryptanalysis and steganalysis techniques and their 
similarities and differences in strengths and weaknesses, it suffices to say that most ideas 
from this analysis are relevant and useful for our stegano-crypto scheme cryptanalysis. It 
is more appropriate to focus on their common strengths and major ideas in their 
mechanisms. We saw that the strength in a cryptanalysis technique lies on the 
mathematical modeling of the solution of the problem at hand, the practicality of the 
solution, the effectiveness of the solution and the portability of the solution. This 
provides a motivation on how to propose a final version of our cryptanalysis technique. 
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17.3. System analysis: Studying the Stegano-Crypto System 
 
Figure 28: The flow chart of the processes involved in the System Analysis step. 
 
 The end goal of steganalysis and cryptanalysis is to extract the hidden message 
and the original cover image from the given stego-ciphertext without using the key. The 
first step is to study, analyze and know the mechanism of the proposed stego-crypto 
scheme while thinking about the cryptography, cryptanalysis, steganography and 
steganalysis aspects of the system. In this step, we look at the nuts and bolts of how each 
individual module participates in the mechanism of the entire scheme. By so doing, we 
can look for potential security problems and weaknesses of the mechanism. Figure 28 
summarizes this step. 
 
 
 
System Analysis
Background 
Information 
Reflection
The Mathematics 
Machine Analysis
Module i, i=1,...,9
The Mathematics 
Machine
Algorithmic 
Complexity 
Analysis
Strengths Weaknesses
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Analyzing the scheme’s mathematics machine 
Background information on algorithm analysis 
The “Big-Oh” Notation 
Definition. Given functions f(n) and g(n) that map non-negative integers to real numbers, 
f(n) is O(g(n)) if there exists a real constant c>0 and an integer constant n0 ≥1 such that 
f(n) ≤ cg(n) for every integer n ≥ n0. 
Asymptotic analysis 
Suppose that algorithm A with running time O( f(n) ) and algorithm B with 
running  time O(g(n)) are solving the same problem where f(n) is O(g(n)). The big-oh 
notation implies that algorithm A is asymptotically better than algorithm B, though for a 
given small value of n, it is possible for algorithm B to have a lower running time than 
algorithm A. 
We can use the big-Oh notation to order classes of functions by asymptotic 
growth rate. The following list of functions is ordered by increasing growth rate: 
 log2 n, log
2
n, √𝑛 , n, n log2 n, n
2
, n
3
, 2
n
, n!. 
 
N log2 n √𝒏 N n log2 n n
2 n3 2n n! 
2 1 1.4 2 2 4 8 4 2 
4 2 2 4 8 16 64 16 24 
8 3 2.8 8 24 64 512 256 40320 
16 4 4 16 64 256 4096 65536 2.09E+13 
32 5 5.7 32 160 1024 32768 4294967296 2.63E+35 
64 6 8 64 384 4096 262144 1.84E+19 1.27E+89 
128 7 11.3 128 896 16384 2097152 3.40E+38 3.86E+215 
256 8 16 256 2048 65536 16777216 1.16E+77 > 3.86E+215 
512 9 22.6 512 4608 262144 134217728 1.34E+154 > 3.86E+215 
1024 10 32 1024 10240 1048576 1073741824 1.79E+308 > 3.86E+215 
Table 17: Growth rates of some functions. 
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Big-Oh Asymptotic Upper Bound 
O(1) Constant 
O( loga(n) ) Logarithmic 
O(n) Linear 
O( n loga(n) ) n log n 
O(n
2
) Quadratic 
O(n
3
) Cubic 
O(n
m
) Polynomial m ≥ 0 
O(c
n
) Exponential c > 1 
O(n!) Factorial 
Table 18: A Big-Oh Hierarchy 
Big-Oh Notation Caution 
The use of the big-Oh notation can be misleading should the factors they hide be 
very large. For instance, while it is true that the function f(n) = 2
1024
n is O(n), if this is the 
running time of an algorithm compared to one whose running time is g(n) = cn
2
, but with 
relatively much smaller constant c such as c=10, then we should prefer g(n) which is 
O(n
2
). Therefore, when using the big-Oh notation, we should be mindful of the constant 
factors and lower order terms we are hiding from the big-Oh notation. Generally 
speaking, an algorithm A with running time O(g(n)) with reasonable factors is considered 
faster (more efficient) than an algorithm B with running time g(n). But, an algorithm that 
does not have a better running time than O(2
n
) should not be considered efficient. In the 
rest of the discussion, we will assume that the big-Oh notation will have reasonable 
factors. In case this assumption is broken, caution will be taken. 
In summary, the asymptotic notation of big-Oh provide a convenient language to 
analyze algorithms so that we can focus on the big picture of the algorithm rather than 
low-level details. 
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Polynomial time algorithms and intractable problems 
A time complexity of an algorithm tends to vary roughly with problem instance 
size. A polynomial time algorithm is the one whose time complexity function is O(p(n)) 
for some polynomial function p, where n refers to an input size variable. It is widely 
agreed that a problem has not been solved well until a polynomial time algorithm is 
found. An intractable problem is a problem that does not have a polynomial time 
algorithm solution. 
The Algorithm Complexity Analysis of the Stegano-Crypto Scheme 
Module 1: Regional Hiding Sub-module 1, Figure 29. 
  Φ1 
 
 
 
       Φ2, Φ3 
 
 
          T1 
 
                  Figure 29: Functions Φ1, Φ2, and Φ3 operating in module 1. 
 
Without loss of generality, let d = 10, 
Let W1 = [wi,j]nxn where wi,j 𝜖 ℤ256, 
Let W2 =  [wi,j‟]nxn where wi,j‟ 𝜖 {x 𝜖 ℤ256| x = ⌊ 
wi,j
𝑑
 ⌋ . d } ⊆ W1. 
Define Φ1: W1 → W2, [wi,j]nxn ⟼ [  ⌊ 
wi,j
𝑑
 ⌋ . d ], 
Let F be the set of all injective functions f that satisfy f: ℤ256 ⟶ ℤ256 x ℤ256, k ⟼ (i,j). 
We construct a surjective function Φ2 𝜖 F as follows: 
- Let domain(f) and codomain(f) denote the domain and codomain of function f respectively, 
W1 W2 
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- Let domain(Φ2) = ℤ256  
- We need to construct codomain(Φ2) ⊆ ℤ256 x ℤ256 with | codomain(Φ2)| = | ℤ256| = 256, 
- Let codomain(Φ2)= ∅, 
- Let wi,j
(k) 𝜖 W1 denote a k-valued wi,j whose address (i,j) is currently non-existent in 
codomain(Φ2). The non-existence in codomain(Φ2) is to ensure uniqueness of address (i,j) in 
codomain(Φ2). 
- Let wi,j’
(k) 𝜖 W2 denote wi,j with value ⌊ 
k
𝑑
 ⌋ . d whose address (i,j) is currently non-existent in 
codomain(Φ2). Similarly, the non-existence in codomain(Φ2) is to ensure uniqueness of 
address (i,j) in codomain(Φ2). 
- We also construct a function Φ3 with domain(Φ3) = ℤ256 and codomain(Φ3) = ℤ3, 
- ∀𝑘 𝜖 ℤ256,( ∃ wi,j
(k) 𝜖 W1) or (∄ wi,j
(k) 𝜖 W1 and ∃ wi,j’
(k) 𝜖 W2) or (∀ xi,j 𝜖 W1 ∪ W2,  xi,j  ≠ k and ⌊ 
xi,j
𝑑
 ⌋ . d ≠ ⌊ 
k
𝑑
 ⌋ . d), 
- Case 1: ∃ wi,j
(k) 𝜖 W1, 
o ∃ wi,j
(k) 𝜖 W1 ⇒ Pick random wi,j
(k) 𝜖 W1, 
o Define Φ2= (i,j) with x_coord(Φ2(k)) = i, y_coord(Φ2(k)) = j;  
o Update codomain(Φ2)  = codomain(Φ2)  ∪ {(i,j)}, 
o Let Φ3(k) = 0, 
- Case 2: ∄ wi,j
(k) 𝜖 W1 and ∃ wi,j’
(k) 𝜖 W2, 
o ∄ wi,j
(k) 𝜖 W1 and ∃ wi,j’
(k) 𝜖 W2 ⇒ Pick random wi,j’
(k) 𝜖 W2, 
o Define Φ2= (i,j) with x_coord(Φ2(k)) = i, y_coord(Φ2(k)) = j; 
o Update codomain(Φ2)  = codomain(Φ2) ∪ {(i,j)}, 
o Let Φ3(k) = 1, 
- Case 3: ∀ xi,j 𝜖 W1 ∪ W2,  xi,j  ≠ k and ⌊ 
xi,j
𝑑
 ⌋ . d ≠ ⌊ 
k
𝑑
 ⌋ . d, 
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o (∀ xi,j 𝜖 W1 ∪ W2,  xi,j  ≠ k and ⌊ 
xi,j
𝑑
 ⌋ . d ≠ ⌊ 
k
𝑑
 ⌋ . d ) ⇒ Pick random (i,j) ∉ 
codomain(Φ2), 
o Define Φ2= (i,j) with x_coord(Φ2(k)) = i, y_coord(Φ2(k)) = j; 
o Update codomain(Φ2)  = codomain(Φ2) ∪ {(i,j)}, 
o Let Φ3(k) = 3, 
⇒  ∀ x 𝜖 domain(Φ2)  = ℤ256, ∃! y 𝜖 codomain(Φ2) :  Φ2(x) = y.  
⇒ Φ2 is surjective. 
 
Claim: Φ2 is bijective. 
Proof: 
To show Φ2 is bijective, we need to show that Φ2 is injective and surjective, 
To show that Φ2 is injective, we need to show that if Φ2(k1)=Φ2(k2) then k1=k2, 
On the contrary, suppose that Φ2(k1) = Φ2(k2) = (i,j) and k1≠k2, 
Without loss of generality, let k1 < k2, 
By the construction of domain(Φ2), we define Φ2(k1) = (i,j) for some (i,j) non-existent in 
domain(Φ2), then (i,j) was added into domain(Φ2), 
But when we process k2, we also define Φ2(k2) = (i,j) for some (i,j) non-existent in 
domain(Φ2),  
But this is a contradiction since (i,j) already exists in domain(Φ2) when we defined (k1) = 
(i,j). 
Therefore, Φ2 is injective.  
To show that Φ2 is surjective, we need to show that ∀ (i,j) 𝜖 codomain(Φ2), 
∃ x 𝜖 domain(Φ2)  = ℤ256 : Φ2(x)=(i,j). 
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On the contrary, suppose ∃(i,j) 𝜖 codomain(Φ2): ∀ x 𝜖domain(Φ2)  = ℤ256 : Φ2(x) ≠(i,j), 
⇒ The construction of codomain(Φ2) did not add (i,j) into codomain(Φ2), 
⇒ At the beginning of construction of codomain(Φ2), codomain(Φ2)  ≠ ∅, which 
contradicts our assumption that codomain(Φ2) = ∅, 
⇒ Φ2 is surjective. 
Since Φ2 is injective and surjective, it follows that Φ2 is bijective. ∎ 
Since Φ2 is bijective, Φ2 is invertible. 
Φ3 is indirectly invertible because codomain(Φ2) and codomain(Φ3) share the same 
domain(Φ2)=domain(Φ3). To invert Φ3, it suffices to use Φ2 and domain(Φ2)=domain(Φ3) 
to find the corresponding (x, Φ3(x)). 
Respectively, Φ2 and Φ3 are directly and indirectly invertible functions that represent the 
Regional Hiding Sub-module 1. 
Having defined Φ2 and Φ3, let C0 be an input cover image to Φ2 and Φ3 in module 1. 
Time Complexity of Φ2 and Φ3 
Since codomain(Φ2) ⊆ ℤ256 x ℤ256, the maximum window to scan in the construction of 
codomain(Φ2) and codomain(Φ3) is 256x256 and does not depend on n. Therefore, the 
corresponding main functions Φ2 and Φ3 have a constant running time algorithm O(1). 
Space Complexity of Φ2 and Φ3 
The space complexity of module 1 is O(n
2
) because the used space only depends on the 
nxn size of the original cover image input, other variables require constant space. 
Maximum Key Space of Φ2 and Φ3 
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To discern the key space size of Φ2 and Φ3, we need to count the possible number of 
permutations of (domain(Φ2) = domain(Φ3), codomain(Φ2), codomain(Φ3)) 3-tuples that 
define Φ2 and Φ3.  
 domain(Φ2) = domain(Φ3)  is always fixed with intensities 0-255, therefore there is only 1 
permutation of a sequence 0,1,2,…, 255, 
 We can also recall that n>16. Without loss of generality, let n > 256 for a worst-case scenario 
analysis. We need to choose 256 pixel addresses for codomain(Φ2) from the maximum 
256x256 pixel address window in C0. Therefore, there are  256𝑥256
256
 =
(256𝑥256 )!
 256x256−256 !  256!
=
 
 256𝑥256 !(256𝑥256−1)!(256𝑥256−2)!…(256𝑥256−255)
256 !
   ways to choose 256 unique pixel 
addresses. We know this number is very large because the i-th term of the numerator is 
much larger than the i-th term of the denominator, therefore the product will be very large. 
 Each of the 256 codomain(Φ3) entries has 3 valid intensity possibilities, 0, 1 or 2. Therefore, 
there are 3256 codomain(Φ2) permutations. 
 All together, Φ2 and Φ3 have at most 1 x  
256𝑥256
256
  x 3256 permutations. 
⇒A brute-force search on the permutation space of Φ2 and Φ3 is a constant running time 
algorithm O(1) for some constant c > 3
256 256𝑥256
256
 . From the discussion of the big-Oh 
notation caution, we can see that c > 3
256 256𝑥256
256
  is a very big number. Many 
astronomers believe that 1 googol = 10
100
 is an upper bound on the number of atoms in 
the observable universe, and c > 3
256
> 10
100
.  In this case, even though, a brute-force 
search algorithm on this permutation space is a constant algorithm solution, it is more of 
a theoretical solution rather than a practical solution: Such a brute force search attack is a 
very inefficient algorithm and should be avoided at all costs. 
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Module Strengths 
The module‟s mathematics machine is very sound: The corresponding main 
functions Φ2 and Φ3 have a very efficient constant running time O(1). Even though a 
corresponding brute force attack is a linear time algorithm solution, it is not a practical 
solution because of its very large hidden constant c > 3
256 256𝑥256
256
  > 3256 > 10100.   
Module Weaknesses 
Module 1 is one of the two modules that make up The Regional Hiding Module, 
the other one being Module 3. Because of its work in progress status in a two-process 
Regional Hiding mechanism, it has no corresponding ciphertext to relate it to for an 
attack apart from a brute force attack on the main corresponding function of the module. 
Instead of trying all possible permutations, a smart brute force attack can be used where a 
known input is given. If a cover input image has many unique pixel values, the key 
search space is significantly reduced. For example, suppose a 256x256 cover input image 
is given with 254 unique pixel values and two non-unique. In such a case, the 254 unique 
values in domain(Φ2) will be directly mapped to those 254 pixel values and the remaining 
two will need at most (256
2
-254) x (256
2
-255) ≤ 232 additional searches, which is a 
relatively very small doable task. A total break will be the one that involves using a best 
case scenario where a 16x16 cover image has all unique pixel values. In such a case, 
there is only one possibility of Φ2 and Φ3. However, such a 16x16 cover-image small size 
is too small to be practically used in our stegano-crypto algorithm because it virtually has 
no hiding capacity. One of the goals of our stegano-crypto scheme is to hide another 
image inside another image, and such a small size defeats the purpose. 
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Module 2: The SCAN Compression Module 1,  
The SCAN compression algorithm was demonstrated in Figure 5. In the context 
of our discussion, Figure 30 illustrates functions gi for i=1,..,5 in the SCAN compression 
algorithm. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 30: Functions gi for i=1,..,5 in the SCAN compression algorithm. 
 
 
In [47] the authors define gi for i=1,..,5 for the SCAN compression algorithm.  
Let Φ4 = g5 ( g3 g2 g1 ⋄ g4 g1 ) represent the SCAN compression algorithm function for 
some concatenation operation ⋄. [47] has proven that Φ4 is invertible, Figure 31. 
 
 
   Φ4    g6 
     
              r x 1            m‟xm‟ 
         mxm            where r < m
2
           where m‟=⌈√𝑟 ⌉, 
 
Figure 31: Function g6 maps the 1-D SCAN compression output space V2 to an 
equivalent 2-D space V3. 
 
Let Φ5= g6 o Φ4: V1→ V3, [vs,t]mxm ↦ [v‟s‟,t‟]m‟xm‟. 
 
 
 
                                           
                        g5 
 
g1 
g2 
 
g4 
 
g3 
 
V1 
V2 
 
V3 
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Therefore, Φ5 is an invertible function that represents the SCAN Compression 
function.  
Having defined Φ5, let M1 = Φ5(M0) for some message to hide M0. 
Time Complexity of Φ5 
With a given known key, Φ5 = g5 ( g3 g2 g1 ⋄ g4 g1 ) is O(m
2
) because g1 is O(m
2
) 
and g2, g3 and g4 are O(1) given g1 while the concatenation operation ⋄ is O(1). 
Therefore, the corresponding main functions Φ5 has an efficient quadratic running time 
algorithm O(m
2
). 
Space Complexity of Φ5 
With a given known key, the space complexity of Φ5 in module 2 is O(m
2
) 
because the used space only depends on the mxm size of the message-to-hide image 
input. 
Maximum Key Space of Φ5 
 Let S(n) be the count of all possible SCAN patterns of a 2
n
2
n 
two dimensional array, 
For a 2
n
2
n 
n2 image, there are 13 basic scan patterns each of which has 8 
transformations resulting in 104 basic scan-transformation patterns.  When n3, there are 
24 additional ways to partition the image into sub-regions of size 2
n-1
2
n-1
 each having 
S(n-1) scan patterns recursively.  This results in S(2) = 104, S(n) = 104 + 24(S(n-1))
4
 n3. 
Therefore, 
            S(2) = 104 
            S(n) = 104 + 24(S(n-1))
4
 for n3  
210 
 
 
    Image size         Number of SCAN keys 
                              is greater than 
        4  4    10
2
 
        8  8    10
9
 
      16  16    10
38
 
      32  32    10
150
 
      64  64    10
600
 
    128  128    10
2400
 
    256  256    10
8500
 
    512  512               10
38000 
  1024  1024               10
152000
 
 
Table 19: Number of SCAN keys [47] 
 
 Since the SCAN compression function Φ5= g6 o Φ4 = g5 ( g3 g2 g1 ⋄ g4 g1 ) and the 
count of the number of SCAN keys correspond to the key space complexity of g1, it 
suffices to deduce that a brute-force search attack on the entire key space of Φ5 is 
practically impossible. 
Module Strengths 
From the above discussion, it is clear that a tremendous number of possible 
SCAN keys make this module relatively secure against an impractical brute-force attack. 
Module Weaknesses 
 Finding a module‟s weakness is an open problem. 
Module 3: The Regional Hiding Sub-module 2 
Define functions  Φ6
(x)
: V3→ V3, M1 = [v‟s‟,t‟]m‟xm‟ ↦ [x_coord(Φ2( v‟s‟,t‟ ) )]m‟xm‟ = 
X_Mask0 
Φ6
(y)
: V3→ V3, M1 = [v‟s‟,t‟]m‟xm‟ ↦ [y_coord(Φ2( v‟s‟,t‟ ) )]m‟xm‟ = 
Y_Mask0 
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Since are Φ6
(x)
 and Φ6
(y)
 are replacement functions, they are invertible. 
Time and Space Complexities of Φ6
(x)
 and Φ6
(y)
 
The time complexity of Φ6
(x)
 and Φ6
(y)
 each is O(m
2
) because in a worst case 
scenario, a replacement function need to make a corresponding copy and traverse through 
the entire compressed image copy whose size is at most mxm. Similarly, the space 
complexity is O(m
2
). 
Maximum Key Space of Φ6
(x)
 and Φ6
(y)
 
This module is the second of the two modules for regional hiding. The key for this 
module is function Φ2. If we know Φ2, attacking module 3 is a trivial problem. If we do 
not know Φ2, then the maximum key space of Φ6
(x)
 and Φ6
(y)
 is the same as the maximum 
key space of Φ2. It can be recalled that a brute-force search on the permutation space of 
Φ2 is a constant running time algorithm O(1) with a very large hidden constant c > 
3
256 256𝑥256
256
 . Because of a very large hidden constant, a brute force algorithm is only an 
impractical theoretical solution: It is a very inefficient algorithm and should be avoided at 
all costs. 
Module Strengths 
From the discussion above, a brute force attack is an impractical theoretical 
solution. 
Module Weaknesses 
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Module 3 is susceptible to a frequency analysis attack. Suppose we do not know 
the key Φ2, by knowing the input compressed image and its corresponding X mask and Y 
mask, the key Φ2 can be generated because we know pixel locations‟ domain and the 
codomain matching links. However, as a system, it is not easy to know the compressed 
image and its corresponding X and Y masks. 
Module 4: SCAN Encryption Module 1 
The SCAN Encryption scheme was illustrated in Figure 6. In [47], the authors 
define the invertible SCAN encryption Encrypt() as shown in Figure 32. 
J = Encrypt(I, N, k1, k2, p, m) 
Inputs:  Image I, Image size NN (N = 2n, n2) 
             Encryption keys k1 and k2, Random seed integer p 
             Number of encryption iterations  m 
Output:  Encrypted image J  
{ 
      Let A, D, G be two dimensional arrays of  size NN and let B, C, E, F, R be one    
     dimensional arrays of length NN 
     Generate NN random integers between 0  and 255 using random seed p and assign  to  R 
     Copy I into A 
     Repeat m times 
     { 
          Read pixels of A using key k1 and write into B 
          C[1]=B[1], C[j]=(B[j]+((C[j-1]+1)R[j])mod256)mod256 for 2jNN 
          Read pixels of C and write into D using spiral key s0 
          Read pixels of D using diagonal key d0 and write into E 
          F[1]=E[1], F[j]=(E[j]+((F[j-1]+1)R[j])mod256)mod256 for 2jNN 
          Read pixels of F and write into G using key k2 
     } 
     Copy G into J and return J 
} 
 
               Figure 32: The invertible SCAN Encryption function Encrypt() as given in [47]. 
 
For the sake of brevity, let Φ7 = Encrypt().  
Therefore, Φ7 represents the SCAN Encryption function. 
Having defined Φ7, let  X_Mask1 = Φ7 (X_Mask0), 
    Y_Mask1 = Φ7 (Y_Mask0) 
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The time and space complexities of Φ7 
The time complexity of Φ7 is O(m
2
) because the running time of Φ7 depends only 
on the size of the input image mxm. Similarly, the space complexity of Φ7 is O(m
2
). 
Maximum Key Space of Φ7 
 With reference to the discussion on the maximum key space of the SCAN compression 
function Φ5, let S(n) be the count of all possible SCAN patterns of a 2
n
2
n 
two 
dimensional array and let T(n) be the number encryption key pairs for encrypting a 2
n
2
n 
image. A scan key pair has two scan keys each of which can be any of S(n) scan patterns, 
resulting in T(n) = (S(n))
2
. 
 
    Image size         Number of SCAN encryption 
                              key pairs is greater than 
 
        4  4    10
4
 
        8  8    10
18
 
      16  16    10
76
 
      32  32    10
300
 
      64  64    10
1200
 
    128  128    10
4800
 
    256  256    10
19000
 
    512  512               10
76000 
  1024  1024               10
304000
 
 
Table 20: Number of SCAN encryption key pairs 
Module Strengths 
 From the discussion above, it is clear that a brute-force search attack on the entire key 
space of Φ7 is practically impossible because of the tremendous number of possible key 
pairs. 
Module Weaknesses 
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 Finding a module‟s weakness is an open problem. 
Module 5: SCAN Hiding, Figure 33 and Figure 34 
 
 
 
Figure 33: The SCAN Hiding Scheme [47]. 
 
 
Complexity(I, C, k1, k2, k3, k4) 
Inputs:  Cover image I 
             Threshold values 0k1k2k3k4<255 
Output: Complexity matrix C 
{ 
     Let C[i][j] = 0 for 1iheight(I), 1jwidth(I) 
     For (i = 2 to height(I)-1,  i = i+2,  j = 2 to width(I)-1,  j = j+2) 
     { 
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           d = ]))][[(])][[((
8
1
8mod)1(
8
1
jiINBjiINBabs k
k
k 

  
          Let C[i][j] = 0,1,2,3,4 if 0d<k1, k1d<k2, k2d<k3, k3d<k4, k4d255, respectively 
     } 
} 
EmbedBit(I, C, M) 
Inputs:  Rearranged cover image I 
             Rearranged complexity matrix C 
             Secret data bit stream M 
Output: Bits of M are embedded into I 
{ 
     Let p = length(M) 
     For (i = 1 to height(I),  j = 1 to width(I)) 
     { 
           If p equals 0 
                Stop embedding 
           Else 
                 k = minimum{C[i][j], p} 
                 Replace k least significant bits of I[i][j] with next k bits from M 
                 p = p - k  
     } 
} 
Figure 34: The SCAN Hiding Algorithm [47]. 
 
For the sake of brevity, let  g7 = Complexity() 
    g8 = SCANRearrangment() 
    g9 = EmbedBit() 
    Φ8 = g8
-1
 o g9 o g8 o g7 = SCANHiding() 
 
Therefore, Φ8 is an invertible function that represents the SCAN Hiding function.  
Having defined Φ8, let  S0 = Φ8 (C0, X_Mask1). 
The time and space complexities of Φ8 
The time complexity of Φ8 is O(n
2
) because the running time of Φ8 depends only 
on the size of the input image nxn. Similarly, the space complexity of Φ7 is O(n
2
). 
The maximum Key Space of Φ8 
We know that Φ8 = g8
-1
 o g9 o g8 o g7 = SCANHiding(). Function g7 is O(5
nxn
) 
since each of the n
2
/4 complexity pixels has 5 possible threshold values in the worst case 
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scenario. Function g8 is a SCAN path permutation whose complexity is similar to g1 in 
module 2. Function g9 is O(n
2
) since bit embedding is a replacement algorithm that 
traverses through n
2
/4 pixels in a worst case scenario. It is clear that a brute-force search 
attack on the entire key space of Φ8 = g8
-1
 o g9 o g8 o g7 = SCANHiding() is practically 
impossible. 
Module Strengths 
 From the discussion above, it is clear that a brute-force search attack on the entire key 
space of Φ8 is practically impossible because of the tremendous number of possible key 
pairs like in SCAN compression and SCAN encryption. 
Module Weaknesses 
 Finding a module‟s weakness is an open problem. 
Module 6: LSB Hiding 
Let  Bnxn be a byte matrix space with dimensions nxn, 
 B‟nx8n be a bit matrix space with dimensions nx8n, 
 
Given  S0 = [si,j]nxn 𝜖 Bnxn, si,j 𝜖 ℤ256, 
 Y_Mask1 = [yi,j]m‟xm‟ 𝜖 Bm‟xm‟, yi,j 𝜖 ℤ256, m‟<n, 
 
Let g9 be a function such that ∀ r 𝜖 ℕ, a byte matrix Qrxr is converted into its 
corresponding bit matrix Q‟rxr as follows: 
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g9: Qrxr→ Q‟rxr, [bi,j] rxr ↦ [bi,j
(0)
 bi,j
(1)
 bi,j
(2)
 bi,j
(3)
 bi,j
(4)
 bi,j
(5)
 bi,j
(6)
 bi,j
(7)
] rxr, where 
bi,j
(k)
  represents the k-th bit of byte bi,j 𝜖 Qrxr with bi,j
(7)
 being the least 
significant bit of bi,j. 
 
Define g10: (Q‟rxr , Q‟sxs) → (Q‟rxr , Q‟sxs),  
([bi,j
(0)
 bi,j
(1)
 bi,j
(2)
 bi,j
(3)
 bi,j
(4)
 bi,j
(5)
 bi,j
(6)
 bi,j
(7) 
     bi,j+1
(0)
 bi,j+1
 (1)
 bi,j+1
 (2)
 bi,j+1
 (3)
 bi,j+1
 (4)
 bi,j+1
 (5)
 
bi,j+1
 (6)
 bi,j+1
 (7)     
bi,j+2
 (0)
 bi,j+2
 (1)
 bi,j+2
 (2)
 bi,j+2
 (3)
 bi,j+2
 (4)
 bi,j+2
 (5)
 bi,j+2
 (6)
 bi,j+2
(7)   
bi,j+3
(0)
 bi,j+3
 (1)
 
bi,j+3
 (2)
 bi,j+3
 (3)
 bi,j+3
 (4)
 bi,j+3
 (5)
 bi,j+3
 (6)
 bi,j+3
 (7)
] rx(r/4) , [ci,j
(0)
 ci,j
(1)
 ci,j
(2)
 ci,j
(3)
 ci,j
(4)
 ci,j
(5)
 ci,j
(6)
 
ci,j
(7)
] sxs)  
↦  ([bi,j
(0)
 bi,j
(1)
 bi,j
(2)
 bi,j
(3)
 bi,j
(4)
 bi,j
(5) 
ci,j
(0)
 ci,j
(1) 
     bi,j+1
(0)
 bi,j+1
 (1)
 bi,j+1
 (2)
 bi,j+1
 (3)
 bi,j+1
 (4)
 bi,j+1
 
(5)
  ci,j
(2)
 ci,j
(3)     
bi,j+2
 (0)
 bi,j+2
 (1)
 bi,j+2
 (2)
 bi,j+2
 (3)
 bi,j+2
 (4)
 bi,j+2
 (5)
 ci,j
(4)
 ci,j
(5)   
bi,j+3
(0)
 bi,j+3
 (1)
 bi,j+3
 
(2)
 bi,j+3
 (3)
 bi,j+3
 (4)
 bi,j+3
 (5)
 ci,j
(6)
 ci,j
(7)
] rx(r/4) , [bi,j
(6)
 bi,j
(7) 
bi,j+1
 (6)
 bi,j+1
 (7)
 bi,j+2
 (6)
 bi,j+2
(7) 
bi,j+3
 (6)
 
bi,j+3
 (7)
] sxs)  
, with 4s
2
 ≤ r2, 
For the sake of brevity, define function Φ9 = g9 
-1
( g10 o (g9(S0) , g9(Y1) ) ). 
Let (S1 , R) = Φ9 (S0, Y_Mask1) with S1 𝜖 Bnxn and R 𝜖 Bm‟xm‟. 
Thus, Φ9 is an invertible function that represents the LSB Hiding function. Note that R 
will be used again in Module 8, the image packing module. 
Having defined Φ9, let  S1 = Φ9 (S0, Y_Mask1). 
The time and space complexities of Φ9 
The theoretical time complexity of the LSB algorithm Φ9 is O(n
2
) since all n
2
 
pixels are accessed to hide 2 least significant bits, i.e., the running time of Φ9 depends 
only on the size of the input image nxn. Similarly, the space complexity of Φ7 is O(n
2
). 
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Maximum Key Space of Φ9 
This variation of LSB Hiding algorithm has only one key, which consecutively 
and sequentially hides bits of the message-to-hide into 2 least significant bits of the cover 
image. This is by far the easiest module to cryptanalyze since there is no trick involved in 
hiding and extracting information. The secrecy of this LSB hiding variant lies in hiding 
the presence of hidden data, but our assumption already assumes that we know the 
mechanism of the scheme, therefore we already know that there is hidden data and how 
the data is hidden, which means that we can extract it back. 
Module Strengths 
The module has an efficient quadratic running time algorithm and it can fuse two 
images together as it hides one image into another. 
Module Weaknesses 
The module‟s key space has only one element, i.e. only one possibility. One we 
know the mechanism which we already assume, a successful attack is a given straight-
forward solution. 
Module 7: SCAN Compression Module 2 
We can recall from module 2 that Φ5 is an invertible function that represents the 
SCAN Compression function.  
Let S2 = Φ5(S1) with S2 𝜖 Btxt for some t<n. 
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Time Complexity, Space Complexity, Maximum Key Space, Module Strengths and 
Weaknesses 
In module 2, we discussed the time complexity, the space complexity and the 
maximum key space of Φ5. Similarly, Module 2 and 7 share the same strengths and 
weaknesses. We also deduced that a brute-force search attack on the entire key space of 
Φ5 is practically impossible. 
Module 8: Image Packing 
Let  ⋄ represent the concatenation operation, which is an invertible operation. 
Let Φ10 be the function that represents this concatenation operation, 
Let S3 =  Φ10 (width_Cover ,  characterCount_SCAN_Key, byteCount_S2, [ 
(domain(Φ2), codomain(Φ2), codomain(Φ3) ) ]256x4 
, bytes_SCAN_Key1, bytes_SCAN_Key2, R, S2, dummyByteArray), 
 for some dummyByteArray with byteCount_ dummyByteArray = 
byteCount_C0 - byteCount_S3 
=  width_Cover  ⋄  characterCount_SCAN_Key  ⋄ byteCount_S2 ⋄ [ 
(domain(Φ2), codomain(Φ2), codomain(Φ3) ) ]256x4 ⋄
 bytes_SCAN_Key1  ⋄ bytes_SCAN_Key2 ⋄ R ⋄ S2 ⋄
 dummyByteArray 
 
Note that R is from Module 5 (the LSB Hiding module). 
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The time and space complexities of Φ10 
The theoretical time complexity of Φ10 is O(n
2
) since all n
2
 pixels are accessed to 
save the concatenated inputs. Similarly, the space complexity of Φ7 is O(n
2
). 
Maximum Key Space of Φ10 
The image packing function Φ10 has only one key, which consecutively and 
sequentially appends its input. The theoretical time complexity of Φ10 is O(n
2
) since in 
the worst case scenario, all n
2
 pixels are accessed to save the information into the nxn 
cover image. Like the LSB module, this image packing module is easy to cryptanalyze 
since there is no trick involved apart from appending the inputs and adding dummy 
variables to cover the „empty‟ remaining space in the resulting image. 
Module 9: SCAN Encryption Module 2 
We can recall from module 4 that Φ7 is an invertible function that represents the 
SCAN Encryption function.  
Let S4 = Φ7(S3). 
Time Complexity, Space Complexity, Maximum Key Space, Module Strengths and 
Weaknesses 
In module 4, we discussed the time complexity, the space complexity and the 
maximum key space of Φ7. Similarly, Module 4 and 9 share the same strengths and 
weaknesses. We also deduced that a brute-force search attack on the entire key space of 
Φ7 is practically impossible. 
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The Stegano-Crypto algorithm as a system 
S4 = Φ7(S3) ⇒  S4= Φ7( Φ10 (width_Cover, characterCount_SCAN_Key,  
byteCount_S2, [(domain(Φ2), codomain(Φ2), codomain(Φ3))]256x4, bytes_SCAN_Key1, 
bytes_SCAN_Key2, R, S2, dummyByteArray) ) 
⇒  S4= Φ7( Φ10 (width_Cover, characterCount_SCAN_Key,  byteCount_S2, 
[(domain(Φ2), codomain(Φ2), codomain(Φ3))]256x4, bytes_SCAN_Key1, 
bytes_SCAN_Key2, R, Φ5(S1), dummyByteArray) ) 
⇒  S4= Φ7( Φ10 (width_Cover, characterCount_SCAN_Key,  byteCount_S2, 
[(domain(Φ2), codomain(Φ2), codomain(Φ3))]256x4, bytes_SCAN_Key1, 
bytes_SCAN_Key2, R, Φ5( Φ9 (S0, Y_Mask1) ), dummyByteArray) ) 
⇒  S4= Φ7( Φ10 (width_Cover, characterCount_SCAN_Key,  byteCount_S2, 
[(domain(Φ2), codomain(Φ2), codomain(Φ3))]256x4, bytes_SCAN_Key1, 
bytes_SCAN_Key2, R, Φ5( Φ9 (Φ8 (C0, X_Mask1), Y_Mask1) ), dummyByteArray) ) 
⇒  S4= Φ7( Φ10 (width_Cover, characterCount_SCAN_Key,  byteCount_S2, 
[(domain(Φ2), codomain(Φ2), codomain(Φ3))]256x4, bytes_SCAN_Key1, 
bytes_SCAN_Key2, R, Φ5( Φ9 (Φ8 (C0, X_Mask1), Φ7 (Y_Mask0) ) ), 
dummyByteArray) ) 
⇒  S4= Φ7( Φ10 (width_Cover, characterCount_SCAN_Key,  byteCount_S2, 
[(domain(Φ2), codomain(Φ2), codomain(Φ3))]256x4, bytes_SCAN_Key1, 
bytes_SCAN_Key2, R, Φ5( Φ9 (Φ8 (C0, Φ7 (X_Mask0) ), Φ7 (Y_Mask0) ) ), 
dummyByteArray) ) 
⇒  S4= Φ7( Φ10 (width_Cover, characterCount_SCAN_Key,  byteCount_S2, 
[(domain(Φ2), codomain(Φ2), codomain(Φ3))]256x4, bytes_SCAN_Key1, 
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bytes_SCAN_Key2, R, Φ5( Φ9 (Φ8 (C0, Φ7 (Φ6
(x)
(M1) ) ), Φ7 (Φ6
(y)
(M1)) ) ), 
dummyByteArray) ) 
⇒  S4= Φ7( Φ10 (width_Cover, characterCount_SCAN_Key,  byteCount_S2, 
[(domain(Φ2), codomain(Φ2 (C0 , Φ1(C0)  ) ), codomain(Φ3 (C0 , Φ1(C0) ) ))]256x4, 
bytes_SCAN_Key1, bytes_SCAN_Key2, R, Φ5( Φ9 (Φ8 (C0, Φ7 (Φ6
(x)
(M1) ) ), Φ7 
(Φ6
(y)
(M1)) ) ), dummyByteArray) ) 
⇒ Define a function  Φ11 =  
Φ7 
(  
Φ10  
(  
(Φ2, Φ3),  
Φ5 
(  
Φ9  
( 
Φ8 (Φ7 (Φ6
(x)
  ( ( Φ2, Φ3) (Φ1), Φ5  )  ) ),  
Φ7 (Φ6
(y)
 ( (Φ2, Φ3) (Φ1), Φ5  )  ) 
)  
)  
)  
). 
 
Summary of functions Φi: 
Φ1:  Segmentation 
(Φ2, Φ2): Hiding sub-module 1 
Φ5:  SCAN compression 
Φ6:  Regional Hiding sub-module 2 
Φ7:  SCAN encryption 
Φ8:  SCAN Hiding 
Φ9:  LSB Hiding 
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Φ10:  Image Packing 
⇒ Function Φ11 represents the proposed Stegano-Crypto scheme and it is invertible. 
System Weaknesses 
From the analysis above, the LSB Hiding Module (Module 6) and the Image 
Packing Module (Module 8) are the weakest modules because they do not use any key 
and the input-output pair has only one possibility. In each of these modules, once an 
output of the module is known, it may be possible to reconstruct a corresponding input. 
Additionally, the image packing module reveals a lot of important information (such as 
the SCAN keys) that could be used to reverse-engineer the entire system, hence 
reconstructing the original cover image and message-to-hide. 
A successful attack 
Security Hole 1: Image Packing Module (Module 8) exposes a lot of important 
information  
It can be recalled that the Image Packing Module (Module 8) involves a 
concatenation operation that sequentially concatenates a set of input variables as follows: 
Output S3 =  Φ10 (width_Cover ,  characterCount_SCAN_Key, byteCount_S2, [ 
(domain(Φ2), codomain(Φ2), codomain(Φ3) ) ]256x4 
, bytes_SCAN_Key1, bytes_SCAN_Key2, R, S2, dummyByteArray), 
 for some dummyByteArray with byteCount_ dummyByteArray = 
byteCount_C0 - byteCount_S3 
Since the Image Packing Module exposes a lot of important information 
concatenated together, we can devise a successful software run-time analysis and chosen-
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ciphertext attack by analyzing the program context of the Stegano-Crypto algorithm: The 
idea is to analyze a process‟s address space to extract all the inputs that includes the 
SCAN key.  
17.4. Security Hole Exploration and Exploitation: The Reverse 
Engineering Attack 
This step involves a successful reverse engineering attack. It involves searching 
for security holes in the stegano-crypto system by exploring and exploiting the data space 
to analyze the ciphertext topology. The goal of this step is to explore and exploit security 
holes. [53], which is a hybrid cryptanalysis technique for breaking Fagen Li‟s and Yong 
Yu‟s signcryption cipher, exploits the cipher‟s flaw of exposing the secret key of the 
sender during encryption. The principle used is similar to our system analysis phase 
where we exploit the cipher‟s security hole of exposing crucial information during the 
hiding and encryption process. However, the analysis in [53] differs from this proposed 
attack because this proposed attack is based on a heap analysis attack while theirs is 
based on solving a mathematical problem. This step involves tweaking space and 
environment variables repeatedly. 
In the system analysis phase, we saw that the LSB Hiding Module (Module 6) and 
the Image Packing Module (Module 8) are the weak links of the system because they do 
not use any key and the input-output pair has only one possibility. It was also pointed out 
that in each of these modules, once an output of the module is known; it may be possible 
to reconstruct a corresponding input. Looking at the image packing module (module 8), it 
exposes crucial secret information (such as the SCAN keys) that could be used to reverse-
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engineer the entire system, therefore successful reconstruction of the original cover image 
and message-to-hide. 
The Image Packing Module (Module 8) sequentially concatenates a set of input 
variables as follows: 
Output S3 =  Φ10 (width_Cover ,  characterCount_SCAN_Key, byteCount_S2, [ 
(domain(Φ2), codomain(Φ2), codomain(Φ3) ) ]256x4 
, bytes_SCAN_Key1, bytes_SCAN_Key2, R, S2, dummyByteArray), 
 for some dummyByteArray with byteCount_ dummyByteArray = 
byteCount_C0 - byteCount_S3 
Since the Image Packing Module is not encrypted and open to view, it exposes all 
the concatenated elements. Since the variables are dynamically allocated in the heap 
during run-time, we can devise a successful software run-time analysis and a chosen-
ciphertext attack by analyzing the program context of the Stegano-Crypto algorithm: The 
idea is to analyze a process‟s address space to extract all the inputs that also include the 
SCAN key. In the memory during run-time, the process‟s address space contains text 
(source code), data (uninitialized global variables), BSS (Block Started By Symbol, 
initialized global variables), stack (statically allocated variables) and heap (dynamically 
allocated variables). Segments are contiguous portions of the address space. In a 
program context, the text, data, bss, stack and heap are segments. When we run an 
executable (in this example, a stegano-crypto algorithm executable), a loader is run to 
take the various segments off a disk file (for example, the corresponding C/C++ code for 
the stegano-crypto algorithm) and place them into memory and then modified 
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accordingly as the executable runs in the memory. The result is something like Figure 35 
below. 
 
                       Figure 35: A program context in memory. 
 
Since the S3 image is a dynamically allocated variable in the memory, it resides in 
the heap. By analyzing the heap, we can extract S3. Having known S3, we can also know 
the cover image width and height n, the character count of the SCAN key, the byte count 
of S2, Φ2, Φ3, the SCAN keys, the replaced bits of the LSB Hiding module, S2 and the 
dummy byte array. With this information, we can reverse-engineer the entire system, 
hence execute a successful attack. It is to be noted that the reverse engineering attack 
starts on Module 8, the Image Packing Module, and not the last module of the system, the 
SCAN encryption module. This is so because a solution to a successful SCAN 
Encryption break is yet to be found and still an open problem. That means, having only 
an input set of the Stegano-Crypto methodology and its corresponding output is not 
enough to do a reverse engineering.  The reverse engineering is only possible with 
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exploiting the weakest links, which are the Image Packing Module and the LSB Hiding 
Module. 
18. A small-scale example of the Reverse Engineering 
The small scale example serves as a demonstration as to how the stegano-crypto 
methodology works, from its encryption and hiding stages in its modules to how a 
successful attack is performed. For clarity and simplicity, the small-scale example will 
use minimal size inputs some of which are smaller than the constraints set for the 
methodology‟s inputs. The demonstration is also a manual simulation done by hand 
rather than a computer generated simulation. 
A. Encryption and hiding. 
Module 1: Regional Hiding Sub-module 1 
Assumption: All pixel intensities range from 0 to 16. 
Inputs: 8x8 Cover image C0, segmentation threshold d=2. 
Outputs: Segmented Cover C1, Intensity-Address Look-up Table T1. 
Processing: 
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8x8 Input Cover image C0. Missing 
intensities are 10, 12 and 13. 
Present intensities are 0-9, 14 and 
15. 
 
 
Segmentatio
n 
d=2 
 
8x8 Output Cover image C1. 
 
 
Output Intensity-Address Lookup Table T1 
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Figure 36: Small scale example, module 1. 
 
 
Module 2: SCAN Compression 
Assumption: n=1 in the n-LSB Hiding Module. 
Inputs: 2x2 Message-To-Hide M0. 
Outputs: SCAN Compressed image M1. 
Processing: 
 
0 9 
11 15 
2x2 Input image M0. 
 
 
0 9 
11 15 
2x2 Output image M1. 
 
M0 is only 2x2 and it is therefore too small for the SCAN compression algorithm to 
compress. The SCAN Compression algorithm requires that the input image size be at 
least 16x16 meaning that the cover image should be at least 64x64 which is too big to 
demonstrate as a small scale demonstration. Therefore, we loosen the rules and do 
nothing to this image. So, the output image M1 = M0. 
 
Figure 37: Small scale example, module 2. 
 
Module 3: Regional Hiding Sub-module 2. 
Input: M1 and T1. 
Output: X Mask X0 and Y Mask Y0. 
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Procedure: 
 
0 9 
11 15 
2x2 Input image M0. 
 
Intensity-Address Lookup Table 
T1. 
 
1 5 
5 7 
2x2 Output X Mask  image 
X0. 
 
5 4 
8 6 
2x2 Output Y Mask  image 
Y0. 
 
 
 
Figure 38: Small scale example, module 3. 
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Module 4: SCAN Encryption Module. 
Input: X Mask X0, Y Mask Y0, SCAN Encryption key k = {key k1= X0, key k2= Z1, random 
seed integer p=100, number of encryption iterations m= 1}. 
Output: SCAN Encrypted X Mask X1, SCAN Encrypted Mask Y1. 
Procedure: 
Recall encryption keys X0 and Z1, 
 
X0  Z1 
X-Mask Channel 
Generate 4 random integers between 0 
and 16 using random seed p=100 and 
assign to R. 
3 7 8 14 
 R 
1 5 
5 7 
2x2 X Mask image input X0. 
 
1 5 
5 7 
 A 
  key k1 
Y-Mask Channel 
Generate 4 random integers between 0 
and 16 using random seed p=100 and 
assign to R. 
3 7 8 14 
 R 
5 4 
8 6 
2x2 Y Mask image input Y0. 
 
5 4 
8 6 
 A 
  key k1 
232 
 
5 5 1 7 
 B 
 Substitution 
 C[1]=B[1]=5,  
 C[j]=(B[j]+((C[j-1]+1)R[j])mod256)mod256 
 C[2]=(B[2]+((C[1]+1)R[2])mod256)mod256=11 
 C[3]=(B[3]+((C[2]+1)R[3])mod256)mod256=1 
 C[4]=(B[4]+((C[3]+1)R[4])mod256)mod256=3 
 
5 11 1 3 
 C 
 Spiral key s0 
3 1 
5 11 
 D 
 Diagonal key d0 
3 1 5 11 
 E 
 Substitution 
 F[1]=E[1]=3,  
 F[j]=(E[j]+((F[j-1]+1)R[j])mod256)mod256  
 F[2]=(E[2]+((F[1]+1)R[2])mod256)mod256=13 
 F[3]=(E[3]+((F[2]+1)R[3])mod256)mod256=5 
 F[4]=(E[4]+((F[3]+1)R[4])mod256)mod256=15 
 
3 13 5 15 
 F 
 key k2 
4 8 5 6 
 B 
 Substitution 
 C[1]=B[1]=4,  
 C[j]=(B[j]+((C[j-1]+1)R[j])mod256)mod256 
 C[2]=(B[2]+((C[1]+1)R[2])mod256)mod256=11 
 C[3]=(B[3]+((C[2]+1)R[3])mod256)mod256=5 
 C[4]=(B[4]+((C[3]+1)R[4])mod256)mod256=10 
 
4 11 5 10 
 C 
 Spiral key s0 
10 5 
4 11 
 D 
 Diagonal key d0 
10 5 4 11 
 E 
 Substitution 
 F[1]=E[1]=10,  
 F[j]=(E[j]+((F[j-1]+1)R[j])mod256)mod256  
 F[2]=(E[2]+((F[1]+1)R[2])mod256)mod256=2 
 F[3]=(E[3]+((F[2]+1)R[3])mod256)mod256=12 
 F[4]=(E[4]+((F[3]+1)R[4])mod256)mod256=1 
 
10 2 12 1 
 F 
 key k2 
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15 5 
13 3 
 G 
 
15 5 
13 3 
Encrypted X Mask Output X1. 
1 12 
2 10 
 G 
 
1 12 
2 10 
Encrypted Y Mask Output Y1. 
 
Figure 39: Small scale example, module 4. 
 
Module 5: SCAN Hiding Module. 
Inputs : Cover image C0, Encrypted X Mask X1. 
Output : Stego-image S0 
Procedure: 
Step 1: Complexity Identification. 
Calculating the Complexity Matrix C 
0 0 2 2 3 2 3 2 
1 0 1 2 2 2 1 1 
2 3 3 4 9 7 2 4 
3 2 4 5 6 6 8 6 
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1 6 3 2 7 9 14 14 
0 0 15 9 9 15 14 14 
1 4 5 6 8 14 14 15 
2 3 6 7 9 11 11 15 
Original C0 
Given d = ]))][[(])][[((
8
1
8mod)1(
8
1
jiINBjiINBabs k
k
k 

 for the above underlined 
pixels, 
C[i][j] = 0,1,2,3,4 if 0d<k1, k1d<k2, k2d<k3, k3d<k4, k4d255, respectively, 
For threshold values 0<k1<k2<k3<k4<16, let k1=1, k2=2, k3=3, k4=4. 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 1 0 2 0 2 0 1 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 1 0 2 0 2 0 2 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 2 0 2 0 2 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0 2 0 1 0 2 0 2 
Output Complexity Matrix C. 
 Hiding capacity = sum of values in C = 26 bits. 
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 Since bits to hide = 4 pixels x 4 bits/pixel = 16 bits, the hiding capacity suffices to 
hide the message bits. 
 
Step 2: SCAN Rearrangement. 
Suppose the encryption key k1 = X0 (c0 c0 c0 c0) 
 
X0    c0 
 
3 2 3 2 1 1 2 2 
9 7 2 4 6 8 6 6 
1 6 3 2 9 15 0 0 
1 4 5 6 7 6 3 2 
0 0 2 2 2 1 0 1 
2 3 3 4 5 4 2 3 
7 9 14 14 14 14 15 9 
8 14 14 15 15 11 11 9 
SCAN rearranged Cover C0 
0 0 0 0 1 0 2 0 
0 0 0 0 2 0 2 0 
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0 0 0 0 2 0 2 0 
0 0 0 0 1 0 2 0 
0 0 0 0 2 0 1 0 
0 0 0 0 2 0 1 0 
0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 
0 0 0 0 2 0 2 0 
SCAN rearranged Complexity Matrix C 
15 5 
13 3 
Message to hide 
15 5 13 3 
Linear byte stream 
1111 0101 1101 0011 
Linear bit stream 
1 11 10 10 11 10 1 00 11 
Linear bit stream by pixel distribution 
3 2 3 2 1 1 3 2 
9 7 2 4 6 8 6 6 
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1 6 3 2 11 15 2 0 
1 4 5 6 7 6 0 2 
0 0 2 2 3 1 0 1 
2 3 3 4 5 4 2 3 
7 9 14 14 14 14 15 9 
8 14 14 15 15 11 11 9 
C0 with embedded bit stream of X1. 
Step 4: Reverse SCAN rearrangement. 
0 0 2 2 3 2 3 2 
1 0 1 3 2 3 1 1 
2 3 3 4 9 7 2 4 
3 2 4 5 6 6 8 6 
1 6 3 2 7 9 14 14 
0 2 15 11 9 15 14 14 
1 4 5 6 8 14 14 15 
2 0 6 7 9 11 11 15 
Final stego-image S0 containing C0 with embedded X1. 
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Figure 40: Small scale example, module 5. 
 
Module 6: LSB Hiding Module 
Input: S0, Y1 images. 
Output: Stego-image S1. 
Procedure: 
From Y1, the embedding byte stream is: 
 The embedding bit stream is: 
 
Using n=1 for LSB Hiding, we get the following output: 
0 0 2 3 3 3 2 2 
0 0 1 2 3 2 1 0 
2 3 3 4 9 7 2 4 
3 2 4 5 6 6 8 6 
1 6 3 2 7 9 14 14 
0 2 15 11 9 15 14 14 
1 4 5 6 8 14 14 15 
2 0 6 7 9 11 11 15 
Output image S1. 
Replaced bits: 
1 12 2 10 
0001 1100 0010 1010 
0000 1010 1011 0111 
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Figure 41: Small scale example, module 6. 
 
Module 7: SCAN Compression 
Input: S1 
Output: S2 
Procedure: 
Step 1: Scanning and Prediction 
 
 Image S1 is partitioned into 4 blocks of equal size, 
 Each block is scanned with various SCAN paths where pixel values are predicted 
using different predictors along the SCAN paths. 
 Without loss of generality, assume that the SCAN paths O2 is the optimum SCAN 
path for prediction and SCAN bit encoding in all four blocks,  
 
 
SCAN path O2 
 Then the prediction errors are as follows: 
Given pixel s scanned right before p,  
if q and r are already scanned, then e = p – (q + r)/2, else e = p 
– s 
 
3 3 2 2 
3 2 1 0 
s=6 
0 2 1 2 
-6 -5 1 -2 
          
BR 
 
        BL 
                       
BL 
            
UL 
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9 7 2 4 
6 6 8 6 
 
0 0 2 3 
0 0 1 2 
2 3 3 4 
3 2 4 5 
 
1 6 3 2 
0 2 15 11 
1 4 5 6 
2 0 6 7 
 
7 9 14 14 
9 15 14 14 
8 14 14 15 
9 11 11 15 
 
3 1 -2 0 
0 0 4 -1 
s=3 
0 -1 0 1 
-2 -1 1 0 
-1 1 1 0 
0 -1 2 1 
s=0 
-2 4 -5 -9 
-1 0 13 1 
-2 4 -4 -1 
2 -2 4 1 
s=1 
-2 -5 0 0 
1 4 -1 0 
-3 3 0 1 
8 2 -1 4 
 
 
L1={0,  2, 1, 2, -6, -5, 1, -2, 3, 1, -2, 0, 0, 0, 4, -1}, Prediction Error E1=Σ L1= -2 
L2={0, -1, 0, 1, -2, -1, 1, 0, -1 1, 1, 0, 0, -1, 2, 1}, Prediction Error E2 = Σ L2= -8 
L3={-2, 4, -5, -9, -1, 0, 13, 1, -2, 4, -4, -1, 2, -2, 4, 1}, Prediction Error E3= 3 
L4={-2, -5, 0, 0, 1, 4, -1, 0, -3, 3, 0, 1, 8, 2, -1, 4}, Prediction Error E4=11 
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Output:  
E = E1 + E2 + E3 + E4 = 4. 
Sequence Lpof prediction errors = Append(L1, L2, L3, L4) = {0, 2, …, -1, 4} 
 
Step 2: SCAN Path Encoding 
Inputs: SCAN path P = C0 (O2 O2 O2 O2), Block size N=8. 
Procedure: 
For each SCAN path, the following is done. 
P is not a basic SCAN path, 
 Let P  = (O2 , O2, O2, O2) 
Q  = Append (1, Encode(O2,4), Encode(O2,4) Encode(O2,4), Encode(O2,4)) 
= Append (1, Append(code(O), code(2)) , Append(code(O), code(2)) , 
Append(code(O), code(2)) , Append(code(O), code(2))  ) 
= Append(1, Append(10,10) , Append(10,10) , Append(10,10) , 
Append(10,10) ) 
= Append(1, 1010, 1010, 1010, 1010) 
= 11010101010101010 (17 bits) 
 Therefore we get SCAN Path encoding Q, which is the output of step 2. 
 
Step 3: Context modeling. 
Given u and v as the first and second pixels which were 
scanned before p, and if q, r, s are already scanned, a = (|q – r| 
+ |r – s|)/2 else a = |u – v| 
Also b = 0 if 0  a  2, b = 1 if 3  a  8, b = 2 if 9  a  15, b 
= 3 if a  16  
Then, the B matrices for the four blocks are as follows: 
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3 3 2 2 
3 2 1 0 
9 7 2 4 
6 6 8 6 
 
0 0 2 3 
0 0 1 2 
2 3 3 4 
3 2 4 5 
 
1 6 3 2 
0 2 15 11 
1 4 5 6 
2 0 6 7 
 
7 9 14 14 
9 15 14 14 
8 14 14 15 
9 11 11 15 
 
 
0 0 0 1 
0 1 1 0 
0 0 1 1 
0 0 1 1 
u=3, v=3 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 
u=0, v=0 
1 2 1 1 
1 0 0 1 
1 0 1 0 
0 0 0 0 
u=1, v=6 
-2 -5 0 0 
1 4 -1 0 
-3 3 0 1 
8 2 -1 4 
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 Sequence Lc of contexts of errors = {0, 0, 0, 1, 0, 1, 1, 0, 0, 0, 1, 1, 0, 0, 1, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, 2, 1, 1, 1, 0, 0, 1, 1, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, -2, -5, 0, 0, 1, 4, -1, 
0, -3, 3, 0, 1, 8, 2, -1, 4} 
 
Step 4: Arithmetic Coding 
The prediction errors and contexts of errors of the whole image are encoded using 
Context Based Adaptive Arithmetic coding. 
Input: Sequence Lp of prediction errors and sequence Lc of contexts of errors. 
Output: R = {(Buffi, Ni) : 0  i  3} where Buffi is binary encoding of errors in             
context i and Ni is length of Buffi.. 
Procedure: For the sake of clarity, we will only look at how (Buff0, N0) is generated. 
- Given prediction errors of Block 0 = {0, 2, 1, 2, -6, -5, 1, -2, 3, 1, -2, 0, 0, 0, 4, -1} 
Symbol Frequency Probability Interval in [0,1) 
-6 1 1/16=0.0625 [0, 0.0625) 
-5 1 1/16=0.0625 [0.0625, 0.125) 
-2 2 2/16=0.1250 [0.1250,0.25) 
-1 1 1/16=0.0625 [0.25,0.3125) 
0 4 4/16=0.2500 [0.3125, 0.5625) 
1 3 3/16=0.1875 [0.5625, 0.75) 
2 2 2/16=0.1250 [0.75,0.875) 
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3 1 1/16=0.0625 [0.875,0.9375) 
4 1 1/16=0.0625 [0.9375,1.0) 
Total 16   
 
 
The initial interval I0 = [0,1), 
The first incoming symbol is 0 whose interval in the table above is [0.3125, 0.5625). 
 The new interval I1 = [0.3125, 0.5625), 
The next incoming symbol is 2 and its interval in the table is [0.75,0.875), 
 We take interval fraction [0.75,0.875) of I1 = [0.3125, 0.5625) to get interval I2 = 
[0.3125+0.75(0.5625-0.3125) , 0.3125+0.875(0.5625-0.3125) ) = [0.5000, 0.5469). 
The next incoming symbol is 1 and its interval in the table is [0.5625, 0.75), 
 We take interval fraction [0.5625, 0.75) of I2 = [0.5000, 0.5469) to get interval I3 
 We repeat the process for all 16 incoming symbols to get interval I16. 
Any number x in interval I16 is sufficient to be an encoding of prediction errors of 
block 0. Without loss of generality, let x be the lower limit of the interval I16. 
Finally, convert x into its binary equivalent to get the final binary encoding of 
prediction errors Buff0 of block 0. Let N0 be the length of Buff0.  
 
Repeat the process with all four blocks of prediction errors and all four blocks of 
contexts. 
 
Step 5: Compressed image generation 
Compressed image in the following format 
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Header SCAN path encoding Binary encoding of Lp Binary encoding of Lc 
 
where the header contains the width and height of the input image S1, the first two 
image S2 pixels which were scanned in the first block of the image, and the number 
of bits in the binary encoding of prediction errors in each of the four contexts. 
 
Figure 42: Small scale example, module 7. 
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Module 8: Stegano-Crypto Image Packing Module 
Input: Cover width, Byte count of the SCAN key file, Byte count of S2 image, Intensity 
Address Lookup Table, The SCAN key file content, The content of the replaced LSBs of 
the S0 image, The content of S2 image, The sequence of dummy bytes 
Output: Image S3 
Procedure: 
Image S3 = Append (Cover width, Byte count of the SCAN key file, Byte count of S2 
image, Intensity Address Lookup Table, The SCAN key file content, The content of the 
replaced LSBs of the S0 image, The content of S2 image, The sequence of dummy 
bytes). 
 
Module 9: SCAN Encryption Module. 
Input: Image S3 from Module 8 
Output: SCAN-encrypted Image S4 
Procedure: Similar to the previous SCAN Encryption module, module 8. 
 
The Reverse Engineering 
Procedure:  
 Extract S3 from module 8 (Image-packing module). 
 Extract tokens of S3 to get Cover image width, byte count of the SCAN key 
file, byte count of S2 image, Intensity Address Lookup Table, the SCAN key 
file content, the content of the replaced LSBs of the S0 image, the content 
of S2 image and the sequence of dummy bytes. 
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 Since we have access to the SCAN key, the original cover C0, final output 
image S4, we have a full cryptanalysis break of the entire system. Other 
additional information that we obtained could be used for verification and 
confirmation purposes. 
19. Experimental Results 
The following is a series of results from robustness testing and penetration testing 
experiments on the Stegano-Crypto methodology. 
19.1. Robustness testing 
One way to cryptanalyze or attack a methodology is to test it for its robustness to 
see if it behaves as expected. In so doing, we may be able to find security flaws and weak 
points where we could launch an attack. One way to test for the robustness of a 
methodology is to use extreme or unexpected inputs to see if the methodology would 
behave as expected. To test for the robustness of the Stegano-Crypto methodology, we 
use different variations of stego-image inputs consisting of uniform regions of intensities 
0 and 255 only. Inputs of images with relatively random regions and relatively random 
intensity distributions are expected, however images with relatively non-random regions 
and relatively non-random distributions are not expected. So, we use the unexpected 
inputs to test for the robustness. 
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Figure 43: Message-to-hide 128x128 image M0, 17 KB. 
 
To keep the experiment reliable and comparable among different tests, we use the 
same message-to-hide image M0 in all input samples for message-to-hide. All cover 
image samples will also have the same dimensions of 512x512. 
Table 21 is a summary of results of the Stegano-Crypto methodology‟s forward direction 
of information encryption and hiding and that of its corresponding reverse-engineering. 
Cover image cover C0 Stegano-Crypto Output Reverse Engineering- 
Extracted features 
 
 
Image1111 
 
No output, program 
terminates in module 5 
(SCAN Hiding Module) 
because the image has a 0 
hiding capacity. 
 
Not applicable, no output. 
 
 
Image0000 
 
No output, program 
terminates in module 5 
(SCAN Hiding Module) 
because the image has a 0 
hiding capacity. 
 
Not applicable, no output. 
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Image 0011 
No output, program 
terminates in module 5 
(SCAN Hiding Module) 
because the image has a 
relatively much smaller 
hiding capacity compared 
to bytes to hide. 
Not applicable, no output. 
 
 
Image1100 
No output, program 
terminates in module 5 
(SCAN Hiding Module) 
because the image has a 
relatively much smaller 
hiding capacity compared 
to bytes to hide. 
Not applicable, no output. 
 
 
Image0101 
No output, program 
terminates in module 5 
(SCAN Hiding Module) 
because the image has a 
relatively much smaller 
hiding capacity compared 
to bytes to hide. 
Not applicable, no output. 
 No output, program 
terminates in module 5 
Not applicable, no output. 
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Image1010 
(SCAN Hiding Module) 
because the image has a 
relatively much smaller 
hiding capacity compared 
to bytes to hide. 
 
 
Image0110 
No output, program 
terminates in module 5 
(SCAN Hiding Module) 
because the image has a 
relatively much smaller 
hiding capacity compared 
to bytes to hide. 
Not applicable, no output. 
 
 
Image1001 
No output, program 
terminates in module 5 
(SCAN Hiding Module) 
because the image has a 
relatively much smaller 
hiding capacity compared 
to bytes to hide. 
Not applicable, no output. 
 
 
No output, program 
terminates in module 5 
(SCAN Hiding Module) 
because the image has a 
Not applicable, no output. 
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Image0111 relatively much smaller 
hiding capacity compared 
to bytes to hide. 
 
 
Image1011 
No output, program 
terminates in module 5 
(SCAN Hiding Module) 
because the image has a 
relatively much smaller 
hiding capacity compared 
to bytes to hide. 
Not applicable, no output. 
 
 
Image1101 
No output, program 
terminates in module 5 
(SCAN Hiding Module) 
because the image has a 
relatively much smaller 
hiding capacity compared 
to bytes to hide. 
Not applicable, no output. 
 
 
Image1110 
No output, program 
terminates in module 5 
(SCAN Hiding Module) 
because the image has a 
relatively much smaller 
hiding capacity compared 
Not applicable, no output. 
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to bytes to hide. 
 
 
Image1000 
No output, program 
terminates in module 5 
(SCAN Hiding Module) 
because the image has a 
relatively much smaller 
hiding capacity compared 
to bytes to hide. 
Not applicable, no output. 
 
 
Image0100 
No output, program 
terminates in module 5 
because the image has a 
relatively much smaller 
hiding capacity compared 
to bytes to hide. 
Not applicable, no output. 
 
 
Image0010 
No output, program 
terminates in module 5 
because the image has a 
relatively much smaller 
hiding capacity compared 
to bytes to hide. 
Not applicable, no output. 
 No output, program 
terminates in module 5 
because the image has a 
Not applicable, no output. 
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Image0001 
relatively much smaller 
hiding capacity compared 
to bytes to hide. 
 
Table 21: A summary of results of the Stegano-Crypto methodology‟s forward direction 
of information encryption and hiding and that of its corresponding reverse-engineering. 
 
In all 16 tests, the Stegano-Crypto methodology terminated while on module 5 
(SCAN Hiding Module) because the images‟ intensities are so uniform that their hiding 
capacities are either 0 or close to 0. This implies that the robustness of the Stegano-
Crypto encoding scheme is not perfect. 
19.2. Penetration testing 
In the penetration testing experiments, we use the same rules as in the robustness 
testing experiments (i.e., same 128x128 message image M0 and dimensions 512x512 for 
the cover image C0) except that instead of using images of relatively uniform intensities, 
we use regular natural images. We specifically use the six natural images that we used in 
the experiments to demonstrate the working results of the Stegano-Crypto methodology. 
These images are three standard images of Lenna, green peppers and cameraman and 
three medical images. Note that the reverse engineering process also involves writing a 
small piece of code to extract individual attributes and tokens of image S3, which is the 
image output by the image-packing module, module 8. 
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Cover image cover C0 Stegano-Crypto Output Reverse Engineering- 
Extracted features/tokens 
 
 
 
 
 Cover width: 512 
 Byte count of the SCAN key 
file: 20 
 Byte count of S2 image: 
154143 
 Intensity Address Lookup 
Table (Contents truncated) 
 The SCAN key file content: 
 B2(r3 c1 d1 m0) 
 d3 
 The content of the replaced 
LSBs of the S0 image: 
(Contents truncated) 
 The content of S2 image: 
(Contents truncated) 
 The sequence of dummy 
bytes: 
(Contents truncated) 
 
 
 
 
 Cover width: 512 
 Byte count of the SCAN key 
file: 20 
 Byte count of S2 image: 
110747 
 Intensity Address Lookup 
Table (Contents truncated) 
 The SCAN key file content: 
 B2(r3 c1 d1 m0) 
 d3 
 The content of the replaced 
LSBs of the S0 image: 
(Contents truncated) 
 The content of S2 image: 
(Contents truncated) 
 The sequence of dummy 
bytes: 
(Contents truncated) 
  
 
 Cover width: 512 
 Byte count of the SCAN key 
file: 20 
 Byte count of S2 image: 
47411 
 Intensity Address Lookup 
Table (Contents truncated) 
 The SCAN key file content: 
 B2(r3 c1 d1 m0) 
 d3 
 The content of the replaced 
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LSBs of the S0 image: 
(Contents truncated) 
 The content of S2 image: 
(Contents truncated) 
 The sequence of dummy 
bytes: 
(Contents truncated) 
 
 
 
 
 Cover width: 512 
 Byte count of the SCAN key 
file: 20 
 Byte count of S2 image: 
102392 
 Intensity Address Lookup 
Table (Contents truncated) 
 The SCAN key file content: 
 B2(r3 c1 d1 m0) 
 d3 
 The content of the replaced 
LSBs of the S0 image: 
(Contents truncated) 
 The content of S2 image: 
(Contents truncated) 
 The sequence of dummy 
bytes: 
(Contents truncated) 
 
 
 
 
 Cover width: 512 
 Byte count of the SCAN key 
file: 20 
 Byte count of S2 image: 
103244 
 Intensity Address Lookup 
Table (Contents truncated) 
 The SCAN key file content: 
 B2(r3 c1 d1 m0) 
 d3 
 The content of the replaced 
LSBs of the S0 image: 
(Contents truncated) 
 The content of S2 image: 
(Contents truncated) 
 The sequence of dummy 
bytes: 
(Contents truncated) 
   Cover width: 512 
 Byte count of the SCAN key 
file: 20 
 Byte count of S2 image: 
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107310 
 Intensity Address Lookup 
Table (Contents truncated) 
 The SCAN key file content: 
 B2(r3 c1 d1 m0) 
 d3 
 The content of the replaced 
LSBs of the S0 image: 
(Contents truncated) 
 The content of S2 image: 
(Contents truncated) 
 The sequence of dummy 
bytes: 
(Contents truncated) 
Table 22: The results of six Penetration Testing experiments. 
 
Summary: 
In each of the six experiments above, we are able to get the SCAN key. Since we 
assume that we have the original cover image C0 and its corresponding output S4, the 
SCAN key we extract through reverse engineering is sufficient for a total break. Other 
extracted features could be used for verification and confirmation. Therefore, in all six 
penetration testing experiments, the reverse engineering process is successful. 
19.3. The final evaluation of the Effectiveness Index of the 
Encoding Stegano-Crypto Scheme and the evaluation of the 
Effectiveness Index of the Reverse Engineering Scheme 
In the above discussion, we saw that the robustness of the Stegano-Crypto 
encoding scheme is not perfect. This means that we need to accordingly modify the 
values of the robustness and reliability parameters in the Effective Index Equation 1. It 
can be recalled that their respective values were each a perfect 1.0. We therefore reduce 
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their values from 1.0 to 0.8 to get the following results and leaving other parameters 
unchanged since nothing else changed. Calculating the updated effectiveness index value 
of the encoding scheme gives a value of 80.4 (Table 23). 
As for the new reverse engineering scheme, the scheme was designed so as to 
optimally cover and satisfy all the parameters of interest involved in the effectiveness 
index formula. The entire discussion of Part 3 gives a full description of the reverse 
engineering scheme covering every parameter of interest. Until proven sub-optimal, each 
parameter is given a perfect value (Table 23). 
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Stegano-Crypto 
Encoding 
Scheme  
10  1.0  1.0  1.0  1.0  0.8  1.0  1.0  1.0  0.8  10  80.4  
Stegano-Crypto 
Reverse 
Engineering 
Scheme  
10  1.0  1.0  1.0  1.0  1.0  1.0  1.0  1.0  1.0  10  84.0  
Table 23: The evaluation of the effectiveness index of the Stegano-Crypto Encoding and 
Reverse Engineering Schemes. 
19.4. Part 3 Conclusion 
This steganalysis and cryptanalysis scheme is a solution on how to successfully 
attack the proposed stegano-crypto scheme. The image-packing module (module 8) of the 
stegano-crypto scheme was mathematically proven to be one of the weakest links of the 
system due to its security flaw of exposing secret crucial information such as the SCAN 
key. The proposed attack exploits this security flaw by extracting this crucial secret 
information through attacking the heap where the process‟ dynamically allocated 
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variables reside in the memory. The strategy is to extract the S3 image which is output by 
the image-packing module, module 8. 
20. Further Work 
Proving that the effectiveness index of the new Stegano-Crypto Reverse 
Engineering Scheme is not optimal is an open problem for further work. So far, out of all 
the parameters of interest, no parameter has been proven to be sub-optimally satisfied by 
the reverse engineering scheme. Further tests and experiments need to be conducted on 
the reverse engineering scheme, possibly using many other encoding schemes so as to 
have more samples for testing its success rate.  
21. Conclusion 
Security is an important issue related to the storage and communication of data 
and information. In data and information security, cryptography and steganography are 
two of the most common security techniques. A successful reverse engineering of 
cryptography and steganography give cryptanalysis and steganalysis respectively. This 
discussion presented three parts needed for a scientific study of a cryptanalysis problem. 
The first part laid out a comparative survey of various cryptology and steganology 
techniques by analyzing and comparing different methodologies using a set of predefined 
parameters. This part offers valuable knowledge on the state of the art techniques used on 
cryptanalysis. The second part proposed a new lossless synthetic stegano-crypto 
methodology that blends together five cryptography, steganography and compression 
techniques to form a single methodology for mutual information encryption and hiding in 
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images. The methods that compose the synthetic methodology are SCAN Encryption, 
SCAN Compression, SCAN Steganography, Least Significant Bit (LSB) Steganography 
and Regional Steganography with Segmentation. The Stegano-Crypto methodology plays 
the role of a complex and difficult technique that we have to work on in an attempt to 
break it by using a reverse engineering approach. In the third part, a successful 
cryptanalysis attack against the proposed synthetic stegano-crypto methodology was 
presented in order for the important features (weak points) related to the method to be 
extracted and assist in the reverse engineering process of encrypted information in 
images. For further work, new experiments need to be designed and conducted to test the 
success rate of the reverse engineering scheme as well as to test the effectiveness of the 
reverse engineering scheme. 
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22. Appendix 
Appendix A: The SCAN key files 
 
KEYFILE 
B2(r3 c1 d1 m0) 
d3 
 
CKEYFILE 
B2(x0 y5 s6 r3) 
c5 
 
LRFILE 
d0 
s0 
 
Appendix B: The message to hide file for medical image cover 
images 
The content of the file that represents the message to hide, message.txt 
Source: http://health.nytimes.com/health/guides/disease/cancer/overview.html 
 
Cancer is the uncontrolled growth of abnormal cells in the body. Cancerous cells are also called 
malignant cells. 
Times Essentials 
 
Recent findings and perspectives on medical research. 
Cancer Patients, Lost in a Maze of Uneven Care 
Six Killers | Cancer 
Cancer Patients, Lost in a Maze of Uneven Care 
By DENISE GRADY 
 
Treating cancer can be very complicated, and it is difficult for even the most educated patients 
to be sure they have the best care. 
See All » News & Features 
 
    * Medicare Blow to Virtual Colonoscopies 
    * Bone Drugs May Help Fight Breast Cancer 
    * Regimens: Multivitamins Not Found to Reduce Risks 
    * Medicare and ‘Off-Label’ Cancer Drugs 
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Reference from A.D.A.M. 
Alternative Names 
 
Carcinoma; Malignant tumor 
Back to TopCauses 
 
Cells are the building blocks of living things. Cancer grows out of normal cells in the body. 
Normal cells multiply when the body needs them, and die when the body doesn't need them. 
Cancer appears to occur when the growth of cells in the body is out of control and cells divide 
too quickly. It can also occur when cells “forget” how to die. 
 
There are many different kinds of cancers. Cancer can develop in almost any organ or tissue, 
such as the lung, colon, breast, skin, bones, or nerve tissue. 
 
There are many causes of cancers, including: 
 
    * Benzene and other chemicals 
    * Certain poisonous mushrooms and a type of poison that can grow on peanut plants 
(aflatoxins) 
    * Certain viruses 
    * Radiation 
    * Sunlight 
    * Tobacco 
 
However, the cause of many cancers remains unknown. 
 
The most common cause of cancer-related death is lung cancer. 
 
The three most common cancers in men in the United States are: 
 
    * Prostate cancer 
    * Lung cancer 
    * Colon cancer 
 
In women in the U.S., the three most common cancers are: 
 
    * Breast cancer 
    * Colon cancer 
    * Lung cancer 
 
Some cancers are more common in certain parts of the world. For example, in Japan, there are 
many cases of gastric cancer, but in the U.S. this type of cancer is pretty rare. Differences in diet 
may play a role. 
 
Some other types of cancers include: 
 
    * Brain cancer 
    * Cervical cancer 
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    * Hodgkin's lymphoma 
    * Kidney cancer 
    * Leukemia 
    * Liver cancer 
    * Non-Hodgkin's lymphoma 
    * Ovarian cancer 
    * Skin cancer 
    * Testicular cancer 
    * Thyroid cancer 
    * Uterine cancer 
 
Back to TopSymptoms 
 
Symptoms of cancer depend on the type and location of the tumor. For example, lung cancer 
can cause coughing, shortness of breath, or chest pain. Colon cancer often causes diarrhea, 
constipation, and blood in the stool. 
 
Some cancers may not have any symptoms at all. In certain cancers, such as gallbladder cancer, 
symptoms often do not start until the disease has reached an advanced stage. 
 
The following symptoms can occur with most cancers: 
 
    * Chills 
    * Fatigue 
    * Fever 
    * Loss of appetite 
    * Malaise 
    * Night sweats 
    * Weight loss 
 
Back to TopExams and Tests 
 
Like symptoms, the signs of cancer vary based on the type and location of the tumor. Common 
tests include the following: 
 
    * Biopsy of the tumor 
    * Blood chemistries 
    * Bone marrow biopsy (for lymphoma or leukemia) 
    * Chest x-ray 
    * Complete blood count (CBC) 
    * CT scan 
 
Most cancers are diagnosed by biopsy. Depending on the location of the tumor, the biopsy may 
be a simple procedure or a serious operation. Most patients with cancer have CT scans to 
determine the exact location and size of the tumor or tumors. 
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A cancer diagnosis is difficult to cope with. It is important, however, that you discuss the type, 
size, and location of the cancer with your doctor when you are diagnosed. You also will want to 
ask about treatment options, along with their benefits and risks. 
 
It's a good idea to have someone with you at the doctor's office to help you get through the 
diagnosis. If you have trouble asking questions after hearing about your diagnosis, the person 
you bring with you can ask them for you. 
Back to TopTreatment 
 
Treatment also varies based on the type of cancer and its stage. The stage of a cancer refers to 
how much it has grown and whether the tumor has spread from its original location. 
 
    * If the cancer is confined to one location and has not spread, the most common goals for 
treatment are surgery and cure. This is often the case with skin cancers, as well as cancers of the 
lung, breast, and colon. 
    * If the tumor has spread to local lymph nodes only, sometimes these can also be removed. 
    * If surgery cannot remove all of the cancer, the options for treatment include radiation, 
chemotherapy, or both. Some cancers require a combination of surgery, radiation, and 
chemotherapy. 
 
Although treatment for cancer can be difficult, there are many ways to keep up your strength. 
 
If you have radiation treatment, know that: 
 
    * Radiation treatment is painless. 
    * Treatment is usually scheduled every weekday. 
    * You should allow 30 minutes for each treatment session, although the treatment itself 
usually takes only a few minutes. 
    * You should get plenty of rest and eat a well-balanced diet during the course of your 
radiation therapy. 
    * Skin in the treated area may become sensitive and easily irritated. 
    * Side effects of radiation treatment are usually temporary. They vary depending on the area 
of the body that is being treated. 
 
If you are going through chemotherapy, you should eat right. Chemotherapy causes your 
immune system to weaken, so you should avoid people with colds or the flu. You should also get 
plenty of rest, and don't feel as though you have to accomplish tasks all at once. 
 
It will help you to talk with family, friends, or a support group about your feelings. Work with 
your health care providers throughout your treatment. Helping yourself can make you feel more 
in control. 
Back to TopSupport Groups 
 
A cancer diagnosis often causes a lot of anxiety and can affect your entire quality of life. Several 
support groups for cancer patients can help you cope. 
Back to TopOutlook (Prognosis) 
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The outlook depends on the type of cancer. Even among people with one type of cancer, the 
outcome varies depending on the stage of the tumor when they are diagnosed. 
 
Some cancers can be cured. Some cancers that are not curable can still be treated well. And 
some patients can live for many years with their cancer. Other tumors are quickly life-
threatening. 
Back to TopPossible Complications 
 
One complication is that the cancer may spread. Other complications vary with the type and 
stage of the tumor. 
Back to TopWhen to Contact a Medical Professional 
 
Contact your health care provider if you develop symptoms of cancer. 
Back to TopPrevention 
 
One of the best ways to prevent cancer is to not smoke or chew tobacco. Many cancers can be 
prevented by avoiding risk factors such as excessive exposure to sunlight and heavy drinking. 
 
Cancer screenings, such as mammography and breast examination for breast cancer and 
colonoscopy for colon cancer, may help catch these cancers at their early stages when they are 
most treatable. Some people at high risk for developing certain cancers can take medication to 
reduce their risk. 
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